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I. INTRODUCTION
The role of the "state of the art"'I in strict products liability2
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
1. This Article uses the term "state of the art" to refer to several discrete
concepts. After defining these concepts in the Introduction, the substantive
portion of this Article explores the evidentiary value of different versions of the
state of the art in the context of strict products liability. This Article does not
discuss state of the art in negligence cases, except when it is necessary to cast
light on similar problems in strict liability.
2. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a manu-
facturer will be held strictly liable if its product is "in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property."
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is attended by manifold confusion. The term has been impre-
cisely defined, and has been appropriated to describe a number
of disparate concepts. Few courts adequately distinguish be-
tween use of state of the art concepts in strict liability and in
negligence, or articulate why the state of the art may or may
not constitute an affrative defense to a strict products liabil-
ity claim. In addition, many courts fail to explain the circum-
stances in which state of the art evidence is admissible, and
generally misconceive the relationship between state of the art
evidence and a plaintiff's prima facie case.
An initial cause of confusion is that courts and commenta-
tors attach a variety of meanings to the term "state of the art."
At least six discrete uses of the term appear in court opinions
and critical literature.
One common usage of the state of the art refers to the cus-
tomary practices in an industry.3 These practices may simply
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Under this standard, the
plaintiff is not required to show that the manufacturer's negligence caused the
unreasonably dangerous quality or condition. The plaintiff must demonstrate
merely that the defect existed. A defective product may result from flaws in
manufacture or design, or from the absence or inadequacy of a warning accom-
panying the product. Manufacturing defects result from the faulty production
of an individual item. The design of the product is adequate, but failure to fol-
low the adequate design leads to the production of defective samples, so that
the finished product does not comport with the manufacturer's own design
standards. Typically, the focus of the case is on the manufacturing process,
and state of the art arguments concern .the potential for improvement of that
process. Design defects involve a line of articles that are hazardous even when
produced exactly as intended. The focus of design defect cases, and of prof-
fered state of the art evidence, is on the ability of the manufacturer to make the
product safer. It has sometimes been said that while manufacturing flaws are
inadvertent, design defects are intended. See Phillips, The Standard for Deter-
mining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 CIN. L. REV. 101, 103 n.6 (1977);
Comment, Foreseeability in Product Design and Duty to Warn Cases, 1968 WIs.
L. REV. 228, 231. In an inadequate warning case, the plaintiff does not claim
that the individual product was flawed or that the entire product line was inad-
equately designed; rather, the plaintiff maintains that the manufacturer failed
to warn consumers of the hazards of the product, or to instruct them ade-
quately so they could use the product without injury. The focus in warning
cases, including state of the art evidence, is on whether the manufacturer could
have anticipated and avoided the injurious chain of events by providing a
warning.
3. See, e.g., Raney v. Honeywell, 540 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1976); Wallner v.
Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969); Olsen v. United States,
521 F. Supp. 59, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359,
551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976); Korli v. Ford Motor Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 115,
137 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1977); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 IMl. App. 3d 604, 295
N.E.2d 110 (1973); Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 M App. 2d 133, 237
N.E.2d 759 (1968); Williams v. Brown, 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (1968);
Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956); Thibault v.
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Bexiga v. Havir, 114
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be "custom" in its everyday sense, i.e., standard conduct that
has developed over the years, or they may be embodied in for-
mal industry standards. In either case, the defendant wishes to
show that its conduct conformed to standard practices which it
claims constitute the state of the art.
Governmental standards may also reflect the state of the
art.4 The debate centers upon whether evidence of conform-
ance with governmental standards should be a complete de-
fense,5 prima facie evidence that a conforming product is not
defective,6 or simply evidence which the jury may accept or re-
ject.7 If compliance with governmental standards constitutes a
complete defense or prima facie evidence of nondefectiveness,
it qualifies as a separate usage of the state of the art. On the
other hand, if it merely represents evidence which the jury may
accept or reject, compliance with governmental regulations
merges with other uses of the term.
The state of the art may also refer to the aggregate of prod-
uct-related technical and scientific knowledge existing at any
given time, in the industry itself, and in related fields of in-
quiry.8 The defendant invokes this usage of the state of the art
when it argues that it was impossible to make the product
safer, given the knowledge or technology available at the time
of the product's manufacture. One can distinguish three kinds
of developmental limitations relating to this usage of the state
of the art: (1) limitations resulting from the undiscoverability
N.J. Super. 397, 276 A.2d 590 (1971), rev'd, 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. v. Gonzales, 562 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514
S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). See also Collins v. Rich Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591,
596 (7th Cir. 1975); Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851, 862 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ward v. Hobbart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176,
1185 (5th Cir. 1971); Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide, 422 F.2d 1205, 1216 (3d
Cir.), cerL denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Hall v. E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,
345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
4. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 670 (6th
Cir. 1972); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 540, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 605, 609 (1976); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. Ct.
479, 484, 281 A.2d 707, 710 (1971).
5. See, e.g., In re."Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp.
1046, 1055-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). See also Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Prod-
ucts Liability: A New Look at an Old Defense, 4 OHio N.U.L. REV. 249, 258
(1977).
6. See Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 634, 549 P.2d 1383, 1390
(1976).
7. See Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 437, 396 N.E.2d 534, 537
(1979).
8. See L FRumER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LrmnnrY § 6.05(15), at 104.38
(1980).
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in a given product of a generally known product hazard,9
(2) limitations resulting from the unknowability of the hazard
that produced the plaintiff's injury1O and (3) limitations result-
ing from the technological inability to implement an alternative
product design." These three developmental limitations tend
to arise in different types of products liability cases, and each
raises distinct issues of analysis and policy.
9. A defendant who asserts that a risk was undiscoverable concedes that
the product carried a known risk of defect, but claims that the scientific or tech-
nological capability did not exist to discover which product samples were af-
fected. See James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some
Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALm'. I. REV. 1550, 1557 (1966). See gen-
erally Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Torts, 35 Sw. LJ. 1, 15 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Keeton, Torts]; Keeton, Products Liability - Drugs and
Cosmetics, 25 VAuND. L. REV. 131 (1972); Keeton, Some Observations about the
Strict Liability of the Maker of Prescription Drugs: The Aftermath of MER/29,
56 CAuI. L. REV. 149 (1968). The paradigm cases involve plaintiffs who have
contracted hepatitis following blood transfusions. In these cases, the risk of
contaminated blood samples was known to the supplier, but until very recently
nothing the supplier could do would protect against it. See Russell v. Commu-
nity Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47111. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Brody v. Overlook
Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972).
10. The unknowable risk is one that cannot be anticipated, even statisti-
cally. A prime example is the innocent-appearing drug whose harmful effects
take years to surface. Unknowable risks can arise in connection with drugs or
any other product that must interact with a living organism. It is often impossi-
ble to know how a living organism will react to a foreign substance until the
product is tested upon plants, animals, and humans. For example, millions of
women used the drug DES (diethylstilbestrol) to prevent miscarriages before
use of the drug was linked to vaginal and cervical cancer in prenatally exposed
daughters of DES users. See Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the
DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REV. 668, 668-69 (1981). The problem of
unknowable risks is particularly acute in the case of humans because of the
difficulties in testing the product. The unknowable risk is similar to the undis-
coverable risk in that neither may be discovered despite the use of all available
scientific and technological knowledge. An unknowable risk differs from an un-
discoverable one, however, in that even the existence of an unknowable risk is
not known before an injury actually occurs.
11. The defendant may argue that existing technology was not available to
improve product design, so that improvement was a technological impossibility.
See Olson v. Arctic Enterprises Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761, 763 (D.N.D. 1972); Lunt v.
Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970); Badorek v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 925, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 328 (1970); E.R. Squibb &
Sons Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1973); Stanfield v. Medalist Industries,
Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 635, .639, 340 N.E.2d 276, 280 (1975). State of the art evidence
of this variety is usually found in defective design cases. The defendant argues
that it was technologically impossible to design a safer product or to implement
certain safety features; it asserts that everything technologically possible was
done to make the product safe. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that a
safer product was technologically possible, and that the manufacturer had a
duty to produce such a product. Neither focuses primarily on what other man-
ufacturers were doing, which distinguishes this concept of state of the art from
the "customary practices" type described above.
[Vol. 67:343
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The final use of the state of the art involves the practicality
or feasibility of a design, manufacturing method, or warning.12
The plaintiff alleges that the design, manufacturing process, or
warning is unreasonably dangerous, and offers an alternative
that the plaintiff claims the defendant should have adopted.
Frequently, the defendant must concede that the plaintiff's al-
ternative design was technically possible, but argues that the
alternative is not feasible because it would inordinately in-
crease the product's cost, diminish its utility, or introduce other
serious hazards. The defendant seeks to establish what is rea-
sonably possible, technically and economically, to reduce a risk
or hazard.13
Although each version of the state of the art described
above presents distinct evidentiary problems in strict products
liability cases, a common problem is each concept's status vis-
a-vis negligence doctrine. Prior to the advent of strict liability,
state of the art evidence was employed exclusively in negli-
gence cases, commonly for the purpose of determining whether
a defendant's conduct was reasonable.14 In strict products lia-
bility, however, the defendant's conduct theoretically is not an
issue. The plaintiff need not prove that the defendant was neg-
ligent, but only that the product was "defective." Conse-
quently, the defendant cannot avoid liability simply by proving
the exercise of due care.15 Initially, therefore, one might sense
that because the state of the art commonly is related to the
negligence concept of reasonableness, evidence of the state of
the art would be irrelevant in strict products liability cases.
Nonetheless, strict liability theory rests upon interpretations of
"reasonabless" that sometimes ought to permit admission of
12. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng. Co. Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443,
455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978); Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d
971, 983, 326 N.E.2d 74, 86 (1975); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 11. App.
3d 313, 315, 281 N.E.2d 749, 752 (1972); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 461, 525
P.2d 125, 129 (1974). See also Amason v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 265 (5th Cir.
1935); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971); Draft Uni-
form Product Liability Law § 106(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 2998 (1979). See also Keeton,
Torts, supra note 9, at 14.
13. Feasibility evidence is difficult to rationalize with strict products liabil-
ity, because it is almost impossible to evaluate feasibility without reference to
reasonableness, a concept which attenuates the "strictness" of strict liability
and parallels negligence doctrine. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors..Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968) (defendant must design product as safe as is rea-
sonably possible according to general negligence principles).
14. See 2 L. FF.UmER & M. FIEDMAN, supra note 8, § 16A[4] [i]; Robb, A
Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Liability Cases,
77 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1982).
15. See supra note 2.
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state of the art evidence.16 This tension between negligence
and strict liaiblity theories continues to act as a source of con-
fusion and provides difficulties in analytical treatment.
In addition to its relationship to negligence principles, the
state of the art raises questions regarding its relationship to a
plaintiff's prima facie case. One potential relationship is that
evidence of the state of the art may be offered as a general de-
fense such that, if it is established, the plaintiff cannot recover.
The other potential relationship between the plaintiffs case
and the defendant's reliance on state of the art evidence is that
the evidence may be merely relevant to some element of the
plaintiff's case. 17 For example, the defendant may proffer evi-
dence on the state of the art to negate the existence of a defect.
The problem in this context is to formulate a rationale for ad-
mitting state of the art evidence that does not introduce negli-
gence as an issue, or a rationale for excluding the evidence that
does not make the manufacturer an insurer of its product.
A court's treatment of a defendant who proffers state of the
art evidence will also depend to some extent on the court's
view of the policies underlying strict liability theory. Two ratio-
nales, loss spreading and accident minimization, are most often
adduced for holding the defendant liable for the plaintiff's in-
jury without negligent conduct on the defendant's part.18 Loss
16. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimvwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 498, 525 P.2d 1033,
1039 (1974). But see Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-34, 501 P.2d
1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
17. Assuming that state of the art evidence is admissible, a court must de-
cide at which point in historical time to assess the state of the art. The issue is
usually narrowed to whether state of the art evidence should be viewed as of
the date of manufacture, the date of injury, or the date of trial. See, e.g., Bruce
v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976). Compare Dean v.
General Motors, 301 F. Supp. 187, 192 (E.D. La. 1969) (state of the art assessed
at the time of manufacture, focusing on the reasonable conduct of the manufac-
turer) with Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978) (state of the art assessed at the time of trial; trier
of fact using hindsight to evaluate safety of design).
18. See Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Man-
ufacture, 52 Tax. L. REv. 81, 82-83 (1973). Two related arguments for strict lia-
bility are enterprise liability and implied representation. Enterprise liability
originates from the theory that a product's market price ought to include the
costs of accidents caused by defects in the product. Because higher prices for
riskier products will shift consumer demand to lower cost, safer substitutes,
the overall accident costs to society will be reduced. See Klernme, The Enter-
prise Liability Theory bf Torts, 47 U. COLo. L. REV. 153, 158 (1976). The implied
representation rationale for strict liability extends warranty doctrine. It rests
upon the assumption that a manufacturer, by placing its goods in commerce,
implicitly represents that the product is safe, and that consumers ought to be
compensated for the disappointment of their reasonable expectations when
they are harmed by unsafe products. See Shapo, A Representational Theory of
f[Vol. 67:343
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spreading means that the cost of compensation is dispersed
throughout society, reallocating the financial burden that would
otherwise be borne by a single accident victim.' 9 The defend-
ant manufacturer is said to be in a better position to spread the
loss, either throughout the industry, by purchasing insurance,
or throughout the marketplace, by increasing its prices. Acci-
dent minimization, the other primary rationale for strict liabil-
ity, means that manufacturers are more able than consumers to
identify potential product risks and to confine the risks to ac-
ceptable levels.2 0 The pressure of strict liability is thought to
encourage manufacturers to expend the resources necessary to
reduce the risk and thus minimize accidents. A court that sub-
scribes to loss spreading as the principal rationale for strict lia-
bility will be relatively uncongenial to state of the art evidence
in any form, because if such evidence permits the defendant to
avoid liability, the rationale is subverted. Accident minimiza-
tion, on the other hand, justifies the use of some varieties of
state of the art evidence in certain kinds of cases, although not
all.
This Article establishes a conceptual framework for apply-
ing different versions of the state of the art to products liability.
The Article does not provide an exhaustive treatment of all the
issues implicated in each use of the state of the art. Its task is
the more modest one of considering each version of the state of
the art in the context of the three categories of products liabil-
ity claims-manufacturing defect, design defect, and inade-
quate warning-to determine (1) whether evidence relating to
the state of the art should be admissible, and (2) if admissible,
whether the state of the art should constitute an affirmative de-
fense. This analysis proceeds from an evaluation of arguments
advanced in cases and commentaries and from an assessment
of the policies underlying strict products liability. It is hoped
that the conceptual framework posited in this Article will sug-
gest solutions to some of the troublesome problems encoun-
tered in relating the different definitions of the state of the art
to products liability.
Consumer Protection" Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Dis-
appointment; 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
19. See Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178
(1970).
20. See Montgomery & Owen, Reflections of the Theory and Administration
of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L REv. 803, 809-10 (1976).
1982]
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II. CUSTOMARY INDUSTRY PRACTICES
The state of the art is often defined in terms of the prevail-
ing norms within an industry.2 ' This use of the state of the art
provides a useful starting point in the analysis of product de-
fect cases, because it establishes a touchstone for comparing
expectations for similar products and for evaluating the com-
mercial context in which the product was manufactured.
A. MANUFACTURING DEFECTS
A product containing a manufacturing defect obviously
does not meet any industry standard for the completed prod-
uct. In fact, a flawed product does not meet the manufacturer's
own design standard; the product deviates from other products
manufactured according to identical specifications. Proving
this is precisely the plaintiffs burden.
If its specifications are reasonable, the defendant must
somehow relate industry customs and standards to the plain-
tiffs claim that the defect occurred during production. The evi-
dence usually consists of a demonstration that the defendant's
production methods, although not perfect, followed those used
in the industry as a whole.
A threshold question in relating the defendant's evidence
of compliance with customary industry practices to the plain-
tiff's claim is whether such evidence should be admissible at all
in a strict products liability action. One argument against ad-
missibility focuses on the distinction between the manufac-
turer's conduct and the defectiveness of the product. While
negligence relates to the conduct of the manufacturer, the argu-
ment runs, strict liability only examines the product itself.2 2
For example, Dean Green has stated:
The violation of the seller's duty involves only a specific product-the
thing. Its measurement has no similarity to the measurement of the
conduct of the defendant in a negligence case by the conduct of the or-
dinary prudent man. In products liability, the measure is the danger-
ously defective quality of the specific product in the litigation-not the
average of products of the same kind.2 3
21. See cases cited supra note 3. Defining the relevant "industry" for a
given manufacturer, of course, may be a source of considerable dispute.
22. See generally W. KvmLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIAABLrTY § 155, at 179
(1979). '"The care taken by the supplier of a product in its preparation, manu-
facture, or sale, is not a consideration in strict liability ... ." Gonzales v. Cat-
erpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. 1978).
23. Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Liti-
gation, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1185, 1210 (1976) (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 67:343
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The argument continues that custom evidence, being evidence
of a manufacturer's conduct, is inadmissible.
This approach is not particularly compelling. It suggests an
artificial distinction between conduct and the results of con-
duct. The manufacturer's conduct produces the product; to
criticize the product is to criticize the conduct. To judge the re-
sulting product intelligently, one must know how and why the
manufacturer designed and produced the product as it did.
A position similar to that of Dean Green's is suggested by
the portion of the Restatement 24 which states that the rule of
strict liability applies although "the seller has exercised all pos-
sible care in the preparation and sale of his product .... ,25
Because evidence of compliance with industry standards or
customs is essentially evidence of due care, and due care does
not relieve a manufacturer of liability, the argument concludes
such evidence is irrelevant.26 Moreover, one may argue that ad-
mission of due care evidence in the form of industry customs
would signal a return to a negligence standard and defeat gains
that have been made in the area of strict liability.27 This argu-
ment, although preferable to the conduct/product distinction, is
also flawed. Although the argument relies upon the Restate-
ment, it is not really supported by the Restatement, which indi-
cates only that the use of due care is not a defense to strict
liability.28 The Restatement does not say that evidence of due
care is inadmissible. Arguments for and against admissibility
must be sought elsewhere.
Negligence would be reintroduced to products liability
cases if prevailing industry standards, offered to show due care,
constituted an affirmative defense. Due care is not the only is-
sue in a products liability case to which evidence of industry
custom is germane, however. Admission of such evidence on
certain other issues would not signal a return to negligence. In
particular, evidence of compliance with custom and industry
standards is relevant and should be admitted in manufacturing
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
25. Id.
26. Dean Prosser has stated that "[s]trict liability has eliminated any
question of negligence, and in the ordinary case has made evidence of the de-
fendant's due care immaterial." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 672
(4th ed. 1971).
27. See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 467, 266
N.E.2d 897, 902 (1970). See also Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in
Products Liability, 69 CALF. L. REV. 919, 930-31 (1981); Robb, supra note 14, at
14-15.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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defects cases on the issue of whether a defect existed at all,29
or the time a defect came into existence. 30
An effort to use evidence of standard industry practices to
disprove the existence of a defect is illustrated by the seminal
case of Pulley v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co.31 The plaintiff
in Pulley brought an action for breach of implied warranty, al-
leging that she became ill after she noticed a cigarette and
floating bits of loose tobacco in a bottle of Coca-Cola she had
been drinking. No one else witnessed the opening of the bottle
or the discovery of the cigarette. The defendant sought to offer
evidence of its standard processing and bottling methods to es-
tablish that it was unlikely for a cigarette to find its way into
the bottle before the plaintiff opened it. The trial court ex-
cluded this testimony. On review, the Washington Supreme
Court recognized that one effect of the excluded testimony
would be to impeach the plaintiff's testimony that the defect
existed, but excluded the proffered evidence on the ground that
it was "collateral."32 The court held that because the defend-
ant's proffered testimony was only evidence of due care and
"was not directly refutative of the plaintiffs relation of the inci-
dent involved,"33 it was inadmissible.
The Pulley court's reasoning is questionable because it
characterized the defendant's evidence only as evidence of due
care, and failed to recognize that the defendant's proffered evi-
dence of its standard bottling practices, while of admittedly
slight probative value, may be relevant to the substantive issue
29. See W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 22, § 155, at 179-80; Bernstein,
Evidence of Producer's Care in a Products Liability Action, 25 VAND. I REv.
513, 518-19 (1972); Keeton, Torts, supra note 9, at 10.
30. See Bernstein, supra note 29, at 519. Of course, for the evidence to be
relevant to the issue whether a defect existed at the time of manufacture, the
evidence must relate to the prevailing industry practices at the time the alleg-
edly defective item was manufactured. Ascertaining the precise date of manu-
facture for some products may be difficult, but it is obvious that evidence of
customary industry practices is of no help to the defendant unless it followed
the practices at the time it made the offending item.
Problems in ascertaining the date of manufacture are compounded when
features of the product are installed by several parties at different times. One
court held that evidence of industry standards or trade customs was admissible
to determine when a particular feature is generally installed, even though the
evidence was inappropriate as a determinant of the reasonableness of defend-
ant's conduct because the action was in strict liability. Christner v. E.W. Bliss
Co., 524 F. Supp. 1122, 1125-26 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
31. 68 Wash. 2d 778, 415 P.2d 636 (1966).
32. Id. at 784, 415 P.2d at 640.
33. Id. The court's holding effectively precludes any showing of indirect or
circumstantial evidence to refute a plaintiff's mere assertion of harm from a
contaminant in food or drink. See id.
[Vol. 67:343
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of the existence of the defect. Although the general rule is that
a party may not contradict previous testimony with evidence of
collateral facts,3 4 evidence is not collateral when it relates to
facts "which would have been independently provable regard-
less of the contradiction" of previous testimony.3 5 The court
apparently assumed that, although the defendant's quality con-
trol evidence would tend to undercut the plaintiff's story,3 6 the
evidence did not relate independently to the material issue of
defectiveness. Because the evidence was only of "due care,"37
it was "collateral" in the court's view and thus not admissible
to impeach the plaintiff's testimony.38
The court's analysis would be correct if the evidence was,
in fact, appropriately labeled "collateral." This assumption,
however, is mistaken.39 As long as the evidence is not offered
to prove a collateral fact, it is admissible, even if the evidence
has the dual aspect of reflecting on the plaintiff's credibility. In
Pulley, evidence of the defendant's standard bottling practices
was directly relevant to the substantive issue of "defective-
ness," because it tended to reduce the possibility that the
plaintiffs bottle was contaminated by a cigarette. Admittedly,
the probative value of the evidence is minimal. Nonetheless,
under the facts in Pulley, one would be hard pressed to argue
that a juror who received evidence that Coca-Cola's quality
control efficiency was 99.9 percent would be less likely to con-
34. See C. McCoRMICK, THE LAw oF EVIDENCE § 47, at 98 (2d ed. 1972).
35. Id. McCormick suggests two kinds of facts which meet the test for be-
ing "noncollateral": (1) "facts that are relevant to the substantive issues in the
case," which may have the "dual aspect of relevant proof and of reflecting on
the credibility of contrary witnesses"; and (2) facts that are "independently
provable by extrinsic evidence, apart from the contradiction, to impeach or dis-
qualify the witness," such as facts showing bias, interest, criminal convictions,
or incapacity. Id., § 47, at 99. In Pulley, the defendant's evidence of its stan-
dard bottling practices would be relevant to a substantive issue in the case, the
existence or nonexistence of the foreign object, and thus admissible as noncol-
lateral evidence under McCormick's test. See infra text accompanying notes
39-41.
36. 68 Wash. 2d at 783, 415 P.2d at 639.
37. Id. at 783, 415 P.2d at 640.
38. Id. at 784, 415 P.2d at 640.
39. See supra note 35. Professor Bernstein, in his criticism of the Pulley
case, correctly observes that "whether evidence is collateral is determined by
its relation to the issues of the case, and not by its characterization as direct or
circumstantial." Bernstein, supra note 29, at 515. Bernstein, however, goes on
to describe incorrectly the significance of labeling evidence as "collateral." He
asserts that "whether due care evidence is characterized as 'collateral' would
not affect its admissibility." I& at 515 n.18. Collateral evidence is generally
inadmissible. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 34, § 47, at 97-100. The mistake in
Pulley, however, was in characterizing the evidence as "collateral" in the first
place.
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clude there was a foreign object in the bottle than if the effi-
ciency rating was 80.0 percent.40 Although such evidence may
not have sufficient probative value to forestall a directed ver-
dict for the plaintiff, this does not mean that the evidence is
irrelevant.4 1
In addition to the issue of whether a defect existed, evi-
dence of a prevailing practice is relevant to the issue of when
the product became defective. A manufacturer may concede
the existence of the defect, but maintain that the defect ap-
peared after the product left the manufacturer's control. Con-
taminated soft drink cases illustrate how evidence of custom
might be relevant to the issue of when the defect occurred. The
contaminant, a cigarette, roach or mouse, undeniably is present
in the bottle. Perhaps, unlike the plaintiff in Pulley, the plain-
tiff opened the bottle at a party, and twenty people will swear
the contaminant was in the drink by the time the bottle came
into the plaintiff's possession. Nevertheless, the defendant bot-
tler might contend that someone tampered with the container
after it left the plant.42 Evidence of standard industry practices
may support this contention by demonstrating that the contam-
inant could not have gotten into the bottle at the plant.43 Simi-
larly, in a brake failure case, the defendant manufacturer may
want to show that the brakes were damaged as a result of the
accident, rather than before the mishap. Evidence of prevailing
practices would strengthen this contention by demonstrating
the improbability of a defect being introduced in the manufac-
turing process. This use of evidence of custom is readily distin-
guishable from its use as due care evidence. Moreover, even if
40. "[T]he most acceptable test of relevancy is the question, does the evi-
dence offered render the desired inference more probable than it would be
without the evidence?" C. McCovCK, supra note 34, § 185, at 437 (emphasis in
original).
41. The test of relevancy, which is to be applied by the trial judge in
determining whether a particular item or group of items of evidence is
to be admitted is a different and less stringent one than the standard
used at a later stage in deciding whether all the evidence of the party
on an issue is sufficient to permit the issue to go to the jury.
Id. at 436.
42. See, e.g., Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d
1094 (1957); Harris v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.. of Chicago, 35 Il. App., 2d 406, 183
N.E.2d 56 (1962); Strawn v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Mo., 234 S.W.2d 223 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1950).
43. Bernstein observes that the probability that the product became defec-
tive after it left the defendant's control will depend on (1) the nature of the
product, (2) the manner in which the product was distributed, and (3) the
other possible occurrences which may have affected the product in the inter-
mittent period. Bernstein, supra note 29, at 520.
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evidence offered to establish circumstantially the absence of a
defect is characterized as "due care" evidence, such a use is
supported by a comment in the Uniform Commercial Code,
which states that evidence of due care in manufacturing goods
"is relevant to the issue of whether [a] warranty was in fact
broken."4 4 This statement means that evidence of due care in
the manufacturing process, established by reference to indus-
try custom, is relevant to the issue of whether the product was
in fact defective at the time of delivery.4 5
Despite the arguments in favor of admitting evidence of
prevailing industry practices on the issue of defectiveness,
such evidence can never be conclusive. If evidence of custom
was conclusive, there would be a complete return to negligence
standards and a complete effacement of strict liability. Evi-
dence of custom has the same quality as any other evidence,
and can be given as much or as little weight as a jury desires.
The burden of production of the evidence should be on the
party who intends to rely on it, so that no inference of compli-
ance or noncompliance with the prevailing practice is made un-
less a party produces evidence on the issue.
B. DESIGN DEFECTS
Many of the arguments raised against admitting evidence
of customary industry practices in design defect cases reflect
those advanced in manufacturing defect cases.4 6 The inquiry in
a defective design case, however, is somewhat different than in
a manufacturing defects case. The plaintiff's main problem in a
44. U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 13 (1978).
45. See Bernstein, supra note 29, at 514.
46. See generally supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. One might ar-
gue, for example, that since evidence of compliance with prevailing industry
design practices is not an affirmative defense because a whole industry may be
designing "unreasonably dangerous" products, the evidence must be intended
to establish the defendant's standard of care, which supposedly is irrelevant in
a strict products liability action. See, e.g., Note, Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 402A and State of the Art Evidence, 43 J. Am. L. & COM. 587, 591 (1977).
See also supra text accompanying note 23; Scarzafava, An Analysis of Product
Liability Defenses in the Aftermath of Hopkins, 9 ST. MARY's L.J. 261, 270-71
(1977). Several courts have refused to admit evidence of standard industry
practices in design defect cases. See, e.g., Rexrode v. American Laundry Press
Co., 674 F.2d 826, 831 (10th Cir. 1982); Blohm v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 341
(10th Cir. 1967); Matthews v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 20 Ill. App. 3d 470, 314
N.E.2d 683 (1974). Other courts have admitted such evidence as persuasive, but
not conclusive evidence of reasonable care. See, e.g., Page v. Barko Hydraulics,
673 F.2d 134, 138-39 (5th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Minster Mach. Co., 669 F.2d 628, 633-
34 (10th Cir. 1982); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1140 (5th Cir.
1981).
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manufacturing defects case is to establish the existence of the
defect and the time at which it occurred. Frequently, the exist-
ence of the defect may be demonstrated rather easily by show-
ing that the product departed dangerously from the design of
identical products manufactured by the defendant.47 In a de-
sign defect case, however, the plaintiff must prove that the de-
sign itself is inadequate by referring to some external standard
of adequacy.48
In setting an external standard, some courts still rely on
the concept of the expectations of the ordinary consumer used
by the Restatement. 49 Under this definition, evidence of cus-
tomary industry practices is relevant to establishing whether a
design defect existed as of the date of manufacture. Evidence
that the product was designed in the same manner as other
products of the same type tends to show that the product in-
volved is similar to other products of the same type, and there-
fore, that an ordinary consumer familiar with the class of
products would know of its dangerous characteristics.5O Aller v.
Rodgers Machinery Manufacturing Co., Inc.51 contains lan-
guage and reasoning consistent with this position. In Aller, the
Iowa Supreme Court stated that if an ordinary consumer ex-
pects a product to be in the condition received, the plaintiff
cannot recover on a theory of strict liability, because the defect
was not dangerous "to an extent beyond that which would be
47. See Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product
Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV.
773, 773-74 (1979). Of course, there may be some cases in which the manufac-
turing defect destroys the entire product, thereby making the plaintiff's
problems of proof considerably more difficult.
48. Id.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). This com-
ment states that a product is unreasonably dangerous when it is "dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
its characteristics." Id. One court has stated: "We feel relatively comfortable
applying strict liability principles to those cases in which the product falls be-
low the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer. The 'defect' is as-
certainable by an objective standard, i.e., not within reasonable consumer
expectation which is unreasonably dangerous." Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr.,
121 Ariz. 253, 257, 589 P.2d 896, 900 (1979). For other cases relying upon this
standard, see Banks v. Koehring Co., 538 F.2d 176, 179 (8th Cir. 1976); Gilbert v.
Stone City Constr. Co., 171 Ind. App. 418, 420-23, 357 N.E.2d 738, 741-42 (1976);
Kleve v. General Motors Corp., 210 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Iowa 1973); Vincer v. Esther
Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 331, 230 N.W.2d 794,
798 (1975).
50. See Murray, The State of the Art Defense in Strict Products Liability, 57
MARQ. L. REV. 649, 654 (1974).
51. 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978).
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contemplated by the ordinary consumer."5 2 The court upheld
the trial court's instruction that in considering the defendant's
liability, the jury must consider ordinary consumer expecta-
tions as of the date of manufacture. A plaintiff's expectations
that differed from those contemplated by ordinary consumers
apparently would be an unreasonable consumer expectation.
Although Aller was not a "customary practices" case, the trial
court's instructions implicitly endorse the relevance of state of
the art evidence, because the community's common knowledge
at the time of manufacture could be established circumstan-
tially by a showing that most or all products of the same type,
manufactured about the same time, were designed essentially
the same as the defendant's product.53
The "ordinary consumer" definition of product defective-
ness, which has been criticized on the ground that consumers
often have no expectations whatever as to the dangerous char-
acteristics of a product,54 is not the only definition in wide use.
Dean Wade and Dean Keeton have provided an alternative def-
inition of defectiveness in strict products liabilitys5 that has
gained substantial support.5 6 They propose that the strict lia-
bility standard is not different from that of negligence, except
that the seller is presumed to have knowledge of the actual
condition of the product when it leaves its hands.7 In design
defect cases, the test employed is whether the danger in fact
outweighs the utility of the product.58 In other words, the court
balances the utility of the product and the dangers arising from
the product's use, presuming the seller knows of the danger.
Such a balancing test injects the concept of reasonableness
into the underlying substantive law. For example, several
courts have required a manufacturer to have acted "reason-
ably" in choosing the selected design,5 9 or to have designed a
52. Id. at 834.
53. Id. at 837.
54. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect 5 ST. MARY's
LJ. 30, 37 (1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Product, 44
MIss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973).
55. Keeton, supra note 54, at 37; Wade, supra note 54, at 829.
56. See Henderson, supra note 47, at 776-77. Professor Henderson criti-
cizes courts that have added unique twists to the standard. Id. at 782-807.
57. See Keeton, supra note 54, at 38; Wade, supra note 54, at 836-38.
58. See Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. LJ. 1, 3 (1973).
In Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978), the court
pointed out that this balancing process is the same whether the doctrine of
negligence or the doctrine of strict liability is being utilized.
59. See, e.g., Banks v. Koehring Co., 538 F.2d 176, 178 (8th Cir. 1976); Hoppe
v. Midwest Conveyer Co., Inc., 485 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1973); Nicklaus v.
Hughes Tool Co., 417 F.2d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 1969); Cardullo v. General Motors
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"reasonably" safe product.60 Other courts have stated the man-
ufacturer's design must obviate "unreasonable" risk of harm61
or the product being "unreasonably dangerous." 62
Under this concept of reasonableness, liability turns on an
examination of the defendant's conduct in adopting the product
design, given the risk the product creates.63 A subjective exam-
ination of this sort requires that the product be related to the
circumstances surrounding its use, design, and manufacture.64
Evidence of custom logically ought to be admissible on the is-
sue of reasonableness, which is part of the question of design
defectiveness for courts using the Wade-Keeton approach.
Many courts have admitted evidence of custom for this pur-
pose. For example, in Raney v. Honeywell, Inc.,6 5 the court
stated that the jury could consider "the knowledge common to
those in the industry and the knowledge available to the de-
fendant in deciding whether the design was unreasonably dan-
gerous."66 Similarly, in Price v. Buckingham Manufacturing Co.
Inc.,67 the court admitted into evidence safety belt specifica-
tions that had been adopted by other large users of equipment
similar to that involved in the accident. The court stated that a
defect "exists where the article is not reasonably fit for the or-
dinary purposes for which such articles are sold and used ....
[I] ndustry practices would seem as relevant in relation to that
criterion as where the issue is negligence in manufacture."68
Corp., 378 F. Supp. 890, 893 (E.D. Pa. 1974) aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir.
1975); Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187, 190 (E.D. La. 1969); Brady
v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 259, 589 P.2d 896, 902 (1978); Garst v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 20, 484 P.2d 47, 60 (1971).
60. See, e.g., Weakley v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th
Cir. 1975); Gates v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 458, 459 (10th Cir. 1974).
61. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 397, 405, 276 A.2d
590, 594 (1971), rev'd, 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39
N.Y.2d 376, 385, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976).
62. See, e.g., Simien v. S.S. Kresge Co., 566 F.2d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 1978);
Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 266 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907
(1976); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 758 (E.D. Pa. 1971) aff'd mem., 474
F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Pust v. Union Supply Co., 38 Colo. App. 435, 440, 561
P.2d 355, 359 (1976), Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex.
1979); Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 595, 235 N.W.2d 677, 681 (1975).
63. See, e.g., Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 259, 589 P.2d 896,
902 (1978).
64. See Weinberger, The State of the Art and Products Liability, 28 DEF.
L.J. 303, 310 (1979).
65. 540 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1976).
66. Id. at 938. See also Vanskike v. ACF Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 188, 195 (8th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1632 (1982).
67. 110 N.J. Super. 462, 266 A.2d 140 (1970).
68. Id. at 464, 266 A.2d at 141.
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Industry custom and standards thus may have considera-
ble probative value in determining the existence of a design de-
fect, and ought to be admissible without hesitation.6 9 For
courts using the ordinary consumer expectations test, industry
practices are relevant to establish such expectations. For
courts using the Wade-Keeton test, industry standards and cus-
toms can establish whether or not the manufacturer acted rea-
sonably in balancing the many factors involved in the design
process.7 0 As one court has stated, these standards "are likely
to be more probative than a single learned treatise or an expert
opinion, as they represent the consensus of an entire
industry."7'1
In addition to the probative value of evidence of industry
customs, other advantages may attend its use in design defect
cases.72 For example, the use of this evidence will give design-
ers some assurance that the jury will consider the methods em-
ployed in the everyday world, and that they will use an
ascertainable and comprehensible standard. The importance of
such a standard should not be overlooked. The accident mini-
mization rationale7 3 of products liability depends on designers
and businessmen understanding the legal tests on which they
are to be judged. If present legal tests are often incomprehen-
sible for lawyers and judges, they are certainly no more under-
standable for product designers.7 4 Moreover, evidence of
custom is provable as a fact, and thus is considerably stronger
than an "expert's" assessment of a product's dangerousness.
Of course, conformance to industry standards, standing
alone, should not protect a manufacturer from liability. Con-
formance is simply evidence for the jury to consider as it re-
lates to the issues in the case. Some commentators have
argued, however, that custom evidence not only ought to be ad-
missible, but should be given conclusive effect. These commen-
tators assert that without such a conclusive effect, the current
69. Of course, the plaintiff may use the failure of a design to conform with
design standards of the industry in order to prove a defect. See, e.g., Anderson
v. Hyster Co., 74 Ill. 2d 364, 368, 385 N.E.2d 690, 692 (1979); Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Ford, 406 So. 2d 854, 858-59 (Ala. 1981).
70. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
71. Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 177, 583 P.2d 276, 286 (1978).
72. See generally Raleigh, supra note 5, at 252-53.
73. See supra text accompanying note 20. See also First Nat'l Bank, Albu-
querque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 87, 537 P.2d 682, 695 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied sub nom New Mexico Mill & Elevator Co. v. First Nat'l Bank,
88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975); C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN JR. & R. EPSTEIN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 553 (3d ed. 1977); Holford, supra note 18, at 82-83.
74. See Raleigh, supra note 5, at 250-51.
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state of the art might be applied retroactively to products man-
ufactured years earlier,7 5 which would effectively render the
manufacturer an insurer of its product.76 This argument misses
the point. Although giving conclusive effect to prevailing indus-
try standards is one way to prevent judgment by hindsight, it is
hardly the only solution. Hindsight judgments can be avoided
more simply and directly by a rule that declares subsequent in-
dustry standards inadmissible.
The argument against giving conclusive effect to evidence
of industry standards was presented most convincingly by
Judge Learned Hand in The T. J. Hooper.77 The T. J. Hooper, a
tugboat, had departed Norfolk, Virginia for New York City, tow-
ing a series of coal-laden barges. As the tow passed the Dela-
ware breakwater about midnight, the weather was fair. In the
morning, however, the wind rose to gale force. The tug and the
barges were forced to anchor and ride out the storm, and one of
the barges was lost. The barge owner claimed that the T. J.
Hooper should have been equipped with a radio receiver. If the
tug had carried a radio, he argued, its master would have re-
ceived timely weather warnings and would have been able to
put in safely at the Delaware breakwater. The trial court found
the T. J. Hooper was not equipped with a radio receiver, that a
March gale was not unusual north of Cape Hatteras, and that a
prudent master who had received a radio weather warning
would not have continued the voyage. The trial court also
found that it was not a regular custom of coast line carriers to
equip tugs with radio receivers. The defense contended that
this custom ought to be conclusive. In reply to this contention,
Judge Hand observed, "Is it then a final answer that the busi-
ness had not yet generally adopted receiving sets? ... Indeed
in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence;
but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have
unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices."78
Although industry custom may be evidence of the proper stan-
dard of care, "courts must in the end say what is required;
there are precautions so imperative that even their universal
disregard will not excuse their omission."79
75. See Kircher, Products Liability - The Defense Position, 44 INs. CouNs. J.
276, 295-97 (1977).
76. See id. at 296; Robb, supra note 14, at 16.
77. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Eastern Trans. Co. v. North-
ern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
78. Id. at 740.
79. Id.
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Indeed, as Judge Hand observed, an entire industry may be
negligent in failing to implement new technology. If the appli-
cable standard of care is conclusively based on custom, the
courts will eviscerate one major purpose of strict products lia-
bility-providing an incentive for product safety research and
rapid adoption of safer practices as they become available. The
resulting loss in consumer protection clearly would be out of
step with consumer expectationsO and present expectations of
industry.8 1 Despite these arguments, four states have enacted
statutes declaring that compliance with the state of the art is a
defense to a design defect action. In Arizona 82 and New Hamp-
shire,83 the statutes make compliance with the state of the art
an affirmative defense. The Indiana84 and Nebraska85 statutes
provide that compliance with the state of the art is "a defense"
or a "valid defense." "State of the art" as used in these statutes
presumably can be established by evidence of custom. 86 The
statutes also suggest that compliance with the custom pre-
cludes recovery.
Other courts may treat evidence of custom as though it is
conclusive on the issue of defective design if the plaintiff does
not adduce evidence that the custom itself is unsafe. A recent
Virginia case, Turner v. Manning, Maxwell and Moore, Inc.,8 7
adopted this approach. In that case, a hoist manufacturer mar-
keted its hoists without safety latches on the upper hooks.
Plaintiff was injured when one of the hoists became disengaged
and struck him on the head. The manufacturer submitted evi-
dence that the prevailing practice of the industry was not to in-
clude safety latches on hoists. Although the court
acknowledged that evidence of a customary industry practice
does not conclusively establish due care, the court held that
such evidence may be conclusive of nonliability when "there
80. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64-65, 207 A.2d 305,
311-12 (1965); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461, 467 (1973). See generally Shapo, A Representational Theory of
Consumer Protection Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Dis-
appointmen 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
81. See generally PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PRODUCT LiABILrY OF MANU-
FACTURERS: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE (1980).
82. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (1982) (effective September 3, 1978).
83. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:4 (Supp. 1980) (effective August 22, 1979).
84. IND. CODE ANN. § 344-20A-4 (Burns Supp. 1980) (effective June 1, 1978).
85. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,182 (1979) (effective July 22, 1978).
86. Cf. Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 260, 589 P.2d 896, 903
(1978).
87. 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863 (1975). See also Dye v. Kean's, 412 So.2d 116,
120-21 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
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[is] no evidence that the industry custom was not reasonably
safe." 88 Because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that
omission of safety hooks was unsafe, the court held as a matter
of law that the manufacturer was not liable.
The Turner court's approach essentially creates a presump-
tion against defectiveness when the defendant can show com-
pliance with industry practice, so that the defendant should
prevail as a matter of law when it has established compliance
with a regular industry practice without any substantial coun-
tervailing evidence of fault.8 9 Following this approach, the
states of Colorado,90 Kentucky, 91 and Utah92 have passed stat-
utes declaring that compliance with the state of the art gives
rise to a rebuttable presumption that the product was not de-
fectively designed, and evidence of custom apparently is appro-
priate to establish the state of the art.
McClung v. Ford Motor Co.93 offered another rationale for
treating custom evidence as conclusive. The plaintiff in Mc-
Clung claimed that the steering wheel of his automobile was
defectively designed. In granting Ford's motion for summary
judgment, the court held:
To be actionable, in the Court's opinion, the vehicle, alleged to have
been of a design that makes it unfit for its intended use, must have
been of such design and structure as was at variance with, or contrary
to, the accepted body of scientific knowledge possessed by the average
mechanical or structural engineering personnel in the profession hav-
ing to do with the manufacture of subject vehicle. The design must
have been such as in the application of prevailing engineering and sci-
entific knowledge, it could have been reasonably foreseen that in the
course of normal and accepted use of the product so designed. .. , the
alleged result here could be reasonably expected.
9 4
One writer has suggested that McClung appears to be based on
the idea that legal standards should reflect the standards that
guide the work of design engineers, since design engineers do
not find much guidance in such vague and conflicting concepts
as "intended use," "foreseeability," "reasonable care," and "de-
88. Id. at 251, 217 S.E.2d at 868.
89. At least one commentator has favored this approach. See Raleigh,
supra note 5, at 261-64.
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (Supp. 1981) (effective July 1, 1977).
91. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Baldwin Supp. 1982) (effective June 17,
1978).
92. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6 (1977) (effective May 10, 1977).
93. 333 F. Supp. 17, 21 (S.D.W. Va. 1971), af'd, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973).
94. Id. See also Olson v. Artic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761, 764-65
(D.N.D. 1972).
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sign duties."95 If industrial standards were the legal test, then
the legal test apparently would be in accord with the way the
real world works,9 6 and would further the accident minimiza-
tion rationale of products liability. 97
Although present legal standards may not provide an in-
centive to design safer products because they are vague or
meaningless to a designer,98 neither a conclusive test based on
custom nor a custom-based rebuttable presumption of
nondefectiveness is a satisfactory solution. A conclusive test
based upon custom creates no incentive at all for development
of safer products; therefore, it is hardly a preferable alternative.
Moreover, retaining the present legal tests along with a custom-
based presumption of nondefectiveness would not afford much
enlightenment to designers.99 As noted earlier, such a pre-
sumption is a small departure, if any, from existing law in de-
sign cases.100 The plaintiff still has the burden of showing that
"alternative designs for the product could reasonably have
been developed. . . .101 In other words, the plaintiff still must
prove the existence of a defect. It is difficult to see how such a
presumption would provide better guidance to a designer than
if no presumption existed.
In summary, evidence of prevailing industry practice
should be admissible on the issue of the existence of a design
defect. Courts and commentators, however, have offered no
persuasive reason why such evidence should be conclusive
against the plaintiff or raise a presumption of nonliability. It is
sufficient that the jury hear and evaluate custom evidence
along with other evidence relating to the existence or nonexis-
tence of a defective design.
95. See Raleigh, supra note 5, at 263.
96. Id. at 264.
97. Cf. O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art: Terminology,
Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 627, 644 (1978) (disallowing state of the
art evidence provides a disincentive for accident minimization by deeming
even substantial efforts to improve design irrelevant).
98. See Raleigh, supra note 5, at 264. The argument is less than precisely
stated.
99. "If the [industry custom] is that of cutting costs, augmenting profits, ig-
noring viable safety standards, and complying with other marketing impera-
tives that call for putting safety considerations last, an industry yardstick has
little to do with whether a product was defective." J. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT 393 (1981).
100. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
101. Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 716, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749
(1976).
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C. INADEQUATE WARNINGS
The arguments for and against admitting evidence of indus-
try custom in a case involving an inadequate warning are simi-
lar to those raised in the contest of manufacturing and design
defect cases. An additional consideration, however, is the
scope of the manufacturer's duty to warn.
Some courts hold that a manufacturer must warn only
against those dangers of which it knew or should have
known.102 For example, the court stated in Oakes v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co.103 that "[a] manufacturer or supplier of a
product must give warning of any dangerous propensity of an
article produced or sold by him inherent in the product or in its
use of which he knows or should know, and which the user of
the product would not ordinarily discover."' 04 In line with this
holding, many courts state candidly that duty to warn cases are
governed by a reasonableness standard. 05 The requirement
that the danger be reasonably foreseeable or scientifically dis-
coverable 06 is an important limitation upon the seller's liability
as well as on the reach of strict liability. 0 7 If reasonable fore-
seeability is adopted as a limitation upon the duty to warn, evi-
dence of custom plainly is relevant to establish what the
manufacturer reasonably was able to foresee. 0 8 Although
courts have admitted custom evidence in strict liability warning
102. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 344 (5th Cir.
1982); Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 12-14 (8th Cir. 1964); Cudmore y.
Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1003 (1967), disapproved, Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 S.W.2d 429,
432 (Tex. 1974).
103. 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969).
104. Id. at 650, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 713 (quoting Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 860, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (1963)) (emphasis added by the
court in Oakes).
105. See, e.g., Griggs v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851, 856 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090 (5th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Blasing
v. P.R.L. Hardenbergh Co., 303 Minn. 41, 47, 226 N.W.2d 110, 114 (1975); Bitumi-
nous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974). See also Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974),
in which the court seems to adopt this rule by stating- "If the manufacturer
knows or should know of potential harm to a user because of the nature of its
product, the manufacturer must give adequate warning." Id. at 433.
106. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
107. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 .(5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
108. See Webb v. Fuller Brush Co., 378 F.2d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Two Cases Of Chloro-Naptholeum Disinfectant, 217 F. 477, 479-80 (D.
Md. 1914); Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Mo. 1958).
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defect cases, most have failed to offer an express rationale.109
Because the warning duty in a strict liability case approaches
the concept of the standard of care in negligence cases, how-
ever, the rationale for admitting evidence of prevailing industry
practices in negligence actions provides a predicate for admit-
ting it in strict liability actions.
Other courts," 0 and some commentators,"' have argued
that foreseeability should not be a limitation on the duty to
warn. The leading case adopting this view is Jackson v. Coast
Paint & Lacquer Co. 112 In Jackson, the court rejected foresee-
ability in a warning defect case and stated that "[i]n strict lia-
bility it is of no moment what defendant 'had reason to believe.'
. . . It is the unreasonableness of the condition of the product,
not of the conduct of the defendant, that creates liability."113
Custom evidence is unlikely to be admitted under this view.
For example, in Holloway v. JB. Systems Ltd., 14 the plaintiff
charged the defendant with failing to warn that a vacuum tank
could not be subjected to internal pressurization, and asserted
that this lack of warning rendered the tank defective. The de-
fendant attempted to show that, in not providing a warning
with the tank, it had merely conformed to the standards of the
industry in the year that the tank was manufactured. The court
held that such evidence was erroneously admitted.
It was inappropriate to admit testimony regarding trade custom,
because the jury might have inferred that if virtually no other tank
manufacturer in 1969 included a warning about pressurization it could
hold [a defendant] not liable. This use of trade customs as evidence of
the reasonableness of [defendant's] inaction would be permissible if
the case were tried under negligence principles, but is inconsistent
with the doctrine of strict liability.
1 1 5
The court went on to emphasize that "negligence concepts such
as 'trade custom' or 'reasonable care' have no place in suits
109. See, e.g., Johnson v. Husky Industries Inc., 536 F.2d 645, 648 (6th Cir.
1976); Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851, 858 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
110. See Little v. PPG Industries, 19 Wash. App. 812, 820-22, 579 P.2d 940, 945-
47 (1978), modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979). The court reasoned
that to base the duty to warn on the manufacturer's knowledge or imputation
of knowledge would shift the emphasis away from the condition of the product
and back to the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct. See also Hamil-
ton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 384-85, 549 P.2d 1099, 1107 (1976); Haugen v. Min-
nesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 386-88, 550 P.2d 71, 76-77 (1976).
111. Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tax. L, REV.
398, 404-09 (1970).
112. 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
113. Id. at 812.
114. 609 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1979).
115. Id. at 1073.
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brought under § 402A as that section has been interpreted by
the Pennsylvania courts."116 The Holloway court apparently
would make the scope of the manufacturer's duty to warn as
broad as the jury might decide, knowing of the plaintiff's in-
jury."17 The preferable approach, however, would be to admit
customary practices evidence as bearing on the manufacturer's
potential to predict mishaps.
Admission of custom evidence is more difficult to justify
when reasonable foreseeability is not a limitation on the duty
to warn, and courts adopting this standard would have to ex-
clude the evidence to be consistent."18 Courts that require
manufacturers to warn even of unforeseeable hazards clearly
have taken a very strict view of strict liability. Nevertheless,
even in jurisdictions using the strict approach, it is possible to
argue that custom evidence is relevant to the issue of adequacy
of a particular warning. A case involving the oral contraceptive
Enovid suggests how a defendant might advance this argu-
ment.119 In that case, the court stated that for a warning to be
legally adequate, it must meet the following criteria: (1) its
form must be such that it could reasonably be expected to
catch the attention of the reasonably prudent man in the cir-
cumstances of its use [members of the medical profession];
(2) the content of the warning must be of such a nature as to
be comprehensible to the average physician; (3) it must indi-
cate the nature and extent of the danger to the mind of the rea-
sonably prudent user; (4) it must warn with the degree of
intensity that would cause the reasonably prudent user to exer-
cise caution commensurate with the potential danger.120 These
elements are tied to the "reasonably prudent user" and the "av-
erage physician." If it is the industry custom to warn in a par-
ticular way, and there is a relatively low incidence of injuries
similar to those suffered by the plaintiff, then the customary
warning must be adequate for the great majority of users and
physicians. A majority of users and physicians presumably de-
fines the class of "reasonably prudent" users and "average"
physicians. Consequently, in jurisdictions that require a le-
gally adequate warning and do not permit foreseeability to
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. The same is true in jurisdictions where foreseeability is a limitation on
the duty to warn, when the issue at trial is the adequacy of the warning, rather
than foreseeability.
119. Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 390 N.E.2d 1214 (1979).
120. Id. at 562, 390 N.E.2d at 1230. See also Bituminous Casualty Corp. v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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limit the scope of the manufacturer's duty to warn, evidence of
custom may yet be admissible on the issue of the adequacy of
the warning.' 2 ' Again, however, the jury should be carefully in-
structed as to the issue to which such evidence is relevant.
I. GOVERNMENTAL STANDARDS
When the state of the art is defined in terms of governmen-
tal standards, such standards relate only to product design and
distribution and do not apply to manufacturing defects. 122 In
design defect and warning cases, the general rule is that gov-
ernmental standards define only minimum product design
quality and conditions of distribution. Nevertheless, a few
cases hold that evidence of compliance with governmental
standards will preclude a manufacturer's or seller's liability,
and several states have enacted statutes that provide that com-
pliance constitutes a general defense.
A. DESIGN DEFECTS
The almost universal rule is that compliance with govern-
mental design standards, rules, and regulations constitutes
some evidence of the adequacy of the product's design, but is
not conclusive. 123 On the other hand, noncompliance with the
same governmental standards, rules, and regulations is usually
held to be negligence per se.124 Generally, governmental regu-
lations set forth minimum safety standards, and compliance in-
dicates no more than that the manufacturer performed the
minimum effort required to make a product safe.125 The gen-
eral rule is illustrated by Lubbock Manufacturing Co. v. Pe-
rez.126 In Lubbock Manufacturing, a case involving both
negligence and strict liability claims, a liquified petroleum gas
tank truck overturned, resulting in an explosion and fire which
caused several deaths. The defendant, which had designed and
manufactured the tank truck, argued that Texas courts were
without jurisdiction to decide the adequacy of the design be-
121. See supra note 118.
122. Obviously, a product with a manufacturing flaw will never meet appli-
cable governmental standards.
123. See authorities cited supra notes 4-7.
124. See, e.g., Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 484,
281 A.2d 707, 710 (1971).
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965); Weinberger, supra
note 64, at 318; Comment, The State of the Art Defense in Products Liability:
"Unreasonably Dangerous" to the Injured Consumer, 18 DuQ. L REV. 915, 922
(1980).
126. 591 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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cause the design was approved by the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion pursuant to its legislatively delegated authority. The court
held that although "violation of a statute (or in this case, action
of the Railroad Commission which consists of delegated legisla-
tive action) usually is negligence per se, it does not follow that
compliance with a statute (or action of the Railroad Commis-
sion) establishes the defendant's due care as a matter of
law."127
The Illinois Supreme Court ratified this approach in Rucker
v. Norfolk & Western Railway.128 In one of the clearest judicial
statements of the general rule, the court explained:
[EIvidence of compliance with Federal standards is relevant to the is-
sue of whether a product is defective . . . , as well as the issue of
whether a defective condition is unreasonably dangerous .... If the
product is in compliance with Federal standards, the finder of fact may
well conclude that the product is not defective, thus ending the inquiry
into strict liability. If a finding is entered that the product is defective,
evidence of compliance becomes additionally relevant to the issue of
whether the defective condition is unreasonably dangerous.
1 2 9
The Rucker court also discussed the weight to be accorded evi-
dence of compliance with federal standards. The defendant
urged that it could not be strictly or otherwise liable for the
manufacture of a defective product when the product is in com-
pliance with federal regulations. The court disagreed, stating
that a product may be defective "notwithstanding its conform-
ity to Federal standards."130 Moreover, the court noted that a
state is not precluded from imposing more stringent standards
on products than those imposed by federal regulations. As the
court observed, to hold otherwise would be to control and limit
state common law tort liability through the use of federal stan-
dards.131 This would usurp the power of a state court jury to
determine independently whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous or defective
The general rule was also affirmed in Wilson v. Piper Air-
craft Corp.132 Wilson was. an aircraft design defect case in
which the defendant manufacturer asserted that the airplane in
question could not have been defective because it met all appli-
127. Id. at 914 (emphasis in original).
128. 77 Ill. 2d 434, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979).
129. Id. at 439, 396 N.E.2d at 536-37.
130. Id. at 440, 396 N.E.2d at 537.
131. Id. See also Olsen v. United States, 521 F.2d 59, 67-68 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(government regulations admissible as evidence of trade custom or usage but
plaintiff nevertheless can show a reasonable manufacturer would believe the
regulations to be inadequate and conduct additional tests).
132. 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978).
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cable Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) safety standards
and had been issued a certificate of airworthiness by the FAA.
The Oregon Supreme Court held that compliance with the FAA
safety standards was not a complete defense in a defective de-
sign case. 133 In support of its holding, the court cited the FAA
enabling statute,134 which expressly provides that any safety
standards set by the FAA are only minimum standards.135 The
court allowed that such safety standards should be considered,
but stated that compliance should not be conclusive of nonlia-
bility in the absence of legislative intent indicating other-
wise.136 It concluded that if a statute or regulation expressly
states that the standards are minimal, or is silent on the sub-
ject, then compliance with the statute or regulation only consti-
tutes some evidence of nonliability. On the other hand, if the
enacting or promulgating body declares the standards to be
more than minimal, then they should be given more weight, al-
though the court did not specify how much. The court presum-
ably meant that compliance with such a standard should be
conclusive if the enacting or promulgating body so stated. If
that were the court's intention, however, the same federal-state
conflict discussed in Rucker could arise. For example, a federal
standard containing a "conclusive as to nonliability" clause
would preclude a state jury from evaluating defectiveness on
its own accord or with reference to a more restricted state
standard.
In another case involving aircraft and the Federal Aviation
Administration,137 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania analo-
gized to negligence cases in holding that compliance with FAA
standards or regulations is not conclusive on the issue of dan-
gerousness in strict products liability. The court noted that in a
negligence case, evidence of compliance does not establish the
exercise of due care as a matter of law; it is evidence of due
care, but it is not conclusive. Compliance does not bar a finding
of negligence when a reasonable person would have taken addi-
tional precautions to those set out in the regulation. The court
applied this reasoning to strict liability theory:
133. Id. at 64, 577 P.2d at 1324-25.
134. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1) (1976).
135. 'The Administrator is empowered and it shall be his duty to promote
safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing... [s]uch mini-
mum standards... as may be required in the interest of safety .... " Id.
136. 282 Or. at 70-71, 577 P.2d at 1328.
137. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d 707
(1971).
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Since the seller's care is immaterial, compliance with the FAA reg-
ulations was offered to show that the helicopter was not unreasonably
dangerous .... It was certainly evidence to be considered by the jury
but, by analogy to the negligence cases, we hold that it was not conclu-
sive and the issue was entitled to go to the jury.1 3 8
The court below had maintained that if a jury can reach its
own conclusions concerning standards of defectiveness, then
governmental regulations defining such standards are meaning-
less. 139 Such an argument is at best shortsighted, because it ig-
nores the fact that governmental standards almost universally
set up minimum requirements. These requirements do not
pretend to represent the most advanced state of the art or the
greatest safety that is technologically possible. To the contrary,
governmental regulations define the lower limits of the stan-
dards of safety. The specifications contained in regulations,
rules, and standards merely represent standards below which
no product should fall. For a jury to find defective a product
that complies with governmental standards in no way under-
mines the purpose and meaning of the standards. Such a find-
ing would only reflect the jury's opinion, after hearing
extensive testimony from both sides, that the product was un-
reasonably dangerous or defective, regardless of compliance
with minimum standards.140
Defendants, of course, would prefer that governmental reg-
ulations constitute a complete affirmative defense. In Hurt v.
General Motors Corp.,141 the court accepted this view and held
that a seat belt complying with "multifaceted regulations
adopted by the federal government regulating the standards
and installation of seat belts in motor vehicles" was not unrea-
sonably dangerous as a matter of law.142 The plaintiffs' case
138. Id. at 485, 281 A.2d at 710.
139. Id. at 484, 281 A.2d at 710.
140. Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976), stands for
the same proposition. Bruce involved a suit against an airplane manufacturer
and an intermedidate seller arising out of an airplane crash. The court of ap-
peals stated that compliance with governmental air safety regulations is some
evidence of nondefectiveness, but is not conclusive. Id. at 446.
Similarly, in Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973),
a clothing manufacturer sought to have an adverse award set aside on the
ground that its product, a girl's nightgown, met the standards of flammability
set by the federal government under the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1191 et seq. (1976), and therefore, as a matter of law, the product was not un-
reasonably dangerous. The First Circuit held that although compliance with
federal standards is relevant, such standards are not to be used as the measure
of defectiveness or unreasonable danger under New Hampshire state law. 484
F.2d at 1027.
141. 553 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1977).
142. Id. at 1184.
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had been dismissed pursuant to a take-nothing judgment, and
the plaintiffs appealed on the ground of improper jury instruc-
tions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal without regard
to possible errors, because it found no evidence of any product
defect. The court stated that General Motors should have been
granted a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, because
the seat belt angle was within the upper and lower limits pre-
scribed by the federal standard.143 In the court's view, a plain-
tiff's expert witnesses should not be allowed to second-guess
the federal regulations, and no futher duty should be imposed
on the manufacturer.144
Proponents of this complete defense argument believe that
the safety of a particular product's design should not be left to
the lay judgment of each individual jury. For example, in Self
v. General Motors Corp .,145 the California Court of Appeals ob-
served that the "prosecution of a lawsuit is a poor way to de-
sign a motor vehicle."146 Such courts decry the case-by-case
determination of design safety by individual juries, which can
ignore national or state standards, statutes, and regulations and
rely instead on one expert's testimony that the product is un-
safe. This concern was expressed by a defendant auto manu-
facturer in Arbet v. Gussarson:147
[T]he national character of the automobile industry dictates that auto-
mobile design not be subject to piecemeal regulation by different juries
in different states .... [TJhe problem of designing safe cars is for
Congress, not state courts, and ... federal safety regulations estab-
lished by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, pursuant
to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, pre-empt
the field of automobile safety regulation thus rendering state courts
powerless to act in this area.1 4 3
This argument, however, was not received sympathetically by
the court. It noted that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 states that compliance with any federal mo-
tor vehicle safety standard promulgated under the Act does not
relieve a manufacturer of common law liability.49 In other
words, the federal regulations were not conclusive, but were
only supplementary to the law of products liability.
The Arbet court's position results in less uniformity than
defendants would prefer. Although uniformity, in general, is a
143. Id. at 1182.
144. Id. at 1184.
145. 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).
146. Id. at 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
147. 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).
148. Id. at 562, 225 N.W.2d at 438 (footnote omitted).
149. Id.
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desirable characteristic, unique circumstances and conditions
dictate flexibility in the law. For example, specifications that
are safe in one area of the country may not be in another. In
addition, technology may improve between the time a standard
is promulgated and the product is manufactured, and a jury
should not be bound by an outmoded regulation. Moreover, not
only are governmental standards seldom more than minimal,
setting the lowest acceptable limits of safety, but they are often
broad and general and incapable of accomodating every situa-
tion in which a product might be defective. Another problem
with relying on governmental standards is that the decision as
to what the standard should be is often influenced by political
considerations. Large corporate manufacturers have the organ-
ization and financial resources to lobby government agencies
and legislative bodies to adopt minimum safety standards. As
a result, governmental standards often do not reflect the state
of the art when they are promulgated, and they are even less
representative after several years of technological advance.
This lag is particularly evident in new industries in which im-
provements occur rapidly. Technological improvement, cou-
pled with the phlegmatic nature of legislative and
administrative bodies, results in outdated and inadequate
safety standards that afford the consumer a relatively low level
of protection. Allowing each jury to decide which products are
unreasonably dangerous without being bound by federal regu-
lations may sacrifice uniformity, but the sacrifice is worth the
additional protection to the consumer.
At the other end of the spectrum, one could argue that a
manufacturer's compliance or noncompliance with a govern-
mental standard is irrelevant to any issue in a strict liability
case, and any evidence relating to compliance ought to be ex-
cluded. This theory derives from the rationale of Rourke v.
Garza,15 0 which held that a manufacturer's conduct is irrele-
vant in a products liability case, because the focus is more
properly placed on the product. The Rourke position suggests
that evidence of compliance with governmental standards has
no place in a products liability suit, because the evidence re-
lates to the manufacturer's conduct. This argument, while su-
perficially appealing, is flawed. The Illinois Supreme Court
pointed out the flaw in Rucker v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 151
in which the court considered whether evidence of governmen-
150. 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975).
151. 77 Ill. 2d 434, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979).
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tal standards "improperly direct [ s] the fact finder's attention to
the manufacturer's conduct rather than the product and re-
place[s] strict liability standards with those of traditional negli-
gence."152 The court noted that it is easy to turn the argument
around and say that the focus is not on whether the manufac-
turer's conduct conforms to the governmental standard, but
whether the product itself conforms.153 When viewed this way,
the product/conduct argument against admitting evidence of
governmental standards simply disappears.
An alternative argument is that compliance with govern-
mental standards in a product design case should be a com-
plete defense, but only when the standards reflect the state of
the art. 5 4 Industry custom would define the state of the art in
this context. The Kansas Supreme Court appears to have
taken this approach in Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc. 155 In Jones,
a regulation promulgated by the state fire marshal required
that all liquefied petroleum gas be odorized, so that in the
event of a leak everyone in the affected area would be alerted.
Defendants, the wholesale manufacturer and retail distributor
of some liquefied petroleum gas that escaped and killed three
persons, contended that the gas could not have been defective,
because the requirements of the state regulation were met.
The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the same
rule that applies to industry standards ought to apply to legisla-
tive standards and regulations, and compliance with these stan-
dards is only one kind of evidence that the product is not
defective. 56 The court went on to place a heavy burden on a
plaintiff in this situation, however. It stated that compliance
may be conclusive of nondefectiveness in the absence of a
showing of special circumstances. In other words, a manufac-
turer may rely on governmental standards as long as it does
not have actual or constructive notice that the standards are
inadequate.157
By allowing the defendant to rely on governmental stan-
dards to the extent that the plaintiff cannot show that the stan-
dards have not become inadequate due to advances in
technologies feasibility, the Kansas Supreme Court's position
appears to strike a middle ground between mere admissibility
152. Id. at 439, 396 N.E.2d at 537.
153. Id.
154. See Raleigh, supra note 5, at 258.
155. 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976).
156. Id. at 632, 549 P.2d at 1390.
157. Id.
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and an affirmative defense. It leaves certain questions unan-
swered, however. Once compliance with governmental stan-
dards has been established, the issue shifts to the relationship
between those standards and the state of the art. Because gov-
ernmental standards are not definitive of the state of the art,
the question of what is remains. Although the various ap-
proaches described throughout this Article all reflect efforts to
answer that question, the Jones approach provides no answers.
Moreover, the approach taken in Jones burdens the plaintiff
with proving, independent of the governmental standards, what
the relevant state of the art is, a task which is considerably
more difficult for the plaintiff than the defendant. In light of
the frequent obsolescence of governmental standards and regu-
lations, transferring the burden of proof on this issue hardly
appears warranted.
Although the current general rule, that noncompliance with
governmental standards is conclusive of defective design, while
compliance is merely probative of the adequacy of the design,
appears to offer the best solution, defendant manufacturers ex-
press discomfort with it. They suggest that if compliance with
governmental regulations is merely probative and not conclu-
sive, a jury could still find a defendant liable for not adopting
the plaintiff's alternative, even though the plaintiff's proferred
alternative might not meet governmental standards. This con-
cern is real. That compliance with governmental regulations is
not conclusive does not mean that it is unpersuasive. The kind
of jury response that troubles defendants is likely to be rare,
and the threat that it may occur does not appear to be suffi-
ciently serious to justify a significant departure from the pres-
ent general rule.
B. WARNNG DEFECTS
Few warning defect cases based on strict liability involve
admissibility of governmental standards,158 although at least
one case has held that evidence of noncompliance with govern-
mental warning standards is admissible to show that a drug
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort. In Hoffman v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 159 the plaintiff was allowed to introduce sections of
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act160 pertaining to warn-
158. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2nd Cir. 1969); Ster-
ling Drug, Inc., v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
159. 485 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir. 1973).
160. 21 U.S.C. §§ 32 1(p) (1), 355 (1976).
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ings and to show that the defendant failed to comply with their
provisions. Violation of the Act did not establish the defend-
ant's liability as a matter of law, but constituted evidence of the
defendant's failure to give adequate warning.
Because there are few strict liability cases in this area, any
trend or rule concerning use of governmental standards in
warning defects cases must be gleaned by analogy from the
cases based on negligence. Strict liability design defect cases
involving governmental standards have followed the pattern of
negligent design cases, and it thus seems probable that the
same pattern will occur in the warning cases.
Generally, the rule appears to be that governmental warn-
ing standards set only minimum requirements, and a manufac-
turer is charged with the duty to provide a better warning if
necessary.161 This duty is often predicated on the manufac-
turer's knowledge that the warning aproved or recommended
by the government is inadequate.162 In addition, because any
individual coming into contact with a product is within the
class of persons to be protected, a defendant's duty extends to
anyone who is harmed by its product.163
In negligence cases, compliance with a governmental warn-
ing standard does not conclusively establish a manufacturer's
nonliability. For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has
held that compliance with federal regulations and city ordi-
nances concerning labeling and warnings on flammable sub-
stances is not conclusive that the seller or manufacturer
exercised due care, because such regulations and ordinances
only constitute minimum standards.164 Similarly, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has stated that Food and Drug Administra-
tion regulations or directives as to warnings on drug packages:
may be only minimal.165 Therefore, the manufacturer and sup-
plier have a greater duty to warn, because they usually have
greater knowledge than the FDA.
161. See Weinberger, supra note 64, at 318.
162. See infra note 165.
163. Cf. Comment, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 177, 214-15 (1968) (design, construction,
and performance standards for motor vehicles intended to protect owners, driv-
ers, vehicle occupants, and pedestrians coming into contact with vehicles).
164. Blasing v. Hardenbergh Co., 303 Minn. 41, 49, 226 N.W.2d 110, 115 (1975).
165. Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53, 507
P.2d 653, 661 (1973). See also McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or.
375, 398, 528 P.2d 522, 534 (1974) (holding that FDA regulations are only minimal
and that drug warnings may be inadequate even though in full compliance with
governmental regulations and requirements).
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Similarly, in a Texas Supreme Court case,166 a defendant
drug manufacturer contended that it had been relieved of any
further obligation to warn of the dangers of its drug because
the package insert warning had been approved by the Food and
Drug Administration. The court held that a manufacturer has a
duty to provide a better warning when, as in the case before it,
the proper officials of the drug company know that the govern-
ment approved warning is inadequate.167 Although the court's
opinion might be read to say that if the governmental agency
that sets the standards for a particular warning knows that
these standards are inadequate, the manufacturer is relieved of
the duty of improving them, it is doubtful that the court meant
to create such a rule. To predicate a manufacturer's duty to
warn on the lack of knowledge of the regulatory body charged
with promulgating warning standards would be a drastic modi-
fication of the general rule. Once a manufacturer notified the
government that a particular statutory or regulatory warning
was inadequate, the manufacturer would be relieved of any
duty to incorporate its knowledge in a new warning until the
government promulgated a revised standard. Manufacturers
would be encouraged to pass on new information, but not to act
on it until the bureaucratic process incorporated this new infor-
mation into regulatory warning standards. Such a result would
be clearly undesirable.
Courts also widely hold that violation of a regulation or
statute dealing with product warnings is negligence per se,168
because such regulations and statutes are promulgated to pro-
tect individuals from an unreasonable risk of injury or death.
Compliance with a governmental warning standard, however, is
usually considered to be only some evidence of due care. In
Hubbard-Hall Chemical Co. v. Silverman,169 the First Circuit
held a poison manufacturer liable in negligence even though it
had complied with all applicable governmental standards con-
cerning labeling and warning. The court observed that govern-
mental standards may not be adequate if foreseeable
circumstances, such as illiterate consumers, dictate some other
type of warning. 70 Other federal courts are of substantially the
166. Bristol-Myers v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
167. Id. at 804.
168. See, e.g., Steagall v. Dot Mfg. Corp., 223 Tenn. 428, 436, 446 S.W.2d 515,
518 (1969) (dicta); Muncy v. Magnolia Chemical Co., 437 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968).
169. 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965).
170. Id.
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same opinion. 171
Some jurisdictions, however, find compliance with govern-
mental warning standards very nearly conclusive evidence that
the manufacturer or seller is not liable. In McDaniel v. McNeil
Laboratories, Inc., 172 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that an
FDA determination of the sufficiency of drug warning, while
not necessarily conclusive of nonliability, should be given great
weight. The court stated that approval by the FDA
should not be subject to challenge in a product liability case simply be-
cause some other experts may differ in their opinions as to whether a
particular drug is reasonably safe, unless there is some proof of fraud
or nondisclosure of relevant information by the manufacturer at the
time of obtaining or retaining such federal approval.'
7 3
By "relevant information," the court apparently meant a manu-
facturer's independent knowledge that the FDA's information
is inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading. If this is a correct in-
terpretation, the Nebraska court has developed a very harsh
test. When carried to its logical extreme, McDaniel stands for
the proposition that a government-approved warning on a prod-
uct is adequate as a matter of law unless the manufacturer has
committed some form of fraud by submitting inaccurate, in-
complete, or misleading information to the agency. The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court took a similar position in Leibowitz v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 174 The court held that an FDA-ap-
proved warning conclusively determines that a drug is reason-
ably safe in the absence of "impurity or inadequacy of
labeling." 7 5 The court did not specify, however, how a plaintiff
might show "inadequate labeling" when the defendant shows
that its warning was FDA-approved. If "adequate labeling"
means compliance with the FDA warning standard, of course,
no such occasion could arise.176
C. STATUTES AND PRESUMPTIONS RELYING ON GOVERNMENTAL
STANDARDS
A growing number of states have enacted legislation that
171. Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal, 552 F.2d 788, 791 n.26 (8th
Cir. 1977); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1086-88 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
172. 196 Neb. 190, 241 N.W.2d 822 (1976).
173. Id. at 200, 241 N.W.2d at 828.
174. 224 Pa. Super. 418, 307 A.2d 449 (1973).
175. Id. at 434, 307 A-2d at 458.
176. The court cited Lewis v. Barker, 243 Or. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966), which
was overruled by the Oregon Supreme Court the year after Leibowitz was de-
cided. See McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 398, 528 P.2d
522, 534 (1974).
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extends the preceding argument and sets up a rebuttable pre-
sumption whereby compliance with governmental standards
precludes liability.17 7 The presumption exists in both negli-
gence and strict liability cases, and applies to design and warn-
ing defects. The Tennessee statute, 7 8 which is typical, sets up
a rebuttable presumption that a product is not unreasonably
dangerous if it meets state or federal standards. Such an ap-
proach, however, is undesirable. The presumption places an
unfair burden on the products liability plaintiff. Because regu-
latory standards establish minimum requirements, are suscep-
tible to political partiality and abuse, and are unable to keep up
with changing technology, a products liability plaintiff should
not have to overcome an incorrect presumption that such stan-
dards are adequate.
At least one commentator, however, takes the state statu-
tory reasoning a step further. He proposes that a defendant's
compliance with mandatory federal or state standards ought to
result in an irrebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness "in
any respect in which the product complies."179 This proposal
has at least some supporting logic. If a regulatory body has
made certain standards mandatory, so that it is a violation of
the law to deviate from those standards, then perhaps those
standards establish more than just a floor for consumer safety.
The main reason to place little weight upon compliance with
governmental standards is that most of these standards are in
fact only minimal. If it could be demonstrated that the stan-
dards in question are much more than minimal, it would make
sense to give the standards greater weight when assessing
product defectiveness. Unfortunately, the political factors influ-
encing regulatory agencies and legislatures may undercut the
force of this logic. Manufacturers are likely to resist all but the
most relaxed mandatory standards, and if their influence deter-
mines a standard's final form, even mandatory standards are
not apt to protect the public adequately. Moreover, this ap-
proach would tend to promote technological stagnation, be-
cause a manufacturer who knows that compliance with a
governmental standard is an absolute defense would not spend
money upon research and development and would be discour-
aged from doing so, lest the government be tipped off to newly
177. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(2) (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-28-104 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1977).
178. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980).
179. Kircher, supra note 75, at 298.
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developed safety techniques and raise its standards
accordingly.
A variation of the mandatory standards argument is that a
manufacturer that has no choice but to construct its product ac-
cording to the specifications of a mandatory standard should
not be held liable for a finished product over which it had no
control. This argument makes sense, however, only if the
mandatory standard requires the defect. For example, if a
safer seat belt design is inconsistent with manadatory stan-
dards, the manufacturer should not be liable for failing to adopt
the safer design, since it is unlawful to do so. Under these con-
ditions, an irrebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness
makes sense. There are other situations, however, in which the
presumption is less sensible. For example, if mandatory stan-
dards control many properties of seat belts, but fail to specify a
minimum width, there is no compelling reason to allow a man-
ufacturer to enjoy a conclusive presumption that its belt is non-
defective because it complies with the standards in all other
respects.180
IV. LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC OR TECHNOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE
A major variant of the state of the art defense is a claim
that the product was designed, manufactured and distributed
according to the most advanced known scientific and technolog-
ical methods, and thus it was impossible for the manufacturer
to do anything to avert the injury. In other words, the relevant
knowledge or technology simply did not support a change in
design or in the manufacturing process, nor did it permit the
manufacturer to warn of a given defect or risk.
As described earlier, there are three general types of limi-
tations on scientific and technological knowledge.181 The first
of these is the undiscoverable risk: a hazard is known to be
present in some samples of a product, but it is impossible at
the time of manufacture to know which samples are affected.
Defendants usually introduce evidence that a risk was undis-
coverable in manufacturing defect cases. A second limitation is
180. Dictum in a recent Missouri design defect case supports this position:
"[C]ompliance with the minimum federal standards does not mitigate a manu-
facturer's responsibility under the theory of strict liability any more than does
compliance with the state of the art unless such standards require the defec-
tive condition to exist." Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 689 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978).
181. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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the unknowable risk, in which the hazard that injured the
plaintiff was not known, and could not be known, at the time
the product was manufactured. Evidence that a risk was un-
knowable is usually submitted in an inadequate warning case.
The third kind of limitation is that no one knew how to imple-
ment needed changes. This claim, which this Article has la-
beled technological impossibility, commonly appears in design
defect cases.
Constraints imposed by limitations on scientific knowledge
and its technological application raise different issues from
those addressed in industry custom state of the art cases. Cus-
tom, industry standards and governmental regulations, once es-
tablished, make conceptual sense as ordinary evidence or as
affirmative defenses, although this Article has argued that pol-
icy considerations favor the former treatment. If evidence of
scientific or technological limitations is admissible at all, how-
ever, it almost certainly will have the status of an affirmative
defense. A defendant's showing that nothing it conceivably
could have done would have prevented the injury, could hardly
be just one of several factors for the jury to consider in deter-
mining liability. Thus, the issue in this area focuses on
whether a hazard that is demonstrably impossible to avert will
still result in the manufacturer's liability.
A. UNDISCOVERABLE RISKS
In manufacturing defect cases, the plaintiff's essential
claim is that the manufacturing process has introduced defec-
tive items into the stream of commerce and for this reason, the
manufacturer should be liable. The defendant's response that
no manufacturing process will always result in 100 percent of
the products being nondefective hardly constitutes a persua-
sive defense, for it is still possible to prevent injury if the man-
ufacturer identifies the defective units and removes them from
the stream of commerce. Indeed, the plaintiff may assert that it
is the duty of a manufacturer to conduct inspections and tests
to insure that the product will be reasonably fit and safe for its
intended use, or for a use that is reasonably foreseeable. The
Restatement conceives this duty as requiring such inspections
and tests during the course of manufacture and after the article
is completed as the manufacturer should recognize as reason-
ably necessary to secure the production of a safe article."'182
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 comment g (1965). A manufac-
turer may be required to test and inspect not only his own product, but the raw
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In some cases, however, no tests exist that will reliably
identify the hazardous units. If hazardous products are distrib-
uted despite the use of the very best testing and inspection
procedures, a manufacturer may reasonably assert that the
risks are undiscoverable, and that it should not be held
liable.183
One of the leading cases involving undiscoverable risks is
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital,184 in which the
plaintiff alleged that while she was a patient in the defendant's
hospital, she received a transfusion of defective blood and con-
tracted serum hepatitis. In response, the defendant argued
that "the state of medical science is such that there are abso-
lutely no means by which the existence of serum hepatitis vi-
rus can be detected in whole blood, and that it should thus not
be held strictly liable for injury caused thereby."' 8 5 The appel-
late court held that the defendant was entitled to assert as an
affirmative defense that the state of medical science precluded
it from detecting hepatitis in blood. In recognizing the possibil-
ity of the "state of the medical science" defense, the appellate
court stated that "[t]he defendant hospital may choose to de-
fend its position at trial on the ground that blood is incapable
of being made safe. . . "186
On appeal, however, the Illinois Supreme Court held as a
matter of law that such a defense was not available to the de-
fendant.187 In the court's view, the same public policy consider-
ations that required strict liability for defective products also
barred the proposed defense:
Whatever be the state of the medical sciences in this regard, we disa-
materials or component parts from which the finished product is made. Manu-
facturers are presumed to possess sufficient technical knowledge to form a rea-
sonably accurate judgment as to whether the raw material or component is
reasonably suitable and safe after its incorporation into the finished product.
See Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 378 F.2d 601, 604 (3rd Cir. 1967); Nelson v.
Coleman Co., 155 S.E.2d 917, 920 (S.C. 1967); Standard Motor Co. v. Blood, 380
S.W.2d 651, 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). The amount of care that the manufac-
turer must exercise is proportionate to the extent of risk involved in using the
article; the greater the risk, the greater the need for testing and inspections,
and the greater the care that must be exercised in making the product. See
Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 492, 164 A.2d 773, 781
(1960); Markel v. Spencer, 5 A.D.2d 408, 409, 171 N.Y.S.2d 770, 779, aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d
958, 157 N.E.2d 713 (1959).
183. See supra note 9 and accompanyingtext.
184. 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969), modified, 47 111. 2d 443, 266
N.E.2d 897 (1970).
185. 47 Ill. 2d at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
186. 113 Ill. App. 2d at 86, 251 N.E.2d at 739.
187. 47 IlM. 2d at 455, 266 N.E.2d at 903.
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gree with defendant's conclusion. The Restatement provides in section
402A(2) (a) that '[tihe rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product.' To allow a defense to strict liability on the ground
that there is no way, either practical or theoretical, for a defendant to
ascertain the existence of impurities in his product would be to emas-
culate the doctrine and in a very real sense would signal a return to a
negligence theory.1 8 8
The court's inflexible view of strict liability requires that the
state of medical science be inadmissible, at least when the risk
involved is known but not discoverable. 89
The Cunningham court also rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that, in view of the impossibility of discovering hepatitis
in blood, the defendant should not be held strictly liable be-
cause of a recognized exception to the rule of strict liability
found in comment k to section 402A of the Restatement. 9 0
This comment recognizes that certain beneficial products may
also inherently present potential hazards to human health and
safety, and that they cannot be made entirely safe for their in-
188. 47 IMI. 2d at 488, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
189. The court went on to state that: "[W]e believe that whether or not de-
fendant can, even theoretically, ascertain the existence of serum hepatitis virus
in whole blood employed by it for transfusion purposes is of absolutely no mo-
ment. Any other ruling would be entirely inconsistent with the concept of
strict tort liability." Id. at 455, 266 N.E.2d at 903.
190. See id. at 455-56, 266 N.E.2d at 903-04. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment k (1965) provides:
(k). Unavoidably unsafe products.
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs.
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of ra-
bies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging conse-
quences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to
a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are
fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk
which they involve. Such a product properly prepared, and accompa-
nied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unrea-
sonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines,
and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot be legally sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also
true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, be-
cause of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience,
there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingre-
dients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use
of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller
of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situa-
tion calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate conse-
quences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to
supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, at-
tended with a known but apparently reasonable risk." (emphasis in
original).
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tended and ordinary use.19 1 Suppliers of these products will
not be held strictly liable when proper warnings describing the
risks accompany the product. In response to the defendant's
argument that contaminated blood was such a product, the Illi-
nois court stated:
We believe it clear that the exception set forth in the quoted comment
relates only to products which are not impure and which, even if
propertly prepared, inherently involve substantial risk of injury to the
user. Such exception cannot avail where, as here, the product is al-
leged to be impure.
1 9 2
Thus, in the view of the Illinois Supreme Court, comment k
does not apply to a manufacturing defect case involving an un-
discoverable but known risk.193
Another court has firmly rejected the position adopted in
Cunningham regarding the effect of comment k. In Hines v. St.
Joseph's Hospital,194 the court applied comment k on facts
identical to those in Cunningham, noting that blood is an ap-
parently useful and desirable product, and that the risk of hep-
atitis was outweighed by the public benefit derived from blood
transfusions. The court concluded that blood fell squarely
within the ambit of comment k, because blood is "an appar-
ently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk,'195 and that the defendant's warn-
ing, as required by comment k, was sufficient under the facts of
the case.
The Hines plaintiffs attempted to avoid application of com-
ment k by reliance on Cunningham. The Hines court, however,
severely criticized the Cunningham 96 holding with respect to
comment k, pointing out that the Cunningham court "conve-
191. Comment k applies to known risks as opposed to unknowable risks.
The question considered here is whether comment k applies when a risk is
known but undiscoverable. The unknowable risk is discussed later in this Arti-
cle. See infra notes 220-62 and accompanying text.
192. 47 Ill. 2d at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
193. See S. Karasik, "State of the Art or Science . Is It a Defense to a Prod-
ucts LiabilityZ 60 ILT_ B.J. 348, 356 (1972). The author notes that the Illinois
Supreme Court abolished the state of the art defense in all products liability
cases. The Illinois legislature, however, recently enacted legislation which pre-
cludes the kind of liability for blood transfusions that occurred in Cunningham.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 5101-5103 (1979).
194. 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (1974).
.195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). See 86
N.M. at 764-65, 527 P.2d at 1076-77.
196. For other criticisms of Cunningham, see Brody v. Overlook Hospital,
127 N.J. Super 331, 317 A.2d 392 (1974); Note, 69 McH. I- REv. 1172 (1971); Note,
66 Nw. U.L. REv. 80 (1971); Note, 32 Omo ST. L.J. 585 (1971); Note, 24 VAND. L.
REV. 645 (1971); Note, 16 ViLi. L. REV. 983 (1971).
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niently ignored"197 the statement in comment k that it applies
even when the product lacks "purity of ingredients."198 In
other words, comment k on its face quite clearly covers manu-
facturing defects involving impurity of product ingredients.
The Hines court also argued that limiting applicability of com-
ment k to '"pure" products stultified the flexible policy behind
the exception. "Instead of a balancing of the dangers of a par-
ticular product against its benefits, Cunningham would catego-
rize a large segment of products as vulnerable to strict liability
without regard to social benefits."199
The scope of comment k actually is not as clear as the
Hines court suggests. Comment k's discussion is limited to un-
discoverable risks in the case of new or experimental drugs
when, because of insufficient medical experience, there is no
assurance that the drug's ingredients are pure. Comment k
cannot be applied confidently beyond this limited situation; it
cannot and should not be dispositive in the treatment of the
undiscoverable but known risk.200 Nevertheless, it is appropri-
ate to ask whether the underlying policy of comment k, which
is meant to encourage the marketing of unquestionably benefi-
cial products, 201 would be furthered or frustrated by the impo-
sition of strict liability in such cases.
Although the Hines opinion sharply criticized the Cunning-
ham court's failure to apply the balancing of risks and benefits
manifest in the policy behind comment k, it is unclear how far
the Hines court would extend the protection under a balancing
test. Present case law does not support a balancing of utility
and harm in all manufacturing defect cases. 202 Typically, if it is
shown that the product does not meet its design specifications
and that this flaw has caused harm, then liability automatically
follows. 203 No balancing test is used; the social benefits of the
197. 86 N.M. at 765, 527 P.2d at 1077.
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
199. 86 N.M. at 765, 527 P.2d at 1077.
200. It appears that the application of comment k to the blood transfusion-
hepatitis cases is questionable. The Hines court thought that blood was analo-
gous to the "new or experimental drugs" of comment k. Blood does not seem
to be analogous to these types of drugs, however, because presumably there
has been adequate time and opportunity for sufficient medical experiments to
assure the purity of blood. The problem is that even though there has been
sufficient time and opportunity for medical experiments, there was no way, at
least before the date of Hines, to discover any impurities.
201. See Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir.
1981); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1981).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 22-45.
203. See Henderson, supra note 47, at 773-74.
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product are irrelevant. Alternatively, the Hines court could
mean that the balancing test ought to apply in all cases involv-
ing an undiscoverable but known risk. It is often difficult, how-
ever, to distinguish between the undiscoverable risk and any
other manufacturing defect case. The undiscoverable but
known risk cases are similar to those in which the risk is dis-
coverable, but only at the expense of the destruction of the
product. For example, in cases involving pork trichinosis, the
trichinae "can be detected only by microscopic inspection of
the entire carcass of the animal,"204 which would involve de-
struction of the product. Another example is found in Pabon v.
Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 205 in which Ford Motor Company
was held liable for breach of implied warranty as a result of a
defective ball-bearing assembly supplied to Ford by a reputable
ball-bearing manufacturer. The evidence indicated that Ford
would have been able to detect the defect only by destructive
testing of the ball bearing. No obvious reason exists why these
cases should involve a different theory of liability from those in
which the hazard cannot be detected at all. It should make no
difference that the defect was undiscoverable by any testing or
inspection or that it was discoverable only by destructive test-
ing. But this fact, together with the approach of the Hines
court, would require the balancing test in many cases in which
the test has been squarely rejected. Numerous manufacturers
could argue that it was "impossible" to discover defects in their
products: a tin of canned meat,206 a candy sealed in a paper
wrapper,207 or a bottled drink.208 In each of these cases, the
presence of the adulterating substance could not have been dis-
covered without destroying the product.209 Thus, if undiscover-
ability were to relieve a manufacturer of liability, consumers
would be deprived of protection in cases involving a host of
products that may find their way into the body.210
204. Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 693, 255 N.W. 414, 415 (1934).
205. 63 N.J. Super. 476, 491, 164 A.2d 773, 781 (1960).
206. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
207. Wagner v. Mars, Inc., 166 So. 2d 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
208. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953).
209. See Community Blood Bank Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115, 119-20 (Fla.
1967) (Roberts, J. concurring), in which Judge Roberts stated:
These decisions stand for the proposition that the seller of a product
intended for human consumption is liable for injurious consequences
resulting from the consumption of a defective or adulterated product,
even though it was at the time of the sale and consumption of such
product practically or scientifically impossible to discover the defect in
or adulteration of such product.
210. Besheda v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 198-99, 447 A.2d
539, 546-47 (1982).
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Another basis to refuse to treat undiscoverable risk cases
differently than discoverable risk cases is found in the policies
underlying strict liability. In either case, the manufacturer is in
the best position to spread the cost of unavoidable losses. Gen-
erally speaking, insurance against such losses is more effec-
tively and economically procured by the manufacturer than by
the average consumer, because the cost of insurance can be ad-
ded to the product price.211 Alternatively, the manufacturer
can insure itself. and price the product to cover the cost of inju-
ries. It seems more equitable to distribute the financial burden
of the injuries resulting from product hazards among all who
benefit from the use of the product, rather than to require inno-
cent victims to shoulder such losses alone. This rationale ap-
plies with equal force to discoverable and undiscoverable
defects. The other major policy rationale, accident minimiza-
tion, might at first appear to cut the other way. After all, if dis-
covery of the risk is impossible under known methods, a
manufacturer cannot reduce the hazard even if it is highly mo-
tivated to do so by the threat of strict liability. The answer to
this argument is that a motivated industry may allocate a
greater share of resources to developing new technologies than
it otherwise would have, if strict liability is a part of industry
cost/benefit formulas.
These arguments suggest that the comment k exception
should not be broadened, even in the context of undiscoverable
risks, beyond the kinds of products it expressly discusses.
From the manufacturers' viewpoint, however, such a narrow
application might result in the withdrawal from the market of
high risk, but beneficial, products. It is easier to express this
concern, however, than to document it. Products containing
undiscoverable but known risks are currently marketed, and it
is not obvious that profitable products will be withheld because
of a theory of strict liability, especially in view of the possibility
of insurance. The burden should be on manufacturers to
demonstrate empirically that a theory of strict liability has
such an untoward effect. Assuming arguendo that it does, that
effect would have to be balanced against the incentive for im-
provement that liability may entail. Finally, even when im-
provement appears impractical, a policy of allocating
unpreventable losses weighs in favor of imposing liability.212
211. See generally D. NOEL & J. PHIIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILIrY IN A NUTSHELL
136 (lst ed. 1974).
212. It has been suggested that comment k has as a theoretical base volun-
tary assumption of the risk. Id. at 138. Voluntary assumption of the risk, how-
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The cumulative force of these arguments suggests that the pol-
icy behind comment k does not require its extension generally
to manufacturing defect cases involving undiscoverable, but
known, risks.
If comment k is not to be broadened beyond the class of
cases it explicitly mentions, one must still determine the limits
of that class. One approach is that taken by the court in Cun-
ningham, which held that comment k does not apply when the
product is allegedly "impure." The pure/impure distinction
corresponds to the distinction between alleged defects in de-
sign and in manufacture. A product that is hazardous when
pure is like a defective design, whereas hazards due to product
impurities resemble defective manufacture. The Cunningham
interpretation of comment k, however, has been criticized on
the ground that the pure/impure distinction is insignificant.2 13
The argument is based on the belief that, when a "product is
needed and the user is made aware of the risk involved, then
technical niceties as to whether the risk involves a manufactur-
ing defect or a design defect should not be determinative" of
liability.214
An argument that the distinction between design and man-
ufacturing defects may be irrelevant to determining when the
product has sufficient utility to be encompassed by comment k
does not help to delineate an appropriate scope for comment k.
If the argument is intended to mean that the distinction be-
tween design and manufacturing defects is irrelevant to needed
products generally, and by implication to those covered by
comment k, it is simply wrong. A warning may discharge a
manufacturer's duty in certain design cases, 2 15 but however
beneficial the product, a warning does not generally discharge a
manufacturer's duty with respect to a manufacturing defect. A
similar argument put forward by one commentator notes that a
"pure" product involving an undiscoverable risk may cause
harm because the product is known to cause adverse reactions
in some users and it is unpreditable which ones. 2 16 The Pasteur
vaccine for rabies, explicitly mentioned in comment k, is a pro-
ever, appears to be a weak theoretical support. If comment k is intended to be
limited primarily to drugs, then a consumer has little choice between a high
risk drug and death or a debilitating disease.
213. Murray, supra note 50, at 657 n.37.
214. Id.
215. See Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1981);
Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., Inc. v. Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981).
216. See O'Donnell, supra note 97, at 641 nA9.
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totypical example. An "impure" product involving an undiscov-
erable risk causes harm because of the undetectable presence
in some product samples of a disease-causing organism, such
as blood hepatitis. The commentator argues that a distinction
between these situations is highly artificial, and should not
have dictated the result in Cunningham.2 17
The argument has merit. It is difficult to distinguish the
Pasteur vaccine from blood plasma on any cogent ground. As
noted earlier, however, it may also be difficult to distinguish
blood plasma from impure packaged food. Obviously, lines
must be drawn somewhere. Considerations already mentioned
militate for limiting comment k to the products explicitly men-
tioned therein. The comment explicitly mentions "drugs and
vaccines" of the type represented by the rabies vaccine. By im-
plication, such products are "pure," in the sense that an ad-
verse reaction reflects an unusual characteristic of the user
rather than an unusual condition of the product. The comment
also suggests that impurities might not amount to defects, or
unreasonable dangers, in the case of "new or experimental
drugs" for which there has been an insufficient accumulation of
medical experience to assure their safety. A rule that applied
comment k only to drugs and vaccines which are either pure, or
if not pure then "new or experimental," would have the advan-
tage of predictability and clarity. It would also foster one of the
policies underlying § 402A, for if strict liability is applied to all
undiscoverable but known risks except those mentioned in
comment k, the increased pressure of liability might encourage
efforts to discover the affected products. 218
One final argument has been made against the Cunning-
ham interpretation of comment k. If liability is imposed when
no available technology could have been employed to make the
product safer, the argument runs, there is nothing a manufac-
ture or seller can do to avoid it. This is, in effect, absolute lia-
bility.219 The shibboleth is that absolute liability makes a
manufacturer an "insurer of its product," which predictably
elicits judicial protest. The fact is that many manufacturing de-
fect cases do approach absolute liability. While design cases
require a balancing of risk and utility, manufacturing defect
cases do not. As long as insurance is available and prices can
217. Id.
218. Blood transfusion-hepatitis and pork-trichinosis cases are leading ex-
amples of cases in which liability is frequently denied on grounds of the undis-
coverability of the defect. See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 211, at 130-34.
219. See O'Donnell, supra note 97, at 641 n.49; Robb, supra note 14, at 16.
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be raised, however, manufacturers can share the burden of in-
suring product safety with users of the product.
B. UNKNOWABLE RISKS
When a plaintiff asserts that an inadequate warning re-
sulted in an unreasonably dangerous product, the defendant
may wish to respond that the risk which gave rise to the plain-
tiff's injury was unknowable prior to the injury.22 0 The defense
is that the risk itself, rather than the failure of the risk detec-
tion method to discover all the defects, is unknowable. 221
While the consumer can be warned of an undiscoverable risk,
and a supplier would seldom argue that it was not technologi-
cally possible to warn of a risk of danger in the case of such
products, when the supplier is not and could not be aware of
the danger, it is impossible to give a warning.222 Of course, in
those states which predicate the supplier's duty to warn on
foreseeability of the risk,223 there is an easy solution to the
problem this situation poses. By definition, an unknowable risk
is not foreseeable, and thus the supplier has no duty to warn of
it.
While every unknowable risk is unforeseeable, the reverse
is not always true. Some risks may be knowable but unforesee-
able. Consider a patient who obtains from two different physi-
cians prescriptions for- drugs having opposite physiological
effects. Assume further that a patient who needs one of these
drugs would never need the other. The risk that the mutually
inhibiting action of these drugs would harm a patient who
needed one of them is knowable. The hazard is unforeseeable,
however, because it would be unlikely for anyone to be taking
both drugs simultaneously.
Just as some courts and commentators assert that unfore-
seeability of the risk is irrelevant in determining liability, some
courts have held that unknowability of the risk is irrelevant.
The primary basis for this view is that strict liability is sup-
posed to be strict. It is imposed without consideration of fault.
220. It has been argued that the only practical difference between the un-
knowable risk and the undiscoverable risk is the possible inability of the seller
to insure against the unknowable risk. See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note
211, at 136.
221. See Byrne, Strict Liability and the Scientifically Unknowable Risk, 57
MARQ. L. REV. 660, 661 (1974).
222. Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 33-34, 402 N.E.2d 194, 198
(1980).
223. See Byrne, supra note 221, at 663.
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If the product is defective, then the fact that the "manufacturer
was unaware of the existence of the defect does not alter the
fact that it was defective. '224 The seminal case in support of
this view is Green v. American Tobacco Co., 225 in which the
Florida Supreme Court held that a manufacturer and distribu-
tor of cigarettes could be found liable for breach of implied
warranty resulting in death caused by smoking cigarettes. Lia-
bility could attach even though, prior to such injury, the manu-
facturer could not "by the reasonable application of human
skill and foresight, have known that users of such cigarettes
would be endangered" 226 thereby. After tracing the history of
Florida warranty law, the court concluded that "our decisions
conclusively establish the principle that a manufacturer's or
seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of a de-
fective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his lia-
bility on the theory of implied warranty ... "227
An alternative view is that strict liability should be im-
posed even when the risk was unknowable, unless the benefits
of the product outweigh the ultimate harm to its users. Dean
Keeton has adopted this position, arguing that the manufac-
turer of a "good" product, such as a drug designed to save lives,
should not be held liable for side effects which were unknow-
able at the time of the product's distribution.228 If the utility of
the product is insignificant, however, Keeton would favor plac-
ing the burden of absorbing the costs resulting from unknow-
able risks on the manufacturer. 229
224. Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Require-
ment of a Defec 41 TEx. L. REV. 855, 861 (1963).
225. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), certified question answered, 154 So. 2d 169
(Fla. 1963), answer conformed to, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 943 (1964).
226. 154 So. 2d at 171.
227. Id. at 170. Apparently, the Florida courts have continued to apply this
reasoning under § 402A of the Restatement. See Rostocki v. Southwest Florida
Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973); Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Rus-
sell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
228. See Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation
of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1347 (1966) (using "undiscoverable risks" in the
sense of unknowable risks); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of
"Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559,
570-71 (1969).
229. Keeton uses cosmetics as an example of a nonessential product. His
approach appears to be consistent with a market representation rationale for
products liability. See Shapo, supra note 18, at 1258-64. Even with pervasive
advertising, which distorts the free flow of relevant product information, con-
sumers' access to information about nonessential products appears to be
greater than for "experimental" products.
One commentator has applied the risk/benefit rationale to oral contracep-
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The third approach is to impose no liability for injuries re-
sulting from unknowable hazards. One writer has suggested
that the basic issue is whether a product containing such a risk
is in fact "defective,"230 and indeed, nondefectiveness would be
one theory on which to relieve a manufacturer of liability. The
more common argument, however, is that it is simply impossi-
ble for a manufacturer to give a warning of a risk if the manu-
facturer has no knowlege of the risk.231 This theory was
alluded to in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 232 in
which the plaintiff developed asbestosis after handling asbestosr
insulation for a number of years. Although the particular risk
was known, the court's opinion discussed the problem of un-
knowable risk. "A seller has a responsibility to inform users
and consumers of dangers which the seller knows or should
know at the time the product is sold. The requirement that the
danger be reasonably foreseeable, or scientifically discoverable,
is an important limitation of the seller's liability."233 The
court's language does not distinguish undiscoverable and un-
knowable risks in terms of the availability of this limitation.
The court also ignored these distinctions in considering the ap-
plication of strict liability. In a footnote appended to the above
quotation, the court noted that under a strict liability standard
with no "foreseeability" limitation, "the fact that the maker was
excusably unaware of the extent of the danger would be
irrelevant."234
Unknowable developmental risks also were recognized as a
fives, concluding that because oral contraceptives are nonmedicinal and are
only one method of preventing pregnancy, their overall utility is insufficient to
remove sellers from strict liability when weighed against the risks inherent in
their use. Comment, Liability of Birth Control Pill Manufacturers, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 1526 (1972). These arguments are supported in D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS,
supra note 211, at 136. For a criticism of the risk/benefit test as applied to
products containing unknowable hazards, see Byrne, supra note 221, at 674-75.
230. Byrne, supra note 221, at 663.
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965), which
takes this position when it states that a seller is required to give a warning
against a danger, "if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, de-
veloped human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of
the ingredient and the danger." Id.
232. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
233. Id. at 1088.
234. Id. at 1088 n.22. The court proceeded to state the obvious conclusion:
"The requirement of foreseeability coincides with the standard of due care in
negligence cases in that a seller must exercise reasonable care and foresight to
discover a danger in his product and to warn users and consumers of that dan-
ger." (emphasis in original). Id. See also Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
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basis for restricting liability in Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 2 35
The plaintiff in Basko was treated with three different drugs to
counteract a skin disease. After using these drugs for several
years, the plaintiff suffered a reaction to two of the drugs, both
of which contained chloroquine, and her vision deteriorated to
the point of near-blindness. The risk of ocular complications
was unknown prior to the marketing of the drugs. The court
applied comment k of the Restatement, treating the drugs as
the kind of products to be characterized as "unavoidably un-
safe."236 Comment k provides that a manufacturer will not be
held strictly liable if it gives an adequate warning of the risks
involved. The court pointed out, however, that comment k
adopts the ordinary negligence concept of the duty to warn,
23 7
and under ordinary negligence standards, a defendant is not re-
quired to warn of unknown dangers. The Basko court thus
maintained that for products covered by comment k, a duty to
warn attaches when the risk becomes apparent.238
A California court23 9 reached a similar result but grounded
its reasoning in comment j of the Restatement,240 rather than
comment k. In denying recovery to the plaintiff, who suffered a
235. 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969).
236. The court's reliance upon comment k is misplaced. Comment k applies
only to known risks and does not apply to unknowable risks. See supra notes
190-93 and accompanying text.
237. It would be more accurate to say that comment j, not k, adopts the or-
dinary negligence concept of a duty to warn. See infra note 240.
238. 416 F.2d at 426. In another case involving a chloroquine drug, Christoff-
erson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1971),
the court advanced the unknowable developmental risks rationale to preclude
the manufacturer's liability:
To require [defendant] to compose a warning of side effects not sug-
gested by careful laboratory procedures such as a preceded distribu-
tion of [the drug] would seem to require either a semantically
impossible sort of warning or one which would effectively bar the very
experience which alone could give early hint of side effects of a new
product extremely valuable in many cases of specific illnesses.
Id. at 79-80, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
239. Oakes v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1969).
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965) provides:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably, dangerous,
the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the
container, as to its use .... [When] ... the product contains an in-
gredient to which a substantial number of the population are allergic,
and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally known, or if
known is one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to find
in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has
knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill
andforesigh4 should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient
and the danger.
(Emphasis added).
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severe allergic skin reaction to an ingredient in the defendant's
weed killer, the court observed that comment j merely ex-
presses well-settled rules that are already part of negligence
law.241 Under negligence principles, a manufacturer has no
duty to warn of an unknowable hazard. The court reasoned
that "[t]o exact an obligation to warn the user of unknown and
unknowable allergies, sensitivities and idiosyncrasies would be
for the courts to recast the manufacturer in the role of an in-
surer beyond any reasonable application of the rationale ex-
pressed above."242
The Oakes opinion raises the argument mentioned previ-
ously in this Article, 243 that the imposition of liability in the
case of unknowable risks would impose absolute liability, cast-
ing the manufacturer in the role of an insurer. Courts have
stated time and again that a manufacturer is not an insurer of
its product.244 If this assertion means anything, a manufacturer
should be excused from liability in this situation. Furthermore,
comment j of the Restatement supports a conclusion of nonlia-
bility.245 Nonetheless, one can argue that the rationales behind
section 402A of the Restatement should also apply to the un-
knowable risk.
Several commentators have argued that, despite the
unknowability of a risk, the policies underlying strict liability
support its application. Professor Rheingold has argued that
imposition of liability will achieve desirable loss minimization
because it will motivate manufacturers to proceed with more
care. For example, imposition of liability might encourage the
use of more tests for early detection of potential risks.246 Alter-
natively, manufacturers might keep new products off the mar-
ket for further testing, which would result in safer products. In
addition, many commentators believe that the imposition of lia-
bility, even when a risk is unknowable, will produce desirable
loss spreading. They argue that competition within the indus-
try will induce companies to research, develop, and market new
products, and that mass marketing will spread the cost of liabil-
ity. They reject the claim that product prices will rise intolera-
241. 272 CaL App. 2d at 649 n.4, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 713 nA.
242. Id. at 649, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
243. See supra text accompanying note 219.
244. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087
(5th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
245. See supra note 240.
246. See, e.g., Rheingold, Products Liability--The Ethical Drug Manufac-
turer's Liability, 18 RUTGERs L. REV. 947, 1015-17 (1964).
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bly or manufacturers will be driven into bankruptcy.247
These policy-based arguments for imposing liability for in-
juries from unknowable risks have been challenged. Professor
Connolly has attempted to show that the loss-spreading ration-
ale does not apply to an unknowable risk,248 by arguing that a
manufacturer cannot spread the loss from an unknown risk be-
cause the manufacturer has no way of estimating the amount
of loss or how often it may occur.249 For example, the hazard
may cause a mild'cosmetic problem in a small proportion of
users, or it may cause severe disability in a relatively large pro-
portion of users. Professor Byrne adds that such a risk cannot
be considered a cost of production to be passed on to the pub-
lic, because there is no way to anticipate the unknowable and
assign it a monetary value that can be added to the sales
price.250 He observes that the manufacturer or seller is in no
better position than the user or consumer to protect against an
unknowable risk, because the manufacturer was incapable of
detecting it. Imposing liability under these circumstances
would have little impact on improving research and testing pro-
cedures, as the manufacturer already has done everything pos-
sible to eliminate possible hazards.251
To claim that the two primary rationales of strict liability
are completely inapposite to the unknowable risk, however, is
an overstatement. Although the unknowable risk may not be
an easily computed cost of production, this does not mean that
losses incurred from unknowable risks cannot be spread
throughout society. Difficulty in assessing speculative risks
means only that, until a hazard surfaces, the manufacturer may
overestimate or underestimate the cost of the risk in. setting
prices. Once risks become known, they can be considered costs
of production in the usual manner. At best, therefore, the argu-
ment against loss spreading in this situation applies only to the
first few injuries that occur before a company can treat a risk
as a cost of production. There appears to be no reason why a
manufacturer cannot insure against these initial injuries or in-
247. See, e.g., id.
248. Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards In-
herent in His Product 32 INs. CouNci, J. 303 (1965).
249. "Where the manufacturer cannot spread the risk, he should not, it
would seem, be liable for the defect, because there would be no justification for
making him liable. The only difference between him and the consumer in this
case is that he has the deeper pocket." Id. at 307.
250. Byrne, supra note 221, at 674. A case which supports this position is
Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 36-37 (5th Cir. 1963).
251. Byrne, supra note 221, at 674.
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crease the price of its product after the losses from these inju-
ries have been calculated.
Similarly, although the manufacturer may be in no better
position than the consumer to minimize accidents by protect-
ing against a risk, it is equally true that the manufacturer is in
no worse a position to protect against the risk. More important,
however, liability may provide an incentive to develop new
techniques for discovering such risks.252 It may also provide a
disincentive to premature marketing of potentially hazardous
products.
An affirmative reason sometimes advanced for limiting lia-
bility is that it might effectively reduce the accumulation of suf-
ficient user experience indispensable to research.2 53 For some
products, such as drugs, use by human beings is the only way
tests can be thoroughly conducted and risks discovered. Impo-
sition of strict liability allegedly would be a deterrent to such
experience.254 The argument does not withstand critical scru-
tiny, however. If a given amount of user experience is essential
to testing and risk detection, it is not obvious how liability
would deter accumulation of that experience without minimiz-
ing accidents. If a hazard will only appear, for example, after a
million people have used a drug, it is unclear how liability for
injury to the millionth person would influence the behavior of
the manufacturer. Strict liability aut non gives the manufac-
turer no special interest in stretching the first million sales
over a longer or shorter time. On the other hand, "deterring
sufficient user experience" may actually mean "withholding the
product from the market for the purpose of doing more testing
than would otherwise be done."25 5 This promotes accident re-
duction, which is perceived by many as a benefit of strict liabil-
ity in the case of unknowable risks.256
Between strict liability and no liability, therefore, it ap-
pears that the weight of the arguments favor strict liability
252. It is questionable whether a risk is really ever "unknowable." It may
be unknowable at a certain point in time, but sometime in the evolution of sci-
ence the "unknowable" becomes known.
253. See, e.g., Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75,
80, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1971); Byrne, supra note 221, at 673. One commentator
would make knowledge-based state of the art a complete defense. See Note,
Product Liability Reform Proposals: The State of the Art Defense, 43 Ar. L
REv. 941, 959 (1979).
254. Keeton, supra note 224, at 861.
255. But see Rheingold, supra note 246, at 1015-17 (arguing that manufactur-
ers' insurance is usually sufficient to cover liability for prematurely released
drugs).
256. See Shapo, supra note 18, at 1261-62.
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when the risk associated with the product is unknowable. The
choice would be much easier, of course, if empirical data ex-
isted concerning how manufacturers would respond to imposi-
tion of strict liability when a risk is unknowable a priori. The
imposition of strict liability over the last two decades, however,
does not appear to have abated the number of new products
entering the marketplace. Moreover, the major policies under-
lying section 402A of the Restatement, loss spreading and acci-
dent minimization, appear better served by the imposition of
liability, at least until there is affirmative evidence that such a
practice defeats a competing social policy.
The intermediate approach, balancing utility against risk
when a previously unknowable hazard has surfaced, is also
subject to policy-based objections. Manufacturers will be dis-
couraged from marketing new products if their products are
judged as of the time of trial, after a risk is known. Of course
the liability, not the time perspective, affects manufacturer be-
havior. Because the only alternative to viewing the product as
of the time of trial is viewing it before the risk is known, the
argument becomes that liability for unknowable risks will dis-
courage the marketing of new products. If this claim is true,
the burden of producing empirical evidence to support it
should fall on those who assert it. Meanwhile, the empirical ev-
idence that has been collected fails to substantiate this asser-
tion.25 7 While many manufacturers believe that liability for
unknowable risks will discourage the introduction of new prod-
ucts,2 8 and some have claimed that products liability has
forced them to abandon some new products,25 9 it is impossible
to know whether there has been a positive or negative
impact.
2 60
Another objection to balancing utility and risk is that quan-
tifying utility and risk is difficult, and a court is probably not
the best agency to make this judgment.26 1 A detailed discus-
sion of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
Courts are regularly called upon to quantify utility and risk,
however, in all design defect cases and in the economic ap-
257. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCT LLABIn.Y, at VI-29 (1978) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
258. Id. at IV-30.
259. Id. at IV-29 to IV-30.
260. Id. at IV-30.
261. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L REV. 1531, 1552-62 (1973).
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proach to negligence, 262 and will doubtless continue to struggle
with the issue. A stronger argument is that because the analy-
sis takes place after the fact, a risk-benefit analysis promotes
the underlying policies of strict liability no better than absolute
liability. In other words, the problems raised by courtroom bal-
ancing do nothing to advance the policies behind section 402A
of the Restatement. As an illustration, consider the manufac-
turer of a new and effective backache reliever. If the manufac-
turer were subject to absolute liability for any unknowable
risks, one could argue that the manufacturer would automati-
cally tend to delay marketing of the product in an attempt to
minimize the likelihood that the product contains any defect. If
risk/utility balancing were used, the manufacturer would be
held liable only for risks that outweigh product utility. These
liability producing risks, however, are the most significant in
the context of loss spreading. The less expensive risks will not
result in liability at all. Thus, the balancing approach gives the
manufacturer very little more basis for mathematically calcu-
lating losses as production costs than does absolute liability,
because the only difference between them is the less expensive
risks.
One might also argue that balancing achieves the goal of
accident minimization no better than does absolute liability.
Although manufacturers might devote research efforts to im-
proving their premarketing hazard detection techniques, it is
unlikely that they can focus their research selectively on the
hazards for which they will have to pay under a balancing ap-
proach, because the risks are unknown. Thus, the accident re-
duction resulting from use of a balancing test may not be much
greater than that resulting from the imposition of absolute
liability.
The only advantage the balancing of risks and benefits may
offer over absolute liability is that, knowing that liability varies
with product utility, manufacturers may adjust the caution with
which they market a product to the value of the product. Thus,
the public may receive the benefits of a needed product earlier
than a less necessary one, because the manufacturer takes rel-
atively less risk in marketing the product without exhaustive
testing. If manufacturers did this, premarket test intensity
would tend to correspond to product usefulness or need. This
262. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of
Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61
CoRNEL. L. REv. 495 (1976).
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
potential salutary effect of balancing, however, probably does
not offset the problems associated with it.
In the other two types of scientific impossibility, scientifi-
cally undiscoverable and technologically impossible, the writer,
believing that the weight of the arguments favors imposing
some liability, has opted for a middle ground by employing a
balancing test. As previously demonstrated, the balancing ap-
proach is not as suitable for the unknowable risk. Therefore,
one is left with an unhappy choice between no liability and ab-
solute liability. The choice turns primarily on the effect abso-
lute liability would have on the manufacturer. For want of
empirical evidence, the effect is problematic. In one sense we
are left to choose the best among highly speculative arguments.
This writer believes that the best arguments favor liability. In
another sense, because the arguments are so highly specula-
tive, we have come face to face with a bare axiological choice
between an innocent, injured plaintiff and an innocent seller.
This writer opts for the plaintiff on humanitarian grounds. On
the scale of competing human values, relieving the plaintiff of
involuntary penury must rank very high.
C. TECHNOLOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY
In any design defect case, the plaintiff must convince the
court that the defendant's product design was flawed or inade-
quate in such a way as to create an inherently dangerous prod-
uct.263 To do this, the plaintiff normally must present an
alternative design that he or she claims the manufacturer
should have adopted. The defendant might respond by con-
tending that this design change would have been "impossible"
to implement at the time of the product's manufacture. Of
course, if the suggested design change could have been imple-
mented, then the defendant's failure to conceive of the alterna-
tive design does not amount to a showing of impossibility.26 4
Rather, in a case in which impossibility is maintained, the de-
fendant must demonstrate that the design change could not
have been implemented even if someone had thought of it. The
issue in such a case will center on technological imple-
mentability. Similarly, the issue will arise when the defendant
asserts that while the need for a design change was known,
neither the defendant nor anyone else knew how such a change
263. Henderson, supra note 261, at 1543.
264. See Note, supra note 253, at 959.
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could be implemented technologically.265
A central problem in any case in which technological im-
possibility is raised as a defense is determining the sufficient
conditions for "nonimplementability." Suppose that no one
currently knows how to implement the change, but there is a
known scientific principle that would solve the problem if
someone could only achieve a mental breakthrough and apply
the principle. For example, assume if the issue in The T. J.
Hooper had been whether the tugboat should have been
equipped with radar, rather than a radio. As early as 1886, a
German physicist had demonstrated that radio waves could be
beamed back from various objects. Roughly twenty years later,
another German scientist demonstrated the use of radio echoes
as an aid to ship navigation.266 Before these discoveries, radar
was manifestly "technologically impossible." Still twenty years
later, when the T. J. Hooper set out from Norfolk on its ill-fated
voyage, radar installation was theoretically possible, if not tech-
nologically implementable. Was it, then, still technologically
"impossible" to equip the T. J. Hooper with radar? Apparently
so, but not in the same way it was impossible before the Ger-
man discoveries. The asserted technological impossibility also
differs from a claim that equipping the tug with radar was im-
possible because no one had yet thought of it-as would have
been the case, for example, if radar had been discovered and
used for various things, but no one had thought of using it for
navigation.
Thus, a defendant may claim technological impossibility
because (a) the relevant scientific principles are unknown,
(b) no one has thought of applying the principles to the prod-
uct involved in the case, or (c) no one has been able to trans-
late the scientific principles into a workable product. Most
cases involve situations described by (c); there is no question
that a design change has been considered, and the relevant sci-
entific principles have been discovered, but the manufacturer
asserts that it was not yet known how to apply those principles
to implement the design change. Within this class of cases,
three questions arise in establishing the factual existence of
technological impossibility: (1) When does the knowledge of
how to implement the design change become sufficiently avail-
265. Whether a design change which is technologically possible but not
practical or feasible constitutes any kind of defense is discussed later in this
Article. See infra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
266. Raleigh, supra note 5, at 255.
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able that the technologically impossible becomes possible?
(2) After the design change is technologically possible, for how
long can the manufacturer continue to produce products of the
earlier design? (3) From what temporal perspective is techno-
logical impossibility to be viewed?
To illustrate the first question, suppose Professor Jones of
State University has conceived the technology needed to imple-
ment the design change. Furthermore, suppose that Professor
Jones has written a monograph on the subject which had the
misfortune to be reviewed for publication by an old rival, who
rejected it without understanding it. The manuscript, there-
fore, was not published in a major journal, and now reposes in
the library of the University. The idea is understood perfectly
by Professor Jones and no one else, until the plaintiff's experts
begin to study it. It is clear that Professor Jones's idea has ad-
vanced the state of the art, but to what extent can the manufac-
turer be held responsible for that knowledge? Strictly
speaking, the design change is no longer technologically impos-
sible to implement. The issue thus shifts to when the design
change is technologically possible for the defendant
manufacturer.
Courts have often said that a manufacturer is to be consid-
ered an expert in its field and thus have recognized a manufac-
turer's duty to keep abreast of developments therein.2 67 Courts
have never explained the full extent of this obligation, however.
For example, it is unclear whether the obligation would attach
in the above hypothetical. A fair rule would be that a manufac-
turer must make all reasonable efforts to keep abreast of new
ideas. The reasonableness of such an effort would depend on
the difficulty involved in locating ideas. Thus, if a manufacturer
making a reasonable effort to locate information relevant to the
design change probably would not have run across Professor
Jones's monograph, the manufacturer may raise the claim of
technological impossibility in his defense to a products liability
action.
The second question is how much time the manufacturer
should have to implement the design change after the techno-
logical breakthrough has occurred. Suppose that Professor
Jones's idea is published in a trade journal with maximum cir-
267. See Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); Hall
v. El. Du Pont de Nemours, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Garst v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971); Milau Associates, Inc. v. North
Ave. Dev. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1977); Codling
v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
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culation only two weeks before the manufacture of the product
that causes the plaintiff's injury. Should the manufacturer be
permitted any lead time during which he may still argue tech-
nological impossibility, and if so, how much? One commentator
has suggested the strict rule that no lead time should be per-
mitted,268 an approach that seems rather unfair to the manufac-
turer. Giving a manufacturer no time in which to make
changes results in absolute liability, at least during the interval
in which the manufacturer could not have done anything to ob-
viate the hazard. On the other hand, if liberal amounts of delay
are tolerated in implementing the new technology, the legal in-
centive to promote the design and manufacture of safer prod-
ucts is diminished, and an important policy of strict liability is
subverted. The proper course appears to be to allow a reason-
able amount of lead time to implement the new technology,
with reasonableness based on the type of product and the diffi-
culty involved in implementation.
In a sense, the question just discussed assumes the answer
to the third question, the temporal perspective from which the
technological impossibility must be judged. If technological im-
possibility were a defense only when the design change is still
impossible at the date of trial, there would be no issue of a rea-
sonable time to implement the change. Clearly, the logic of al-
lowing the defense at all argues for choosing the time of
manufacture as the critical point. Otherwise, a manufacturer
who has responded to a spate of injuries by energetically and
successfully researching the technology for a design change
might find that it has in effect created its own liability.
Assuming that the evidence factually establishes techno-
logical impossibility, it must be determined whether the evi-
dence is relevant in a design defect case, and if so, the issue to
which it is relevant. Courts must also determine whether tech-
nological impossibility should constitute an affirmative defense.
A "due care" argument undoubtedly could be made that what
the manufacturer could do is directed at the element of negli-
gence, which is not in issue in strict products liability. Under
this argument, such evidence should be excluded, because it fo-
cuses on the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in-
stead of the product and its defectiveness. This approach
appears to have been adopted in Stanfield v. Medalist Indus-
tries, InC., 2 6 9 in which the plaintiff suffered the loss of several
268. See Note, supra note 253, at 952.
269. 34 M1. App. 3d 635, 340 N.E.2d 276 (1975).
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fingers while operating a boring and cutting machine. The
plaintiff alleged that the machine was defective because it lack-
ed a shield to prevent this sort of injury. The manufacturer de-
fended by saying that no such safety devices were available at
the time the machine was sold or even at the time of trial.270
The court quoted from Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hos-
pital,27 ' to the effect that to allow this state of the art defense
would signal a return to negligence theory, and concluded that
"the availability or non-availability of safety devices or industry
standards is, as stated by the Supreme Court in Cunningham,
supra, 'of absolutely no moment.' "272 This "due care" argu-
ment essentially precludes the products liability defendant
from telling the jury or the court that the alternative design
proposed by the plaintiff could not have been implemented
when the product was manufactured, or even, as in Stanfield,
at the time of trial. Courts are unlikely to adopt this approach
in great numbers, because of their oft-stated antipathy to im-
posing absolute liability and forcing manufacturers and sellers
to become insurers of their products. 273
In Stanfield, technological impossibility apparently was
also rejected as an affirmnative defense. Other courts have ad-
mitted the evidence as relevant to some issue in the plaintiff's
case, but not as an affirmative defense. For example, in Bruce
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 274 the court found evidence of techno-
logical impossibility was relevant to a determination of con-
sumer expectations, and consequently relevant to the issue of
defectiveness. The court reasoned that no ordinary consumer
would expect an aircraft made in the 1950's to employ the
safety features of an aircraft made in the 1970's. In so holding,
the court stated:
There is 'general' agreement that to prove liability under § 402A the
plaintiff must show that the product was dangerous beyond the expec-
270. It is difficult to tell whether Stanfield involved a feasibility state of the
art or a technologically impossible state of the art claim. Because the court
stated that the safety devices were not "available," it will be assumed that the
court was referring to technological impossibility. The same inference can be
drawn from the court's reliance upon Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp.,
113 Ill App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969), modified, 47 ll. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1970) because Cunningham was also a developmental limitations case.
271. 113 IlM. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969), modified, 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266
N.E.2d 897 (1970).
272. 34 ILL. App. 3d at 641, 340 N.E.2d at 280.
273. "No one wants absolute liability where all the article has to do is to
cause injury." Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 491, 525 P.2d 1033,
1036 (1974).
274. 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
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tation of the ordinary customer. The state-of-the-art evidence helps to
determine the expectation of the ordinary consumer. A consumer
would not expect a Model T to have the safety features which are in-
corporated in automobiles made today. The same expectation applies
to airplanes. [The] plaintiffs have not shown that the ordinary con-
sumer would expect a plane made in 1952 to have the safety features of
one made in 1970.275
Although the Model T illustration makes some sense, the
analogy to the airplane is questionable. The ordinary con-
sumer may well have some expectation about the safety fea-
tures of automobiles, but it is unlikely that the ordinary
consumer has any idea what safety features to expect in an air-
craft from one year to the next. The court in effect imputes to
the ordinary consumer technological data regarding the intrica-
cies of aircraft design, an imputation that distorts the notion of
an "ordinary consumer" beyond recognition.276 Bruce illus-
trates the inadequacy of the "ordinary consumer's expectation"
definition of "defective,"277 and although the court avoided the
spector of absolute liability, sparing the defendant required the
court to overlook a patently spurious rationale.
Most courts reject the use of technological impossibility as
an affirmative defense, but admit the evidence in connection
with balancing tests comprising their definitions of defective
design.278 These balancing tests sometimes include an explicit
recognition that the plaintiff must demonstrate the feasibility
of an alternative design.2 79 The defendant's evidence of techno-
logical impossibility is then relevant to feasibility. Dean Wade,
in his analysis of the term "defective,"280 takes into account
"the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
the product."281 A product that cannot be made safer is not
"defective." Thus, evidence of technological impossibility is di-
rectly pertinent to the Wade formula for assessing
defectiveness.
275. Id. at 447.
276. See Note, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and State of the
Art Evidence, 43 3. Am L & COM. 587, 599-600 (1977).
277. See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV.
339, 348-52 (1974); Keeton, supra note 228, at 572.
278. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alaska 1979);
Barker v. Lull Engr. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
237 (1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979).
279. See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 472, 467 P.2d 229, 236,
85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636 (1970); Price v. Niagra Mach. and Toolworks, 67 Cal. App.
3d 185, 136 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538 (1977) (withdrawn by order of court); Sutkowsld v.
Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
280. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825 (1973).
281. Id. at 837.
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A number of courts appear to have adopted this approach.
For example, in Price v. Niagara Machine and Tool Works, 282
the plaintiff was injured while operating a press manufactured
by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the press was de-
fectively designed because it failed to incorporate safeguards to
keep it from descending unexpectedly on an operator's hand.
The defendant introduced evidence that it could not install
safeguards on the press because of its multifunctional nature.
In other words, a safeguard adequate for one function of the
press would not be adequate for another, and might even com-
promise the press's utility for the second function. The court
noted that one factor to consider in evaluating defectiveness is
whether an alternative design could actually be produced.2 83
Similarly, in Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp.,2 84 the court
pointed out that alternative designs are part of the process of
evaluating a defective design. The Sutkowski court observed
that consideration of an alternative design "introduces the fea-
ture of feasibility since a manufacturer's product can hardly be
faulted if safer alternatives are not feasible. In this connection
feasibility includes not only the elements of economy, effective-
ness and practicality but also the technological possibilities
viewed in the present state of the art."285
The approach of the Bruce, Price and Sutkowski courts is
to take technological impossibility into account as one factor to
be considered in establishing defectiveness, by reference either
to consumer expectations or to alternative designs. This ap-
proach is probably motivated by a desire to avoid absolute lia-
bility on the one hand, and at the same time to avoid
reintroducing negligence theory on the other. In reality, how-
ever, the approach achieves neither objective and leads to con-
fusion in analysis. This Article already has noted that the
"ordinary consumer expectations" test of defectiveness may
lead to spurious reasoning in technical design defect cases. 28 6
Use of the Wade formula to establish defectiveness by refer-
ence to alternative design potential is no better. This process
merges technological impossibility with an analytically distinct
282. 67 Cal. App. 3d 185, 136 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1977) (withdrawn by order of
court).
283. 136 Cal. Rptr. at 538. The court went on to say that "appellant cannot
seriously suggest that he should have been permitted to show the absence of
safeguards, but that Niagra could offer no explanation as to how the operator of
the press was to be protected." Id. at 539.
284. 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
285. Id. at 319, 281 N.E.2d at 753.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 276-77.
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version of the state of the art called "feasibility," which will be
discussed later in this Article. Feasibility state of the art can-
not be accepted as a defense to a design defect action without
reintroducing negligence, and mixing feasibility with technolog-
ical impossibility unnecessarily injects negligence. 287 At the
same time, the mixture does not avoid absolute liability. If the
defendant's evidence genuinely establishes the technological
impossibility of a design change, then a judgment for the plain-
tiff results in absolute liability, however it is reached. Unless
the technological impossibility is conclusive, it can be ignored.
If it can be ignored, the plaintiff can recover when an alterna-
tive design is really technologically impossible. In such a case,
the approach has failed to avoid absolute liability. It has only
reduced the incidence of absolute liability, by sparing some de-
fendants without articulating how they differ from those who
must pay. Whatever may be said of absolute liability, few pol-
icy justifications can be offered for "roulette liability." Real, de-
monstrable technological impossibility forces a choice between
an affirmative defense on the one hand and at least potential
absolute liability on the other.288
Comment k of the Restatement 289 may provide the basis
for an affirmative defense. Comment k refers to products inca-
pable, under the present state of human knowledge, of being
made safe for their intended use. Any product that falls within
the parameters of comment k is not defective as a matter of
law. 290 Whether a product falls within the ambit of comment k
depends upon two factors: (1) whether the risk is unavoidable
under the "present state of human knowledge," and
(2) whether the utility of the product justifies its exception
from strict liability.2 91 An illuminating example of judicial rea-
soning along these lines can be found in Borel v. Fiberboard
Paper Products Corp.2 9 2 The plaintiff in Borel developed as-
bestosis after being exposed to asbestos dust, and brought suit
against the asbestos manufacturer. The court observed that as-
287. See infra notes 330-98 and accompanying text.
288. It appears that the reasonableness of an alternative design would be a
jury question while the effect of technological impossibility would be decided
by the court.
289. See supra note 190.
290. See Needham v. white Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir.
1981); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir.
1968).
291. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Murray, supra note 50, at 655-56.
292. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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bestos dust is an unavoidable byproduct of manufacturing as-
bestos insulation, and explained:
'Unavoidably unsafe products' are those which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are incapable of being made safe for their ordinary
and intended use. Strict liability may not always be appropriate in
such cases because of the important benefits derived from the use of
the product. This is especially so with respect to new drugs that are
essential in treating disease but involve a high degree of risk. . . . It
may also be so with respect to other commercial products possessing
both unparalled [sic] utility and unquestioned danger. As a practical
matter, the decision to market such a product requires a balancing of
the product's utility against its known or foreseeable danger.2 93
By definition, technological impossibility meets the first test
the court mentioned. The risk is unavoidable under the "pres-
ent state of human knowledge." Thus, in any particular case,
the only element left to prove is that the utility of the product
justifies its exception from strict liability.
Courts have treated technological impossibility as an af-
firmative defense even without the use of comment k. For ex-
ample, in E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 294 the plaintiff
suffered injuries as the result of the unsuccessful implantation
of a bone transplant product that involved a fifteen percent fail-
ure rate. Because the product was manufactured as intended
or designed, Squibb can be considered a design case.295 On its
facts, the case might have been appropriate for the application
of comment k. Instead, the court emphasized evidence that the
defendant had developed the bone transplant process to the
highest degree then attainable.296 Similarly, Olson v. Arctic En-
terprises, Inc.2 97 involved a plaintiff who injured his foot while
riding a snowmobile. He alleged that the snowmobile was de-
fectively designed because there was no adequate shielding for
the machine's track. The court appeared to give conclusive ef-
fect to the fact that "snowmobile engineers have not succeeded
in designing a shield that would leave the machine opera-
ble."298 If a court allows technological impossibility as an af-
firmative defense,299 then the burden of proof must be
293. Id. at 1088-89.
294. 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974).
295. In design defect cases, "the intended design itself is attacked by [the]
plaintiff as the source of unreasonable risks of harm." Henderson, supra note
261, at 1547.
296. 274 So.2d at 901.
297. 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972).
298. Id. at 765.
299. The state of the art as defined by technological impossibility, when
viewed as an affirmative defense, raises a question whether the defendant has
a continuing duty to issue new warnings as the state of the art advances. One
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allocated. Under comment k, the defendant manufacturer ap-
pears to have the burden of proof.3 00 The burden would be bet-
ter placed upon the defendant, however, regardless of whether
comment k is used. The defendant, presumably has much
greater knowledge of the state of the art than the plaintiff or
any expert that the plaintiff could employ, so the defendant is
in a superior position to bring forth state of the art evidence
and to show that the design change is technologically
impossible.301
This Article has already mentioned that a genuine instance
of technological impossibility, in the context of a design defect
action, forces a choice between an affirmative defense and ab-
solute liability, although some approaches have the effect of im-
posing absolute liability only in a random subset of cases.
Making this choice requires serious consideration of policy.302
Loss spreading, which is one rationale given for applying strict
liability, also results when absolute liability is imposed. Impos-
court has held that if the state of the art advances in some meaningful way sub-
sequent to a product's issuance, so as to reveal a newly discovered danger, the
advance in technology calls for the issuance of new warnings. Rozier v. Ford
Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1344 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Tinnerholm v. Parke Da-
vis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
1969); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 406, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (1979);
Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 901, 275 N.W.2d 915, 923-
24 (1979). But see Jackson v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 166 N.J.
Super. 448, 465, 400 A.2d 81, 89 (1979).
300. Cf. Murray, supra note 50, at 657 (manufacturer utilizing "unavoidably
unsafe" exception of comment k must demonstrate that the state of the art has
not made the risk avoidable).
301. It has been suggested that this version of the state of the art should be
relevant only for injuries caused by nonessential parts or devices, as opposed
to devices essential to the intended purpose of the product. See Note, Products
Liability-Strict Liability-Elimination of the "State of the Art" Defense, 41
TFNN. L. REv. 357, 361 (1974). The writer of the Note argues that nonessential
parts or devices are unnecessary for a machine to fulfill its intended purpose,
and therefore, elimination of the state of the art defense in that context would
not create a risk that the machine would be removed from the marketplace. On
the other hand, if liability is imposed in situations in which it is technologically
impossible to change the design of an essential part or device, then demanding
such a change might result in the manufacturer's withdrawing the machine
from production. In addition, a redesign of an essential part or device might
create new and unforeseen hazards. Id.
This argument has some appeal, but one problem is to distinguish between
essential and nonessential parts or devices in a given case. Courts and juries
may easily become sidetracked by this issue, leaving the main issues to turn
upon the outcome of an arbitrary analysis. On the other hand, there is no rea-
son to deny an affirmative defense when the device involved is not necessary to
the operation of the machine.
302. The two policy rationales most often cited to support strict products li-
ability are loss spreading and accident minimization. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 18-20. See also Holford, supra note 18, at 82.
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ing absolute liability tends to distribute the cost of compensat-
ing the plaintiff throughout society.303 The defendant
manufacturer is in a better position than the plaintiff to spread
the loss, it is claimed, because the defendant may pass the cost
on to consumers by raising prices or may purchase insurance
from a pool supported by the premiums of other manufactur-
ers. Unfortunately, this rationale, when unmodified by other
constraints, may be used to support the imposition of a manu-
facturer's liability in nearly any situation.304 Not only does loss
spreading argue for absolute liability in the context of techno-
logical impossibility, it argues for liability even without the re-
quirements of defectiveness or causation.305 A loss spreading
rationale taken at face value would suggest that manufacturers
are ideally suited to compensate all injured and sick people.
Assuming that other considerations place constraints on the
loss spreading rationale, however, objections can still be made
to relying on loss spreading as a reason to disallow evidence re-
lating to technological impossibility and to impose absolute lia-
bility. For example, not every business is large enough to
absorb the cost of products liability as a business expense and
pass the costs on to the consumer.306 Moreover, advocates of
loss spreading often assume that manufacturers are more
likely than consumers to carry adequate insurance to cover the
kind of loss involved. Although this claim has empirical sup-
port,307 one commentator has nevertheless argued that it is the
consumer who is the most likely to be carrying adequate insur-
ance, through his own major medical policies and employment
benefits, and various welfare programs.308 Loss spreading also
303. See Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 725-26, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 178, 181-82 (1970).
304. See Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 204 Or. 301, 307-10, 405 P.2d 624, 627-29
(1965). See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MmN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
305. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C.L. REV. 643, 659 (1978). One court has gone so far as to say that to deny the
plaintiff the benefit of the inference of proximate cause would frustrate the loss
spreading policy. Dimond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 183, 134
Cal. Rptr. 895, 902 (1976). Although loss spreading is the decisive rationale, Pro-
fessor Epstein has suggested that the legislature is better equipped to set the
level of benefits and to decide questions of basic taxing policy. Thus, Epstein
suggests there need be no tort system at all, but only a comprehensive system
of first party insurance. Epstein, supra, at 660.
306. See Pearis, The God in the Machine, 29 B.U.L REv. 37, 75-78 (1949). See
also Smyser, Products Liability in the American Law Institute: A Petition for
Rehearing, 42 U. DET. J. URB. L. 343, 350 (1965).
307. In a major survey of firms subject to products liability actions, 86% car-
ried some form of insurance. REPORT, supra note 257, at 111-2.
308. See Klemme, supra note 18, at 191-94 n.107 (1976). This argument may
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could raise product prices to politically and socially unaccept-
able levels, although it is difficult to adduce empirical support
for this claim. To the extent that the loss spreading rationale
fosters absolute liability, it engenders resistance from courts3 09
and may invite dilution of existing products liability law. The
sum of these arguments suggests that loss spreading, although
it is one rationale for strict liability, should not be determina-
tive of all strict liability issues. Other rationales must be
weighed and considered.3 10
Accident minimization, the other major policy rationale,
leads to quite different conclusions from those suggested by
loss spreading. If a design change is in fact technologically im-
possible, the manufacturer probably is in no better position
than the consumer to eliminate or reduce the risk. Hence,
there is no reason to hold the manufacturer liable for the de-
sign problem itself, although there may be a basis for liability
in a warning case. Accident minimization, however, involves
two closely related concepts, one of which may actually favor
application of absolute liability. One concept is that of deter-
rence; strict liability should discourage manufacturers from
marketing products without taking great care in production and
design, or without devoting considerable resources to identify-
ing and correcting preventable risks. As technologically impos-
sible design changes are not preventable risks, .the deterrence
concept does not apply in this setting. Accident minimization
also involves an incentive concept, however. Imposition of
strict liability is thought to encourage research and develop-
ment of newer and safer products.31 ' The incentive concept
can be used to rationalize strict liability even when the design
change is a technological impossibility.312 The factual correct-
ness of the incentive concept has been challenged, however, as
have some validity in that, since 1975, rapidly increasing premiums for products
liability insurance have made the use of such insurance impossible, as a practi-
cal matter, for many small manufacturers and retailers.
309. Cf. Weinberger, supra note 64, at 318. See generally Comment, supra
note 125, at 922.
310. One commentator has suggested that the loss spreading principle in ef-
fect compels the consumer to buy accident insurance for himself through in-
creased prices. Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF.
L. REV. 189, 205-206 (1965).
311. See First Nat'l Bank of Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Products,
Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 87, 537 P.2d 682, 695 (Ct. App. 1975). See also Shapo, supra note
18, at 1371; Note, supra note 301, at 363.
312. See Epstein, supra note 305, at 658-59; Plant, Strict Liability of Manu-
facturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24
TENN. L. REV. 938, 939 (1957); Posner, Strict Liability: A Commen4 2 J. LEGAL
STuD. 205, 209 (1973).
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resting on the incorrect assumption that a manufacturer can al-
lot vast resources and attention to a few well defined classes of
cases. 3 13 This hypothetical manufacturer, with a number of re-
sources to devote to the solution of design problems, is not the
prototypical products liability defendant. Even a large manu-
facturer cannot concentrate its resources on any single prob-
lem, or even on a few, because such a manufacturer can expect
hundreds of lawsuits each year based on a wide variety of de-
sign theories. If in every case the plaintiff's lawyer is permitted
to argue that the design problem could have been alleviated if
only the defendant manufacturer had devoted some undefined
additional amount of resources to research and development,
the incentive concept effectively could lead to requiring manu-
facturers to produce perfect products. 314 In addition, at least
one commentator has pointed out that most design problems
are not well defined research questions.315 Instead, the process
of design necessarily involves a host of interrelated judgments
and compromises. 316
Another observer has argued that strict liability may actu-
ally provide a disincentive to safer design under conditions of
technological impossibility.317 The writer notes that the extent
of industrial research and development is motivated primarily
by profit, and that this motive may retard possible advance-
ment in safety design. To seek a technological breakthrough
may be so unprofitable that the manufacturer would prefer to
withdraw the product.
The opposing arguments are persuasive, but the problem is
fundamentally empirical. Further argument about the incen-
tive concept appears futile until the empirical work has been
performed. It appears that the burden ought to be placed upon
manufacturers to come forward with empirical evidence of
whether strict liability will in fact motivate them to achieve
technological breakthroughs or design changes that are purely
for safety.
Meanwhile, a sensible approach to follow is to permit the
manufacturer an affirmative defense if it can meet the test sug-
gested by comment k. That is, if the defendant establishes the
technological impossibility of a design change, and the utility of
313. See O'Donnell, supra note 97, at 645.
314. Id. at 645-56. See also Willis, Product Liability Without Fault: Some
Problems and Proposals, 15 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 648, 660-63 (1960).
315. See generally Henderson, supra note 261, at 1558.
316. Id.
317. See Note, supra note 301, at 361.
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the product is sufficient to offset its hazards, such a showing
should be conclusive of nonliability. There are several advan-
tages to this approach. For one, this approach supplies a
clearly articulated theory within which the role of technological
impossibility is manifest. In addition, the approach achieves
many of the social benefits of loss spreading and loss minimiza-
tion,3 18 while avoiding the social losses that would result from
manufacturers withholding useful products from the market.
Absolute liability is not eliminated, but there is a yardstick of
usefulness for distinguishing which defendants will be subject
to it and which will not. If a product cannot be made safer, the
manufacturer will have a basis to judge whether it should with-
hold the product, distribute it, or invest extensively in making
it safer. The judgment will reflect the manufacturer's assess-
ment of the profitability of the product, the cost of its hazards,
and the public's perception of its utility. Presumably, a manu-
facturer will be more likely to market products it believes the
public will consider beneficial under the comment k approach
suggested here. Finally, the suggested approach avoids negli-
gence principles. Liability depends on the product's utility, if it
cannot be made safer.
The use of comment k is not entirely without disadvan-
tages, however. Freeing manufacturers of beneficial products
from strict liability may create a disincentive to improve the
design of those products, which might shift manufacturers' re-
sources to design improvements in less useful but highly profit-
able products. Difficulties may also develop in judging product
usefulness. Contraceptives, for example, may be judged less
useful by juries in a heavily Catholic area than in a predomi-
nantly non-Catholic region. The result may be that a plaintiff
injured by contraceptives in one jurisdiction recovers, while an
identically-injured plaintiff in another does not. Despite these
disadvantages, however, affording an affirmative defense under
comment k when technological impossibility is the issue seems
preferable to the alternatives of absolute liability, "roulette lia-
bility," or no liability.
V. FEASIBILITY
In addition to developmental limitations, the form a manu-
facturer's product ultimately takes depends to a great extent
upon economics and upon maximizing the functioning of the
318. There is no reason to doubt that liability would still be extensive under
this approach.
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product for the purposes for which it was intended. These con-
siderations involve "feasibility," and this concept has been
used to define yet another version of the state of the art.3 19 A
manufacturer raising a claim of feasibility state of the art does
not argue that greater safety in the product was impossible to
achieve. Rather, the manufacturer maintains that it could have
been achieved only at an inordinate cost. Usually the cost is
economic, but in some design defect cases the manufacturer ar-
gues that the safety feature proposed by the plaintiff would
have inordinately decreased the utility of the product. The
troublesome concept is "inordinate." A miniscule price in-
crease or a minimal increase in the difficulty of using the prod-
uct obviously does not amount to infeasibility. On the other
hand, a safety measure that adds $1,000 to the cost of a $100
item or that nearly destroys the utility of a product is plainly
infeasible. Feasibility, therefore, inevitably raises issues of rea-
sonableness and the relationship between feasibility and negli-
gence theory. The issues and arguments usually center on
whether evidence of infeasibility should be admitted at all and,
if so, on what issue. If the evidence is admissible, the question
becomes whether infeasibility should constitute an afirmnative
defense.
A. MANUFACTURING DEFECTS
In a manufacturing defect case, an issue may arise whether
a better method of quality control was economically feasible. 20
Several experts have suggested that "[o]ne hundred per cent
quality control probably does not exist, and anything too
closely approaching it might well price out of the market the
product to which it is applied."3 21 Quality control engineers de-
319. See, e.g., Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 26 M1. App. 3d 971, 326 N.E.2d
74 (1975); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749
(1972); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974).
320. "Quality control" here refers to the manufacturing process and its tech-
nology, as well as the process of locating defects after manufacture.
321. Bernstein, supra note 29, at 516. Bernstein cites several works on qual-
ity control, one of which states that the purpose of quality control is to insure
that the "proportion of unsatisfactory or defective units is not excessive." D.
COWDEN, STATISTICAL METHODS IN QUALITY CONTROL 1 (1957). Another author
has stated:
Under the speed of mass production, it is often impossible to continu-
ally turn out 100 percent satisfactory product. One must assume that a
certain percentage of defectives will always occur on certain processes;
however, if the percentage does not exceed a certain limit, it is often
more economical to allow the defectives to go through rather than to
screen each lot.
N. ENRiciC, QuALrry CONTROL 7 (4th ed. 1960).
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termine the optimum level of risk by weighing the cost of quali-
ty control against the percentage of defective products the
market will tolerate.322 Professor Bernstein notes that even the
careful and prudent manufacturer "deliberately assigns to each
consumer a specific known risk that the product he buys will
be defective."32 3 A manufacturer will not attempt to lower risks
if lowering would require an inordinate increase in cost. If eco-
nomic feasibility state of the art is recognized as an affirmative
defense, a manufacturer would never be liable for defectively
manufactured products that escape its quality control, provid-
ing it has correctly computed the optimal risk level. Under this
standard, the manufacturer need only present evidence that its
quality control is adequate, and that improved quality control
would price its product out of the market. This showing would
include a demonstration that the risk level has been set at a
point at which the cost of injuries is outweighed by the cost of
increased quality control.324 For example, suppose that the
level of risk has been set at five percent, so that five percent of
the manufacturer's defective products will escape quality con-
trol and enter the stream of commerce. Furthermore, assume
that injuries resulting from the distribution of this five percent
cost $1 million a year. If the manufacturer were to reduce the
level of risk by one-fifth, to four percent, the cost of the injuries
would be proportionately reduced by one-fifth, to $800,000 a
year. The savings in injury costs would be $200,000 per year.
Assume, however, that it would cost about $300,000 to catch this
additional one percent of defective items. The manufacturer
would be expending $300,000 in order to save $200,000, and the
economic costs would be out of balance.3 25
One argument that can be made against economic in-
feasibility is that it is not relevant to any issue in the case.326
322. D. COWDEN, supra note 321, at 4-5, 101, 489. See generally N. ENRIcK,
supra note 321, at 6.
323. The level of risk most quality control planners will accept is between
five and ten percent. D. COWDEN, supra note 321, at 489; Bernstein, supra note
29, at 516-17.
324. "Quality control consists of inspection (visual comparison) and testing
(actual operation of the product). The two types of control inspection and test-
ing procedures are (1) 100% inspection and testing and (2) sample inspection
and testing." Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 1977
Hous. L. REv. 1, 171.
325. This hypothetical assumes that more economical design changes in the
product or in the manufacturing equipment are not possible. For a description
of additional cost that might be involved in setting a lower standard of risk, see
Holford, supra note 18, at 84-86.
326. No cases involving a feasibility state of the art claim in a manufactur-
ing defect case have been located.
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For example, one might argue that economic feasibility is irrel-
evant to the existence of a defect. But this argument is unnec-
essary, because a defendant raising infeasibility in a
manufacturing defect case effectively concedes that the product
is defective. More to the point, one might assert that in-
feasibility evidence is simply evidence of the exercise of due
care, focusing on the conduct of the manufacturer or seller
rather than on the product, and consequently the evidence is
out of place in a strict liability action. 32 7 This argument cannot
be gainsaid. The critical question is whether or not feasibility
ought to become an issue in a section 402A case.
Proponents of feasibility state of the art offer what is essen-
tially a policy argument transcending the confines of section
402A. The argument is that if a defendant must compensate for
injuries caused by its defective products after it has set its
quality control at optimum levels, then beneficial products will
be driven from the market because of the increase in cost. Sev-
eral responses effectively dispose of this argument. First, the
optimum risk level itself depends on whether the manufacturer
or the consumer pays the cost of injuries caused by defective
products that escape the quality control net. Reconsider the
scenario suggested earlier. Is the $1 million the cost of injuries
paid by the manufacturer, or is it the cost of those that actually
occurred? If it is the cost of injuries that actually occurred,
then absolute liability is warranted, for the risk/benefit level,
and hence the product price, have been set to cover all costs of
injury resulting from the use of the product. Under these con-
ditions, whenever the manufacturer escapes payment it re-
ceives a windfall. An alternative, and far more likely, scenario
is that the $1 million is only the cost of injury actually paid by
the manufacturer. Perhaps the actual cost of injury is $2 mil-
ion, $4 million, or even more. Reconsider the computation us-
ing a $2 million figure. The cost savings from a one-fifth
reduction in cost would be $400,000, rather than $200,000, and an
expenditure of $300,000 to achieve it would be economically fea-
sible. The feasibility of lower risk levels, then, depends on the
injury costs the manufacturer actually pays, which is partly de-
termined by the outcome of products liability lawsuits. 328 So
long as the seller can show it has set the level of risk at an opti-
mum level, then a jury could very easily find that the seller had
327. Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. 1978).
328. The optimum risk level also depends on whether a strict liability or
negligence theory of liability is employed.
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not violated the standard of ordinary care.32 9 Feasibility argu-
ments in this type of case are circular and bypass a major pol-
icy basis of strict liability theory: compelling manufacturers to
set a lower level of risk.
In addition, the argument that beneficial products will dis-
appear from the market if manufacturers and sellers must pay
for the injuries caused by defective products is essentially an
argument for abandoning strict liability and returning to a neg-
ligence standard of liabilty. A negligence standard no doubt
would lower considerably the cost of injuries borne by products
liability defendants, thus encouraging "beneficial" products to
remain on the market. Unfortunately, such lowered costs
would raise the optimum level of risk, and the economics of the
marketplace are such that actual risks would doubtlessly rise.
Strict liability in tort was adopted precisely for that reason, and
permitting feasibility to become an issue in a manufacturing
defect case surely subverts its purposes. Strict liability in tort
displaced negligence not simply to keep the level of risk low,
but to impose liability for risks falling within the optimum
level. It was designed to afford compensation for these risks on
the theory that the seller is in the best position either to mini-
mize or to spread the loss.
The argument that beneficial products will be driven from
the market if the defendant cannot escape liability for risks
falling within the optimal risk levels is subject to a further criti-
cism. The policy implications of the argument depend heavily
on the word "beneficial," which is actually an irrelevant con-
cept. The impact of products liability lawsuits and feasibil-
ity/infeasibility arguments is the same regardless of how
beneficial the product is. Although some situations may exist
in which the benefits of the product are relevant to a manufac-
turer's defense, a manufacturing defect case involving in-
feasibility is not one of them. If a product is highly beneficial,
then the public will be willing to pay enough for it to render the
increased cost of improved quality control economically feasi-
ble. Economic infeasibility, therefore, may be a defense most
frequently invoked for products of questionable benefit.
One should also remember that manufacturers set risk
levels based only on the relative dollar cost of the injuries and
the dollar cost of increased quality control. Dollar costs are not
the only costs which should be considered. Human and social
329. In many negligence cases, the standard of the reasonably prudent
seller would be used.
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costs accompany every injury, and are rarely taken into ac-
count by manufacturers. The courts must encourage manufac-
turers to set risk levels that factor these costs into the analysis.
In summary, if infeasibility could become an issue in a
manufacturing defect case, there would be an effective return
to a negligence standard. If manufacturers and sellers are re-
lieved of liability for defects falling within the optimum level of
risk, they will be encouraged to raise the level of risk. An in-
feasibility defense thus subverts the important rationale of ac-
cident minimization underlying section 402A and, by avoiding
compensation for risks defined by manufacturers as "accepta-
ble," subverts its loss spreading rationale as well.
B. DESIGN DEFECTS
Feasibility state of the art issues arise most often in design
defect cases. The principal issue is usually the feasibility of the
design changes advocated by the plaintiff. One resulting ques-
tion is whether the defendant should be permitted to demon-
strate the infeasibility of the alternative design. If so, a second
question is the point in time at which infeasibility is relevant.
A defendant who argues that the plaintiff's alternative design is
infeasible concedes that it could be technologically imple-
mented, but contends that it is impractical to do so. The rea-
sons usually involve inordinate economic costs, decrease in
product utility, or a claim that the alternative design creates
the same risk or a greater one than the design under attack.
Some or all of these factors are weighed in determining if the
alternative design is infeasible. Again, the most common issue
is whether the defendant's evidence of infeasibility is admissi-
ble on any proper issue in the case, and if so, on which issue. A
second question is whether infeasibility should constitute an
affirmative defense barring the plaintiff's recovery.
The primary argument against admitting evidence of in-
feasibility is the same "due care" argument previously encoun-
tered; that feasibility evidence is simply evidence of the
exercise of due care, and thus relevant only in a negligent de-
sign case, not in a strict liability case. The usual corollary also
applies, that feasibility evidence relates only to the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's conduct in designing its product,
whereas the strict liability case looks-only to the defectiveness
of the product.33 0
330. Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 79 A.D.2d 287, -, 436 N.Y.S.2d 480, 485
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A recent case advancing this position is Baily v. Boatland
of Houston, Inc.,33 1 a wrongful death action in strict liability
against the seller of a fishing boat. The plaintiff's decedent was
thrown from the boat when it struck a partially submerged tree
stump and, with its motor still running, turned and circled
sharply, killing the decedent with its propeller. The plaintiff's
primary contention was that the boat should have been
equipped with a "kill switch" that automatically would have cut
the boat's motor when the decedent fell out. The plaintiffs elic-
ited testimony that kill switches are relatively simple devices
and that they significantly increase boat safety at minimum
cost. The inventor of the kill switch testified that the concept
behind them was not new, and that something similar had been
used for thirty years on racing boats. Apparently, nothing like
a kill switch had ever been used on the type of boat involved in
this case, and although the inventor of the switch had applied
for his patent about five months prior to the accident, he did
not market them until about fifteen months after the accident.
No other kill switches for fishing boats were being marketed
prior to the accident. The defendant's state of the art evidence
was that kill switches were not "commercially available" at the
time this boat was sold, even though the concept of kill switch-
es was not new. The president of Boatland testified that he did
not know about kill switches until about the time of the acci-
dent, and did not begin to sell them until a year later. 3 2
The trial court admitted the evidence, but the court of civil
appeals reversed.333 It rejected the defendant's argument that
evidence of infeasibility due to the commercial unavailability of
kill switches could be used to establish the reasonable expecta-
tions of the ordinary consumer, defined as the ordinary knowl-
edge common in the community as to the product's
characteristics, which would be relevant to the existence of a
defect.3 34 The court stated:
[TIhe intent and purpose of strict tort liability would [not] be satisfied
by the expectations of consumers being defined by the actions of man-
(1981), affd, 56 N.Y.2d 550, 449 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982); Claytor v. General Motors
Corp., - S.C. -, 286 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1982).
331. 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), rev'd, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
332. Boatland was the retailer, not the manufacturer, of the boat. Neither
the court of civil appeals nor the supreme court, however, drew any distinction
between a retailer and a manufacturer with respect to state of the art evidence.
Id.
333. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of civil appeals in
Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Baily, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). The supreme
court's reasoning is discussed infra at notes 351-54 and accompanying text.
334. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
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ufacturers and suppliers whose products may be defective. This phi-
losophy presupposes that the expectation of an ordinary consumer as
to the safety of a product is determined by generally accepted trade
practices within the industry. That line of reasoning requires the pre-
sumption that an ordinary consumer is aware of all the technical ex-
pertise of the manufacturers, who are charged with having expert
knowledge in the field. The expectation of the ordinary consumer
should be based on experience with the product itself, not the expert
technological knowledge of the manufacturer within the industry.
3 3 5
The court's analysis exaggerated the argument favoring ad-
missibility on the consumer expectation definition of defective-
ness. The expectations of the ordinary consumer are not
claimed to be "determined by generally accepted trade prac-
tices within the industry," but only influenced by them. Fur-
thermore, admitting this evidence on the issue of defectiveness
does not require the presumption "that an ordinary consumer
is aware of all the technical expertise of the manufacturers
... ." It only presumes that the ordinary consumer is aware of
the state of the art as it is incorporated into the product in-
volved and similar products. Thus, the expectation of the ordi-
nary consumer is based on experience "of the product itself,"
not the "expert technological knowledge of the manufacturer."
To that extent, the state of the art influences the expectations
of the ordinary consumer.336
The court of civil appeals also took the position that evi-
dence of infeasibility in this case was simply "due care" evi-
dence. It quoted section 402A of the Restatement, that the
seller is liable for a defective product even though it had exer-
cised "all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct."337 The court concluded:
[E]vidence pertaining to the existing state of the art addresses the ir-
relevant issue of care. To allow a defense to strict liability on the basis
a product was made in accordance with the best available practices
and existing technology in the industry at the time of production, it is
argued, would emasculate the doctrine of strict tort liability and 'signal
a return to a negligence theory.'
3 3 8
The court went on to state:
335. 585 S.W.2d at 808.
336. The charge in Baily defined "defective" in terms of the expectations of
the ordinary consumer, or, in the alternative, whether a prudent seller, aware
of the risks, would place the product in the channels of commerce. Telephone
interview with Donald B. McFall, defense attorney (Aug. 10, 1981). At the time
of the case, however, the law of Texas was clear that an alleged defective de-
sign would be judged in terms of utility versus risk. See, e.g., Helicoid Gage v.
Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). See also Campbell v. General
Motors Corp., - Cal. 3d -, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
337. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2) (a) (1965).
338. 585 S.W.2d at 809.
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The focus in a strict liability case is on the product not the reasoning
behind the manufacturer's adoption of the design or the care exercised
by the manufacturer in making such decision .... The admission of
the evidence of the unavailability of kill switches was erroneous. It did
not address the 'utility' of the product or establish the process by
which the design was adopted but rather emphasized the care exer-
cised by the manufacturer, and other manufacturers, in designing the
boat in question. The care exercised by appellee is not in issue.33 9
The court appears to have reasoned that the product's design
should be judged on the basis of utility versus risk. If the dan-
ger of the design is in fact greater than the utility of the prod-
uct, then the product is defective. It does not matter why the
manufacturer chose that particular design, even if it could not
feasibly have done otherwise.
This reasoning overlooks two important points. First, the
court notes that one of the factors a jury may consider in evalu-
ating risk versus utility evidence is "the manufacturer's ability
to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without seri-
ously impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing its
costs ... ."340 This factor clearly invites feasibility evidence
and an inquiry into the reasoning behind a manufacturer's
adoption of a particular design. Many courts and commenta-
tors have taken the position that the only difference between
strict liability and negligence is the defendant's knowledge of
the danger.34 1 In strict liability, the manufacturer is conclu-
sively presumed to know of all dangers associated with the
product. The remaining inquiry is whether the risk of harm
outweighs the utility of the product.342 This inquiry injects a
concept of reasonableness in a design defect case.34 3 The sec-
339. Id. at 810-11 (emphasis in original). From these passages, it appears
that the court was not certain whether this was an "industry custom" case or a
"feasibility" case. The supreme court treated the case as a "feasibility" case.
See Keeton, Tort Liability of an Occupier of Land to an Employee of an In-
dependent Contractor, 35 Sw. LJ. 1, 13 (1981); Note, Use of "State of the Art"
Evidence in Strict Liability Claims: The New Texas Standard, 33 BAYLOR L.
Rav. 165, 170 (1981).
340. 585 S.W.2d at 811.
341. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
342. See, e.g., Bcrel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-
89 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.
Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), a ff'd mem, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Aller v.
Rodgers Mach. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978); Phillips v. Kimwood
Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 495, 525 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1974); Keeton, supra note 111,
at 404; Phillips, supra note 2, at 117; Wade, supra note 54, at 835. But see
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 96-97, 337 A.2d 893, 900 (1975).
343. Some courts have felt that the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" in
§ 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts unnecessarily employs a negli-
gence concept. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d
1153, 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-42 (1972).
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ond problem with the court's "due care" argument is the fact
that a safer design is necessarily an integral part of a design
defect case. The plaintiff cannot attack an allegedly defective
design without offering an implicit or explicit alternative.
When the plaintiff's lawyer tells the jury how the product
should have been designed, the jury is implicitly or explicitly
told that the alternative design is feasible. The plaintiff's own
case really puts the feasibility of the alternative design in issue,
a position well summed up by a statement of the court in
Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp.:344 "he possible exist-
ence of alternate designs introduces the feature of feasibility
since a manufacturer's product can hardly be faulted if safer al-
ternatives are not feasible." 345 If the plaintiff must put the fea-
sibility of an alternative design in issue, not only is it unfair to
the manufacturer not to permit it to point out reasons why the
alternative is infeasible, but it is unfair to the jury, which can
only assume the design suggested by the plaintiff is feasible
unless the defendant shows otherwise. The "due care" argu-
ment overlooks the requirement that the plaintiff must estab-
lish the possibility of a safer design.34 6
The position of the court of civil appeals in Baily illustrates
a tension which permeates the law of products liability. Many
courts desire strict liability in tort to be genuinely strict, and
not a higher form of negligence. Other courts, perhaps con-
cerned about social, economic, and political implications, fear
that a pure form of strict liability is too harsh, and thus import
the notion of reasonableness into design defect cases.347 A
court's view of the purposes of a products liability lawsuit will
likely determine its position concerning evidence of a manufac-
turer's conduct in a design case, including the admissibility of
evidence relating to feasibility. The court is more likely to find
reasons to admit such evidence if it is concerned about the pos-
sible unfairness to the manufacturer in not allowing it to ex-
plain why it chose the design it did, or if it is concerned that
true strict liability will drive some companies out of business or
impose a heavy economic burden on consumers. On the other
344. 5 I1. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
345. Id. at 319, 281 N.E.2d at 753.
346. The reference to "care" in the Restatement only appears to establish
the principle that a lack of negligence does not provide a defense. This refer-
ence cannot necessarily be read to mean that all evidence of "care" is
irrelevant.
347. Texas is one of the states that has incorporated a notion of reasonable-
ness into design defect cases. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d
844 (Tex. 1979).
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hand, if the court is concerned about compensating the plaintiff
and providing an incentive for manufacturers to produce safer
products, it is more likely to opt for strict liability without per-
mitting introduction of any concept which explicitly considers
reasonableness.
Most of the arguments that can be advanced regarding in-
feasibility evidence favor admitting it. One such argument is
found in the oft-repeated rule that a seller is only obliged to de-
sign a reasonably safe product. The seller is not required to de-
sign the safest possible product or to adopt those features that
represent the maximum in safety of design.3 48 If this rule is to
be meaningful, evidence of infeasibility ought to be admissible.
If a jury is not informed as to the infeasibility of a suggested
alternative design, then nothing prevents it from forcing the
manufacturer to adopt the ultimate in safety and design. The
same rule can be taken to mean that a product is not necessar-
ily defective even if a safer, and feasible, design was available.
A more compelling argument for admitting evidence of in-
feasibility is that the evidence is relevant to the issue of defec-
tiveness, based on one of the two major tests for a design
defect.349 One test of defective design is the balancing of utility
versus risk. The cases that have addressed the issue of feasi-
bility of an alternative design in the context of this test gener-
ally have held that the plaintiff must demonstrate the
feasibility of the alternative design in order to show that the
design used was defective.350 This was the position advanced
by the Supreme Court of Texas in reversing the court of civil
appeals in Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Baily.351 The supreme
court recognized that the plaintiff's case implicitly required
proof of a feasible alternative design when it stated that the
348. Weakley v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975);
Warner v. Kewanee Mach. & Conveyor Co., 411 F.2d 1060, 1066 (6th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 906 (1970); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 20,
484 P.2d 47, 61 (1971); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 93 (Tex.
1974).
349. See supra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
350. Feasibility of the alternative design is not an issue in every case, be-
cause the feasibility of the alternative design may be so obvious that it will not
be controverted by the defendant. When the feasibility of the alternative is not
obvious, however, and the defendant controverts the feasibility of the alterna-
tive design, then the plaintiff must demonstrate feasibility as part of his or her
burden of proof. Of course, a design is not determined to be defective solely on
the basis of the feasibility of an alternative design. Feasibility of an alternative
design is a necessary condition to liability, but it is not a sufficient condition to
liability. See O'Donnell, supra note 97, at 637.
351. 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
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"defectiveness of the product in question is determined in rela-
tion to safer alternatives .... -352 The court then elucidated
the requirement of feasibility in the alternative design:
Whether a product was defectively designed must be judged against
the technological context existing at the time of its manufacture. Thus,
when the plaintiff alleges that a product was defectively designed be-
cause it lacked a specific feature, attention may become focused on the
feasibility of that feature-the capacity to provide the feature without
greatly increasing the product's cost or impairing usefulness. 353
The Texas Supreme Court went on to hold that the commercial
unavailability of kill switches was a legitimate aspect of feasi-
bility state of the art and that evidence of this commercial un-
availability was admissible. 354
The Boatland court is on the right track, although its hold-
ing could have been more tightly drawn, and its reasoning, al-
though sound, may have been inapposite to the facts of the
case. In Boatland, "commercial unavailability" apparently
meant that the defendant could not buy kill switches on the
commercial market. Depending on the factual issues posed by
the case, such evidence may or may not be relevant. When the
defendant is a seller who adds various features to a basic prod-
uct made by another, commercial unavailability is relevant to
feasibility. On the other hand, when, unlike Boatland, the de-
fendant is a manufacturer, there may be a duty to manufacture
the safety feature, not just to purchase it. If such a duty exists,
commercial unavailability becomes irrelevant to the feasibility
issue. A manufacturer in such a case should not be able to es-
cape liability by proving that the safety feature could not be
purchased elsewhere.355 Such a rule might encourage manu-
facturers to make a bare bones product and allege that produc-
352. Id. at 746.
353. Id. The court also made suggestions as to how a plaintiff may demon-
strate feasibility:
A plaintiff may advance the argument that a safer alternative was feasi-
ble with evidence that it was in actual use or was available at the time
of manufacture. Feasibility may also be shown with evidence of the
scientific and economic capacity to develop the safer alternative. Thus,
evidence of the actual use of, or capacity to use, safer alternatives is
relevant insofar as it depicts the available scientific knowledge and the
practicalities of applying that knowledge to a product's design.
Id.
354. The court indicated that feasibility state of the art evidence, even
though admissible, did not constitute a defense to the plaintiff's action, nor en-
title the defendant to a defensive issue. Id. at 749 n.3.
355. As to whether a nonmanufacturing seller should be treated differently
from a manufacturing seller, see W. KimILE & R. LESHER, supra note 22, § 138.
In fact, the defendant in Boatland was a nonmanufacturing seller, but the court
drew no distinction between these two types of sellers.
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tion of safety features was beyond the scope of its duty. When
the manufacturer establishes it had no duty to produce the
safety feature, commercial unavailability may become relevant.
No such showing was made in Boatland, however, and in fact
the kill switch would no doubt have been easy and economical
to produce and install. Consequently, commercial unavailabil-
ity should not have been a consideration in the case.35 6
Boatland can also be critiqued on another ground. The
court defined state of the art as including the "scientific knowl-
edge, economic feasibility, and the practicalities of implementa-
tion when the product was manufactured. Evidence of this
nature is important in determining whether a safer design was
feasible."3 57 The state of the art was thus defined to include
both technological impossibility and feasibility, concepts which
are distinguished in this Article. It is preferable to analyze
technological impossibility separately from feasibility, because
the concepts are discrete and relate to issues and policies
differently.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the Texas Supreme
Court now expressly requires a plaintiff to show his or her al-
ternative design is feasible as part of the plaintiff's affirmative
case on the issue of defectiveness. Other courts have permit-
ted the defendant to raise feasibility on the same issue, but
without use of the word "feasibility." The Wade formula for de-
fective design, which has been adopted extensively by the
courts, includes "the ability to eliminate the danger without se-
riously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it un-
duly expensive."3 58 Most courts which have adopted the risk
356. A strong dissent was registered on exactly this ground. See 609 S.W.2d
at 752-53.
357. 609 S.W.2d at 748.
358. The Wade formula for defective design involves balancing the following
factors:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the
user and to the public as a whole; (2) the safety aspects of the prod-
uct-the likelihood that it will cause injury and the probable serious-
ness of the injury; (3) the availability of a substitute product which
would meet the same need and not be as unsafe; (4) the manufac-
turer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its util-
ity; (5) the user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product; (6) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers
inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general pub-
lic knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the exist-
ence of suitable warnings or instructions; (7) the feasibility, on the part
of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the
product or carrying liability insurance. (footnote omitted).
Wade, supra note 54, at 837-38. Dean Keeton's formula considers:
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versus utility test for design defect have adopted all or part of
the Wade formula.359
Several cases illustrate how variations of the Wade formula
invite evidence of feasibility to establish defectiveness. In Hud-
dell v. Levin,360 the court stated that the "manufacturer is re-
quired to take reasonable steps-within the limitations of cost,
technology, and marketability-to design and produce a vehicle
that will minimize the unavoidable danger."361 The court re-
quired that the plaintiff "offer proof of an alternative, safer de-
sign, practicable under the circumstances." 362 Another court,
in Lollie v. Ohio Brass Co., 3 63 stated that the plaintiff must es-
tablish that "in terms of cost, practicality and technological
possibility, the alternative design was feasible."364 Finally, in
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corporation,365 the requirement was
expressed with particular lucidity. In Wilson, the plaintiff's evi-
dence indicated that the design of the airplane's fuel system
contributed to the likelihood of carburetor ice formation, and
that the crash was probably caused by engine failure due to
carburetor icing. Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff
had not presented a prima facie case. The court stated:
[T] he court is to determine, and to weigh in the balance, whether the
proposed alternative design has been shown to be practicable. The
trial court should not permit an allegation of design defect to go to the
jury unless there is sufficient evidence upon which to make this deter-
mination. If liability for alleged design defects is to 'stop somewhere
short of the freakish and the fantastic,' plaintiffs' prima facie case of a
defect must show more than the technical possibility of a safer
(1) That there was in fact an appreciable danger from some condition,
ingredient, or component of the product; (2) That it was a known or sci-
entifically knowable fact at the time of sale that harm could result from
a condition or an ingredient of the product; (3) That the maker realized
or should have realized in the exercise ordinary care the dangers in-
volved in the product's use; and (4) That an ordinary man would have
concluded that the magnitude of the discovered danger outweighed the
benefits of the product, at least in the absence of more satisfactory in-
structions or information.
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 565 (1969).
359. See, e.g., Turner v. General Motors, 584 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. 1979).
360. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
361. Id. at 735.
362. Id. at 737.
363. 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974).
364. Id. at 744. In a negligence case, one court has held that the plaintiff's
alternative design must be practical in the relevant context. This means that
the design must be functional with respect to the product in question. That the
design would work well in a different product with a different purpose proves
nothing. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagon Werk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir.
1974).
365. 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978).
[Vol. 67:343
STATE OF THE ART EVIDENCE
design.366
Later in the opinion, the court also stated:
It is not proper to submit such allegations to the jury unless the court
is satisfied that there is evidence from which the jury could find the
suggested alternatives are not only technically feasible but also practi-
cable in terms of cost and the over-all design and operation of the prod-
uct. It is part of the required proof that a design feature is a 'defect' to
present such evidence.367
The Huddell, Levin and Wilson cases illustrate the ap-
proach of those jurisdictions that have adopted a utility versus
risk analysis. Must the plaintiff also prove a feasible alterna-
tive design in states which have adopted the "consumer expec-
tation" test of defectiveness? Section 402A of the Restatement
requires the plaintiff to show that the product was dangerous
beyond the expectation of "the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics."368 The primary arguments
against admitting feasibility evidence are the "due care" and
conduct versus product arguments; that feasibility evidence is
irrelevant to the expectations of ordinary consumers and would
therefore constitute only evidence of "due care," and that feasi-
bility focuses on the manufacturer's conduct rather than the
defectiveness of the product.
A recent Arizona case illustrates this position. In Brady v.
Melody Homes Manufacturer,369 the plaintiff's decedents per-
ished in a fire which destroyed their mobile home, manufac-
tured by the defendant. Liability was premised upon alleged
design defects. The mobile home contained only one egress,
and the manufacturer had installed no smoke detector alarms,
escape hatches, or pop-out windows. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the Arizona
Court of Appeals recognized the controversy surrounding the
366. Id. at 68, 577 P.2d at 1326.
367. Id. at 69, 577 P.2d at 1327. On rehearing, the court stated: "In our origi-
nal opinion in this products liability case we held that a prima facie case of a
design defect must include evidence which would permit a finding that a safer
design would have been practicable." Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or.
411, 413, 579 P.2d 1287, 1287 (1978). For other cases applying evidence of feasibil-
ity, see Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 162-63, 390 N.E.2d 859, 864 (1979); Back v.
Wickers Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
83 Mich. App. 74, 78-79, 268 N.W.2d 291, 293 (1978); Bexiga v. Haver Mfg. Corp., 60
N.J. 402, 410-11, 290 A.2d 281, 285 (1972). See also W. KINMLE & R. LEsHER, supra
note 22, § 133, at 164-65; Keeton, The Meaning of "Defect" in Products Liability
Law-A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 593 (1980).
368. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i, at 352 (1965);
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 228 (1978).
369. 121 Ariz. 253, 589 P.2d 896 (1978).
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
feasibility of a safer design as an element of a design defect
case. The court then identified the critical question, whether
the facts at trial should be limited to those relating to the prod-
uct alone, or whether the conduct of the manufacturer in pro-
ducing the item could also be considered. The court concluded
that if the harm-producing design fell within the Restatement
definition of "defect," a condition which made the product dan-
gerous beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer,370
only evidence relating to the product itself should be consid-
ered, and that courts which consider feasibility have moved out
of the area of strict liability and into the area of the reasonable-
ness of the manufacturer's conduct. The court explained:
If a trier of fact or a judge must consider such factors as the 'mechani-
cal feasibility,' 'financial cost,' and 'adverse consequences to the prod-
uct,'... we do not conceive how this can be done without considering
whether the manufacturer's conduct was reasonable in choosing the
design utilized. For example, if a given product incorporated all of the
safety factors known to technology at the time of the manufacture, and
advanced technology renders that design obsolete, must not the trier of
fact consider whether the manufacturer's conduct in choosing the ex-
isting 'mechanical feasibility' was reasonable? Or, would not the trier
of fact consider whether a manufacturer's conduct was reasonable in
discarding a safety device costing $1,000 on a product made to sell for
$100?371
To the Arizona Court of Appeals, at least, the feasibility of a
safer, alternative design is not an issue in a strict liability de-
sign defect case. Apparently, if the expectations of the ordi-
nary consumer demanded a safety device costing $1,000 on a
product selling for $100, that court would find the product is de-
fective if the safety device were not included. The court ap-
pears to have opted for absolute liability in design defect cases
involving infeasible alternatives. 72 A most- cogent criticism of
the court's holding can be found in its own opinion in which the
court stated that if "[i]n defining the word 'defect' we have
eliminated any semblance of correctible wrong on the part of
the defendant, we have moved out of the area of tort law and
370. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965).
371. 121 Ariz. at 259, 589 P.2d at 902.
372. The court concluded that the only design defects that are to be gov-
erned by strict liability are those that result in "a condition not contemplated
by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." Id.
at 257, 589 P.2d at 900 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A com-
ment g (1965)). For products for which the reasonable expectation test may
not be applicable because the consumer has no idea how safe the product
could be made, liability is to be determined by negligence principles, through a
risk/benefit analysis which considers feasibility as one of the factors in the
analysis. 121 Ariz. at 259, 589 P.2d at 902.
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into a compensation system based on injury."373
When the expectations of the ordinary consumer define de-
fectiveness, the argument for admitting feasibility evidence is
that such evidence can be used to establish that the product is
similar to all other products of the same type, and that there-
fore an ordinary consumer would have realized the potential
danger.3 74 The argument is simple and compelling. If the alter-
native design is infeasible, it is highly unlikely that any product
so designed has ever appeared in the marketplace. If the ordi-
nary consumer has never encountered the proposed alternative
design, then it is unlikey that ordinary consumer expectations
would require such a design. Of course, a consumer, through
lack of technical expertise, occasionally might expect infeasible
safety features. These expectations would change, however, if
the consumer were informed of the infeasibility of the alterna-
tive design.37-
One commentator has contended that, if a manufacturer
can avoid the liability because alternative designs are infeasi-
ble, product safety research may be suspended.376 Although
overstated, the argument may have some merit. Manufacturers
may be less motivated to invest heavily in turning infeasible
designs into feasible ones, if they can argue infeasibility in
court. Even so, the drawbacks of the imposition of absolute lia-
bility when alternative designs are infeasible outweigh its po-
tential benefits for several reasons. First, however motivated a
manufacturer may be to make a currently infeasible design fea-
sible, the multifaceted nature of the design process 377 is inter-
posed between the manufacturer's motivation and the ultimate
product. If that process does not lend itself to resolving a well
defined problem, even massive increments in manufacturer
373. 121 Ariz. at 259, 589 P.2d at 902. In Aller v. Rodgers Machinery Mfg. Co.,
268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978), the court took an unusual approach which com-
bines the consumer expectation test with the risk/utility test. This court re-
solved the risk/utility question from the standpoint of the expectations of the
ordinary consumer. It seems that under this hybrid the feasibility of an alter-
native design would be admissible evidence, especially since the court stated
that the balancing process involved in a strict liability design case is the same
as that used in a negligence case. The court asserted that the balance of risk
and utility from the standpoint of the consumer is no different than from the
standpoint of the seller. Id. at 835.
374. Murray, supra note 50, at 654; Note, supra note 339, at 171; Comment,
supra note 125, at 928.
375. Although this amounts to changing the consumer's expectations in the
courtroom, not to do so would be manifestly unfair.
376. Note, supra note 253, at 953.
377. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. See also Henderson, supra
note 261, at 1540.
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motivation may yield relatively small increases in product
safety. In addition, small manufacturers may not have the re-
sources to assign to solving feasibility problems, regardless of
their motivations. Large manufacturers, on the other hand,
may have so many design problems to attend to that an infeasi-
ble design change cannot command a very large proportion of
its resources. Under these conditions, the imposition of abso-
lute liability when alternative designs are infeasible may pro-
duce very attenuated social benefits, despite any motivation
absolute liability may give to defendant manufacturers.
Against these uncertain benefits must be weighed the costs
of absolute liability in this context. One cost is potential injus-
tice. The plaintiff may offer a design more dangerous in some
respects than the one under attack. If the defendant is not al-
lowed to respond to this alternative, the plaintiff may win on a
fundamentally spurious premise. Surely this result cannot
have been intended by the framers of section 402A, or the juris-
dictions that have adopted it. To hold that a defendant may not
attack the feasibility of the plaintiff's design also distorts the
normal structure of trial argumentation. A key element in the
plaintiff's case, the existence of a feasible alternative, is in es-
sence conclusively presumed. Conclusive presumptions of this
kind may be justified in some cases-for example, when proof
is very difficult and the presumption" is historically accurate.
Because the existence of a feasible alternative does not fit this
pattern, however, its existence should not be conclusively pre-
sumed, unless the presumption results in a direct, tangible
benefit. The marginal increases in product safety that may oc-
cur in response to absolute liability in this context do not ap-
pear sufficient to warrant adopting such a presumption.
Overall, the benefits that may result from excluding in-
feasibility evidence appear too speculative and slight to offset
the costs. It would be preferable to admit the evidence on the
issue of defectiveness, specifically, on the existence of a prefer-
able alternative design.
The preceding discussion leaves several questions which
merit response. Consider, for example, why technological im-
possibility should constitute an affirmative defense for products
covered by comment k, while infeasibility does not. The expla-
nation lies in the distinction between the two concepts as
drawn in this Article. Technological impossibility is a concept
that involves a binary analysis. Under the present state of
human knowledge, the defendant could either produce a design
change which would eliminate the risk and maintain a worka-
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ble product, or it could not. If the defendant could not elimi-
nate the risk, the argument is strong for precluding liability
when the product is extremely beneficial. In such cases, the
product design will be conclusively presumed to have been rea-
sonable. Feasibility, in contrast, is a concept that is not dis-
junctive, and involves a multifaceted analysis. As the Texas
Supreme Court stated in Boatland, "feasibility is a relative, not
an absolute, concept; the more scientifically and economically
feasible the alternative was, the more likely that a jury may
find that the product was defectively designed."378 In other
words, the economic costs, additional risks, and decrease in
utility created by the alternative design are factors which de-
termine feasibility. Each varies with the circumstances and
each is variably influenced, depending on the proposed alterna-
tive design. If feasibility necessarily involves reasonableness,
then the jury ought to decide the weight to be given to evidence
of infeasibility when evaluating the reasonableness of an alter-
native design.
Another question concerns who bears the burden of proof
and the burden of producing evidence of feasibility or in-
feasibility. All the cases examined thus far have held that the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove feasibility of the alternative
design. Although none of these cases have advanced any rea-
sons for such an allocation, it presumably derives from the fact
that proving defectiveness is part of the plaintiff's affirmative
case. In the two cases that have explicitly discussed the bur-
den of proof, however, the burden has been placed upon the de-
fendant seller.379 A discussion of the burden of proof is beyond
the scope of this Article, as a showing of defective design in-
volves far more than the feasibility of an alternative design.
The issue of the burden of production, however, is more inti-
mately related to feasibility state of the art and the scope of
this Article. Although none of the cases have explicitly so held,
the inference is that the burden of production is also on the
plaintiff. The only case to grapple with this subject is Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co. v. Beck,380 which articulated the most cogent
reason for placing the burden of production upon the defend-
ant. The court noted that this rule "puts the burden of produc-
ing the relevant complex and technical evidence on the party
378. 609 S.W.2d at 746.
379. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885-86 (Alaska 1979);
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 CaL 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443, 445, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 237 (1978).
380. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979).
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
who has the most access to and is the most familiar with such
evidence."38 ' The manufacturer has the greatest access to this
technical material and also possesses the greatest understand-
ing of- the material. Logically, the party with the greatest ac-
cess to such a complex material ought to bear the burden of
producing it.382
Another issue is the point in time at which feasibility
should be measured. The choice is usually limited to the time
of sale or the time of the accident. This question only arises, of
course, when the alternative design has become more feasible
between the sale and the accident.383 One of the major com-
plaints of manufacturers is that the adequacy of their products
is judged by post hoc standards. These manufacturers com-
plain that safer designs developed after a product has been
marketed are introduced into evidence to determine product
defectiveness, without any showing that the later design was
scientifically or technologically feasible when the product was
made.384 In negligence cases, courts have long held that the de-
fendant's product is judged by the state of the art as it existed
at the time of manufacture or sale.3 85 In strict liability design
defect cases, the courts have been almost unanimous in adopt-
ing the similar rule that the feasibility of an alternative design
must be determined as of the time the product is designed.386
In fact, Dean Keeton has stated that:
It is difficult to find any support for the position that an unavoidably
unsafe characteristic of a product at the time it was manufactured can
nevertheless make a product defective as designed simply because
under the state of the art at the time of trial it could have been
designed more safely.3 8
7
The reason behind this rule is that "foltherwise, a product
could become defective merely through technological advances
that make a safety feature, which was not technologically feasi-
ble when the product was manufactured, feasible at the time
381. Id. at 886.
382. For a criticism of this theory, see Henderson, supra note 47, at 782-97.
383. Professor Phillips has argued that if an alternative design is feasible at
one point in time, it will usually be difficult to conclude that the design was not
feasible at an earlier time. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 115.
384. Id. See generally O'Donnell, supra note 97, at 649; Raleigh, supra note
5.
385. Karazik, supra note 193, at 351; Phillips, supra note 2, at 115.
386. Anderson v. Heron Engineering Co., 40 Colo. App. 191, 193, 575 P.2d 16,
17 (1977), rev'd, 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674 (1979); Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co.,
256 N.W.2d 530, 535 (N.D. 1977); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Baily, 609 S.W.2d
743, 748 (Tex. 1980); Note, supra note 253, at 950. But see Bell Helicopter Co. v.
Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519, 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
387. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. U.J. 1, 13 (1980).
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the injury occurs."388 Thus, if there has been a delay between
design and manufacture, the feasibility of alternative designs
should be judged as of the time of manufacture rather than the
time of design.389
Although the courts unanimously repeat the foregoing rule,
in practice the rule is under heavy attack. Courts increasingly
admit evidence of subsequent design changes, usually, al-
though not necessarily, changes made by the defendant. A
common way in which the courts do this is to import the subse-
quent repair rule from common law negligence cases, and then
to admit the evidence under an exception to the common law
rule. Evidence of subsequent repairs is not normally admissi-
ble on the question of negligence; 390 an exception to the rule,
however, involves the feasibility of precautionary measures. If
the plaintiff alleges that it would have been feasible for the de-
fendant to take precautions to avoid the injury, and the defend-
ant denies it, the plaintiff may introduce evidence that the
defendant subsequently took the precautions to rebut the de-
fendant's assertion of infeasibility.39l A number of courts in
strict liability cases have used this exception to permit a plain-
tiff to proffer evidence of subsequent design changes to rebut
the defendant's evidence of infeasibility.392 Some courts have
even admitted this evidence as relevant to feasibility without
requiring that it controvert an allegation of infeasiblity.393
Clearly, the plaintiff ought to be able to rebut a defendant's in-
feasibility evidence. But this result should not depend on the
applicabilty of the exceptions to the common law rule. It would
be better to determine whether the common law rule applies at
all in a strict liability design case. The policy arguments for
and against excluding subsequent design changes in strict lia-
388. Note, supra note 339, at 168.
389. Id.
390. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 275, at 666 (2nd
ed. 1972).
391. Id. at 667. This rule was codified as FED. R. EvD. 407.
392. Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373, -, 450 N.Y.S.2d 615, 616 (1982).
393. See, e.g., Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 (8th Cir. 1977); Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alaska 1979); Ault v. International
Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 119, 528 P.2d 1148, 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815
(1974); Christophenson v. Hyster Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 791, 802-03, 374 N.E.2d 858,
867-68 (1978); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319, 281
N.E.2d 749, 753 (1972); La Monica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43,
45, 355 N.E.2d 533, 534 (1976); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 100,
258 N.W.2d 680, 683 (1977). See generally Westner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848,
853 (4th Cir. 1980); Hayson v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474, 485, 573
P.2d 785, 791 (1978); L. FRUMER & M. FrEDMAN, supra note 8, at § 16A [4] [j]
(1979).
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bility cases are briefly mentioned in the footnotes. 394 While a
detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle, it appears reasonable that if the plaintiff is saddled with
the burden of proving the feasibility of alternative designs,
then the plaintiff should be permitted to proffer evidence of
subsequent design changes, because.the changes are relevant
to the issue of feasibility. If the design change was feasible a
few years after the sale of a product, then inferentially it was
feasible at the time the product was designed. Of course, the
defendant can rebut this inference with appropriate
evidence.395
The inference that a subsequent remedial change demon-
strates feasibility at the time of design attenuates with the pas-
sage of time.396 If twenty years elapse between sale and
394. The policy argument against the exclusionary rule was enunciated in
the seminal case of Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d
1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974). The court maintained:
It is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will forego
making improvements in its product, and risk enumerable additional
lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect on its public image, simply
because evidence of adoption of such improvement may be admitted in
an action founded on strict liability for recovery on an injury that pre-
ceded the improvement .... It has been pointed out that not only is
the policy of encouraging repairs and improvements of doubtful valid-
ity in an action for strict liability since it is in the economic self-inter-
est of the manufacturer to improve and repair defective products, but
that the application of the rule would be contrary to the public policy
of encouraging the distributor of mass-produced goods to market safer
products.
Id. at 117, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816. See also Davis, Evidence of Post
Accident Failures, Modifications and Design Changes In Products Liability Lit-
igation, 6 ST. MARY's .J. 792, 797-801 (1975); Swartz, The Exclusionary Rule on
Subsequent Repairs-A Rule In Need of Repair, 7 FoRuM 1, 6 (1971); Note, Prod-
ucts Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DuKE L.J. 837, 845-852.
On the other hand, one court has stated:
[The] lack of probative value is the fundamental reason for excluding
such evidence. Although such evidence may be admissible under the
modern, more liberal test of relevance, the attendant danger that a jury
would misconstrue and misapply it to the prejudice of the accused is so
great as to require exclusion .... A danger particularly relevant to
the present case is that a jury, influenced by hindsight evidence, might
apply an artificially high standard in determining the adequacy of
warnings.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 561 (Ind. App. 1979).
However one may evaluate these policy considerations, the evidence of reme-
dial changes will no doubt have a substantial prejudicial effect. The jury is
likely to interpret such evidence as an injurious admission. Phillips, supra
note 2, at 119.
395. A defendant could probably avoid the evidence of subsequent remedial
change by stipulating that the alternative design suggested by the plaintiff was
feasible, if that is th.e case.
396. The court in Ault v. International Harvester Co. stated that the subse-
quent repairs may well illustrate the feasibility of the improvement "if the
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accident, the inference may not be justifiable. 397 The trial judge
should be permitted to allow evidence of subsequent remedial
measures when it appears relevant to feasibility of alternative
design at the time the product was sold. The trial court should
have the discretion to require the plaintiff to proffer other evi-
dence, or to give reasons why the inference of prior feasibility
can be drawn from subsequent remedial measures taken after
a substantial lapse of time.3 98
C. ADEQUACY OF WARNING
Feasibility state of the art may also arise in warning cases.
The problem in these cases involves the cost of warning all
users or consumers, typically when the warning cannot be
placed on the product itself. This situation would include, for
example, package inserts for drugs and certain products that
require accompanying manuals. The seller's argument is that
cost or other difficulties make it infeasible to send the warning
to all potential users or consumers. Therefore, evidence as to
the infeasibility of such warnings ought to be admissible on the
question of whether or not there has been a breach of the duty
to warn.
The seller's argument must be evaluated in light of the cur-
rent state of the law on duty to warn and its breach. Some
courts limit the duty to warn to foreseeable risks,399 while other
courts do not.400 In order for the warning to be adequate,40 ' it
changes occur closely in time." 13 Cal. 3d at 119, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr.
at 815.
397. See McCants v. Salameh, 608 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)
("[T]he mere fact that a manufacturer produced a safer product twenty years
after the production of an allegedly unsafe product would in no way be indica-
tive of the capabilities existing at the time of the manufacture of the earlier
design.").
398. Several state legislative acts follow the general rule. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-686 (2) (Supp. 1980); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-404 (Supp. 1980);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-407 201 (Supp. 1979). The Colorado statute declares that
any scientific advancement or other knowledge in techniques or design theory
is not admissible for any purpose other than to show a duty to warn.
399. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ml. 2d 26,
402 N.E.2d 194 (1978); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541
(Ind. App. 1979); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
400. See, e.g., Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.
1974); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976); Ulrick v. Kasco
Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976); Little v. PPG Industries, 19 Wash.
App. 812, 579 P.2d 940 (1978).
401. A legally adequate warning must meet the following criteria: (1) Its
form must be such that it could reasonably be expected to catch the attention
of the reasonably prudent person in the circumstances of its use [here, mem-
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must be reasonably calculated to reach the ultimate con-
sumer.402 The word "reasonably" in the previous sentence
would indicate that the feasibility of conveying the warning is
important. Indeed, under negligence law, the feasibility of con-
veying a warning has always been a relevant consideration.
For instance, a comment to section 388 of the Restatement 40 3
states that in order "to satisfy the requirements of reasonable
care, the magnitude of the risk involved must be compared
with the burden which would be imposed by requiring [the
warnings]... ,"404 The same comment states that the means
of disclosure should be "practicable and not unduly burden-
some . "..."405
Of course, reasonable care in a negligence case fundamen-
tally implicates a calculus of risk, in which the magnitude and
probability of a risk is balanced against the burden of alleviat-
ing the risk.406 The question is whether the same calculus ap-
plies in a case of strict liability in tort. The preponderance of
authority appears to apply it, when the issue is whether there
has been a breach of the duty to warn. For example, in Smith v.
E. R. Schwibb & Son, Inc., 40 7 the Supreme Court of Michigan
stated:
when the factual issue is not whether the product itself is defective,
but is whether the manufacturer has provided adequate warnings, the
existence of a product defect and a breach of duty is determined by the
same standard-reasonable care under the circumstances .... Deter-
mination of whether a product defect exists because of an inadequate
warning requires the use of an identical standard. Consequently, when
liability turns on the adequacy of a warning, the issue is one of reason-
able care, regardless of whether the theory plead is negligence, implied
bers of the medical profession]; (2) The content of the warning must be of such
a nature as to be comprehensible to the average physician; (3) It must indicate
the nature and extent of the danger to the mind of the reasonably prudent
user; (4) It must warn with the degree of intensity that would cause the reason-
ably prudent user to exercise caution commensurate with the potential danger.
Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 IM. Spp. 3d 540, 562, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1230 (1979).
See also Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 518
S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
402. See Sales & Perdue, supra note 324, at 23. Another authority does not
use the word "reasonably," although it does state every potential user need not
be warned by the supplier himself. See D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 211,
at 191.
403. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 comment n (1965).
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. For cases which consider the burden or feasibility involved in convey-
ing the warning, see Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851 (8th
Cir. 1975); Weekes v. Michigan Chrome & Chemical Co., 352 F.2d 603 (6th Cir.
1965); Seibel v. Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1974).
407. 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d-476 (1979).
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warranty or strict liability in tort.4 o 8
A similar result was reached in Bryant v. Hercules Inc.,409 in
which the plaintiffs were personal representatives of eight em-
ployees who were fatally injured in a coal mine explosion. The
defendant was the manufacturer of explosives that were used
in the mine. The plaintiffs contended that the manufacturers
had a duty to warn the decedent miners of the danger of leav-
ing explosives exposed only forty-five feet from a prepared
blast. The court held that
[i]t would be a fantastic stretch of the law to require the manufacturer
of explosives to go beyond its written warnings and personally warn
every miner not to tolerate the stacking of dynamite near a point of
blast when it is something that supervision is already aware of, some-
thing that is covered by state and federal law and something that fed-
eral inspectors specifically call to the attention of those in direct
supervisory control at the mine.
4 1 0
Apparently, the failure to warn, both in negligence and in
strict liability, involves the matter of reasonableness in deter-
mining the adequacy of the warning.41 ' The plaintiff must
prove that the defendant's method of discharging its duty to
warn was unreasonable under the circumstances. Evidence as
to the feasibility of other means of warning, under the facts of a
specific case, is palpably relevant to the reasonableness of the
warning method chosen by the defendant. If infeasibility evi-
dence is produced, the issue should be whether the seller made
a reasonable attempt to convey the warning, in light of the bur-
den of conveying the warning and the probability and magni-
tude of the harm.412 The seller ought to have the burden of
408. Id. at 83, 273 N.W.2d at 480. The Michigan Supreme Court opinion af-
firmed a decision by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which had stated that "the
type of evidence considered in determining whether the duty [to warn] had
been discharged will include the degree of risk posed by the drug's dangerous
propensities and the difficulties inherent in bringing the warning home to the
medical profession." Smith v. E.R. Schwibb & Sons, Inc., 69 Mich. App. 375, 382,
245 N.W.2d 52, 56 (1976). This position was also upeld in McEwen v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 390, 528 P.2d 522, 530 (1974). See also Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 993 (8th Cir. 1969). The Second Circuit held
in Doss v. Apache Power Co., 430 F.2d 1317, 1321 (5th Cir. 1970) that a warning
does not have to be given to every user. The warnings must be such as to be
reasonably calculated to be read. It is very difficult to tell, however, whether
these statements apply only in a negligence case.
409. 325 F. Supp. 241 (W.D. Ky. 1970).
410. Id. at 246. See also Hercules Powder Co. v. Hicks, 453 S.W.2d 583 (Ky.
1970).
411. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 549 (Ind.
App. 1975); Rainbow v. Albert Ella Building Co., 79 A.D.2d 287, 436 N.Y.S.2d 480,
484 (1981); Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975).
412. There appears to be no reason infeasibility, if proven by the defendant,
should be permitted as a complete defense. If the ultimate issue is reasonable-
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producing evidence of the infeasibility of transmitting the
warning to the plaintiff, because the seller is in a superior posi-
tion to produce that evidence.
Infeasibility evidence arguably signals a return to negli-
gence. The very ideas of reasonableness and calculus of risk
conjure up negligence principles. One may ask whether, if
these factors are to exist in strict liability warning cases, there
is any basis on which to maintain a distinction between negli-
gence and strict liability in these cases. One interesting answer
to this question focuses on the different theoretical bases of
strict liability and liability for failure to warn,4 13 a subject be-
yond the scope of this Article. A more predictable argument is
that, without some element of reasonableness, there would be
absolute liability in cases involving the feasibility of warnings
and, unless absolute liability is the favored policy, some stan-
dard of reasonableness must be used.414 Although this argu-
ment is valid, a middle ground exists between absolute liability
and complete readoption of negligence. For example, the de-
fendant seller might be allowed to escape liability only when it
has reasonably relied on another party, such as a distributor or
an employer purchaser, who had the duty to convey the
message to the ultimate consumer or user.415 Such an ap-
ness, then it should be left to the jury to decide what weight to give evidence of
infeasbility.
413. See L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, § 16A[4] [f] [vii, at 153.
414. See Bruster, Comparative Negligence In Strict Liability Cases, 42 J.
AiR L. & COM. 106, 110 (1976); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory
and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L.
REv. 803, 824 (1976); Note, Elimination of "Unreasonably Dangerous" from
§ 402A-The Price of Consumer Safety, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 25, 33 (1975).
415. Several courts have already held that the duty to warn is discharged by
warning an employer or a distributor. In Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 219 Kan.
627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976), the court held that a manufacturer of LP gas which
sells it to a distributor in bulk fulfills its duty to the ultimate consumer when
the "manufacturer ascertains that a distributor is adequately trained, is famil-
iar with the properties of the gas and safe methods of handling it, and is capa-
ble of passing on this knowledge to its consumers. The manufacturer then
owes no duty to warn the ultimate consumer." Id. at 639, 549 P.2d at 1394. The
court also noted that the manufacturer had no way to know who the ultimate
purchaser might be and had no package on which to endorse a warning. Id.
Similarly, in Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591 P.2d 478 (1979), the
court held that a supplier had fulfilled its duty when it gave an adequate warn-
ing to an intermediate buyer and when the product was not in the original can,
box, or form. The court found the warning adequate when it was reasonable to
expect that the intermediate buyer had a safety program and that it would
communicate necessary information to the ultimate users. Id. at 724, 591 P.2d
at 481-82. See also Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218, 223 (Del. 1977)
(holding that the manufacturers and distributors of cleaning solvent used in a
dry cleaning establishment had only a duty to warn an injured employee's
employer).
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proach represents the best solution currently available to the
competing considerations in a case in which the feasibility of a
more adequate warning is at issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
The term "state of the art" encompasses a variety of differ-
ent claims made by products liability defendants. This Article
has considered and distinguished four major classes of such
claims: industry customs, governmental standards and regula-
tions, developmental limitations and feasibility. Each usage of
the state of the art was considered in the context of the three
major types of product liability actions: manufacturing defect,
design defect, and inadequate warning. The Article evaluated
arguments for and against admitting the defendant's evidence,
as well as arguments for and against allowing that evidence to
form the basis of an affirmative defense. A summary of the rec-
ommendations follows.
Evidence of customary industry practices should be admis-
sible in all kinds of products liability cases. In manufacturing
and design defect cases, this evidence is relevant to show that
the product is not defective. In manufacturing defect cases, ev-
idence that the product was manufactured in a standard way
tends to show that it is a standard, nondefective product. Cus-
tom evidence in design defect cases tends to show that the de-
sign was not defective under either of the two major tests of
design defect. Under the "ordinary consumer expectations"
test, this evidence establishes the range of similar products
with which consumers could be acquainted, and hence what
their expectations might be. Under the Wade-Keeton test of
defectiveness, custom evidence is relevant to establish indus-
trywide judgments of a reasonable balance of utility and risk.-
In neither case, however, should custom evidence be conclusive
against the plaintiff. In warning cases, admissibility of custom
evidence depends on whether the jurisdiction has adopted fore-
seeability as a limitation on the duty to warn. If foreseeability
is an element, evidence of industry standards is plainly rele-
vant, and should be admitted, on the issue of foreseeability. In
jurisdictions in which foreseeability is not a limitation on duty
to warn, custom evidence may be introduced to rebut certain
claims that a warning was inadequate. Again, however, there is
no basis to permit evidence of prevailing industry practices to
rise to the level of an affirmative defense.
Governmental standards and regulations generally are not
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relevant in manufacturing defect cases. In design defect cases,
the current rule, that noncompliance with such regulations is
defectiveness per se, while evidence of compliance does not re-
lieve the manufacturer of liability, appears to be sound. Evi-
dence of compliance, however, should be admissible on the
issue of product defectiveness. The general rule appears to be
similar in the few inadequate warning cases involving govern-
mental standards. Governmental standards set minimum re-
quirements, but the defendant may have to provide a better
warning. In some jurisdictions, however, compliance with gov-
ernmental warning standards is very nearly conclusive, and in
some it creates a rebuttable presumption that the warning was
adequate. These jurisdictions implicitly assume that the politi-
cally sensitive processes by which governmental standards are
developed provide adequate consumer protection. To the ex-
tent that these jurisdictions rely on this assumption, it is proba-
bly unwarranted. The general rule appears to be the preferable
approach.
Developmental limitations in a manufacturing defect case
usually amount to a claim that the risk was undiscoverable, so
that it is known that some product samples are defective, but it
is impossible to determine which ones. This claim, and the
other claims of developmental limitations, do not make concep-
tual sense as "mere evidence." If the evidence is admitted at
all, it should support an affirmative defense. At least some ex-
amples of products involving an undiscoverable risk are specifi-
cally mentioned in comment k to section 402A of the
Restatement, and for these products the comment supports an
afflrmative defense. Various policy considerations argue for
limiting the availability of this defense to those types of prod-
ucts explicitly mentioned in comment k. By implication, there-
fore, evidence of the undiscoverability of the risk should be
excluded in cases involving other products.
In an inadequate warning case, the developmental limita-
tion amounts to a claim that the risk was unknowable in ad-
vance, and consequently, that the defendant could not warn
against it. When there is no duty to warn of unforeseeable
risks, the defendant's evidence obviously establishes an affirm-
ative defense. When foreseeability is not a limitation on duty
to warn, however, most of the policy rationales support imposi-
tion of liability even in cases of unknowable risks.
Developmental limitations in a defective design case usu-
ally involve the defendant's assertion that it was impossible to
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implement a design change because the relevant scientific or
technological expertise simply did not exist. While some courts
have applied comment k in this setting, and others have per-
mitted an affirmative defense on other theories, it appears that
the best approach is to permit an affirmative defense for prod-
ucts within the scope of comment k.
Finally, the state of the art has encompassed the concept of
feasibility. Although the product could have been made safer,
the manufacturer argues that it was not economical or practical
to do so. In a manufacturing defect case, the argument invaria-
bly involves the economic feasibility of reducing the incidence
of defective products. The situation is plainly prototypical of
those envisioned by the drafters of section 402A, and conse-
quently one in which strict liability ought to be strict. In this
setting, the court should exclude evidence that improving man-
ufacturing technology was not feasible. The situation is differ-
ent in a design defect case. The plaintiff's affirmative case for
defectiveness involves an alternative design which the defend-
ant argues is, or was, not feasible. Under these circumstances,
the defendant should be permitted to rebut this element of the
plaintiff's case. Arguments can be made for this use of evi-
dence of infeasibility whether the jurisdiction uses the "ordi-
nary consumer expectations" test of defective design or the
Wade-Keeton test balancing utility and risk. The burden of
producing evidence of infeasibilty should fall on the defendant,
who has greater access to it, and infeasibility should not consti-
tute an affirmative defense. Feasibility is also relevant in an in-
adequate warning case, in which it is apparently impossible to
exclude at least some considerations of reasonableness without
creating absolute liability. Various formulas are available for
courts to use in fashioning a middle ground between absolute
liability and a return to negligence.
It should be evident from the multiplicity of concepts de-
rived from the term "state of the art" that the expression
should be abandoned. Depending on which of its various us-
ages is involved, the defense merits very different judicial treat-
ment. Use of the expression "state of the art" in statutes and
court opinions will engender needless confusion. It would be
preferable to adopt more specific terms, such as those sug-
gested in this Article, to articulate the very different concepts
encompassed under the state of the art rubric.
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